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Abstract 
This thesis assesses the outcomes of the 1957 and 1963 Conservative Party 
Leadership Selections of Harold Macmillan and Sir Alec Douglas-Home. It analyses 
the two selections using an original analytical framework, that demonstrates the 
importance of both individual and situational criteria in determining the outcomes of 
leadership selections. The individual criteria are the party status of the candidates, and 
their actions and conduct during the selections. The situational criteria are the situation 
and circumstances surrounding the selections, the formal and informal aspects of the 
selection procedure used, and the candidates fulfilment of acceptability, electability, 
and governability. Acceptability, (the need to retain or maintain party unity), 
electability, (the need to be electable), and governability, (the ability to govern), are the 
three core situational criteria on which the candidates are judged. This framework was 
developed to offer a full and inclusive explanation of the outcomes of the two 
leadership selections, because the existing analyses of leadership selections has a 
restrictive approach, and does not offer a conclusive and systematic analysis. 
The thesis demonstrates that the outcomes of the 1957 and 1963 leadership 
selections have clear parallels and distinctions in their outcomes. Both selections 
produced a stop-gap leader in a time of crisis for the Conservative Party. However, the 
situations were clearly distinct, and this was influential in the outcome. The 1957 
selection occurred following a crisis over foreign policy, while the 1963 selection 
occurred during a deep-seated period of domestic crisis and upheaval. In January 
1957, the Conservatives had three years before a general election had to be held, while 
in October 1963, a general election was imminent within twelve months. The selection 
procedure was influential in both selections. The informal aspects of the procedure 
were more influential in 1957, while the procedure had become more formalised in 
1963, and this prepared the way for the establishment of formal leadership elections in 
the Conservative Party in 1965. The choice of Macmillan and Home was made because 
of the circumstances in which the selections occurred, and because they fulfilled the 
three core criteria more conclusively than the other candidates. In both outcomes, 
acceptability was clearly the most important core criteria because the selections 
occurred at a time of severe disunity in the party, and this deemed party unity as the 
crucial task of the new leader. In 1957, Macmillan was selected as he fulfilled the 
requirements of the situation better than R. A. Butler, the other candidate. In 1963, 
Home became leader because of the weaknesses apparent in the other candidates, and 
was the compromise candidate to retain party unity. 
This thesis concludes that the wider individual and situational criteria set the 
terms of reference on which the core situational criteria of acceptability, electability, 
and governability are judged. The most important wider criteria were the candidates' 
actions during the selection, the selection procedure, and the situation that the 
selection occurred in. This demonstrates the utility of the analytical framework 
developed in the study. 
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Introduction 
The Area For Investigation 
This thesis analyses the outcomes of two Conservative Party leadership 
selections. These are the selections of Harold Macmillan to replace Sir Anthony Eden 
in January 1957, and of Sir Alec Douglas-Home to replace Macmillan in October 
1963. These selections are two of the most controversial in the history of leadership 
selection in Britain, because of the manner in which Macmillan and Home were 
selected, and the outcomes they produced. Both selections were made using the 'magic 
circle' system of selection. This was the method by which the Monarchy and the party 
hierarchy conducted informal consultations to determine the best candidate, rather than 
using a formal election procedure. Both selections occurred at a time when there was a 
call for greater accountability and openness in political parties, and the selection of 
Home in October 1963 led to the downfall of the 'magic circle' procedure. In 1965, 
the Conservative Party introduced formal leadership elections, using a secret ballot of 
the party's MPs. The selection of Macmillan also contributed to that process, but the 
selection of Home was the catalyst for the change. 
Leadership selection is an understudied and misunderstood area of political 
science, and the two selections chosen for analysis are typical of the misinterpretation 
and weaknesses in existing work on leadership selection in Britain. Many of the 
publications on the two selections are restrictive in their analysis, and do not fully 
explain the outcomes. This is because of the dominant emphasis on the issue of party 
unity, at the exclusion of any investigation of the other determining factors that 
influenced the outcomes. This has led to the need for the development of a coherent 
analytical methodology by which to analyse leadership contests, because of the lack of 
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a viable approach in existing analyses. The analytical framework developed and applied 
in this study offers a new, inclusive, and systematic approach to the analysis of the 
outcomes of leadership selections, by assessing the importance of all individual and 
situational criteria that may influence the outcome of a selection. The individual criteria 
are the party status of the candidates, and the impact of their actions and conduct 
during the selection process. The situational criteria are the situation and circumstances 
surrounding the selection, the selection procedure used, and the candidates' fulfilment 
of the three core criteria on which they are judged. These are acceptability (the need Z:, 
for party unity), electability (the need to win elections), and governability (the ability to 
govern). This method of analysis will, therefore, offer a full explanation of the 
outcomes of the two selections. 
The Research for the Study 
The research for the study had three main components, each with a distinctive 
objective. The first consisted of an in-depth analysis of the secondary source material 
on the history of the Conservative Party's methods of leadership selection, the two 
selections of January 1957 and October 1963, and works on the careers and lives of 
the candidates in the selections. These were R. A. Butler, Harold Macmillan, Lord 
Home, Lord Hailsham, and Reginald Maudling. This provided the background 
information for the investigation. The second was a study of the existing literature on 
political leadership, leadership politics and leadership selection. This was utilised in the 
development of the analytical framework applied in the investigation. The final area of 
research consisted of archival material to gain primary evidence to develop the study. 
The following collections of archival material were consulted: The Conservative Party 
3 
Archive, the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; The Diaries of Harold Macmillan, 
the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; The Papers of R. A. Butler, Trinity 
College, University of Cambridge; The Public Record Office, Kew; and The Papers of 
the First Earl of Halifax, the Borthwick Institute of I-Estorical Research, University of 
York. This level of research has developed the study into one that encompasses 
research and ideas in British party politics, political science, political psychology, and 
contemporary history. 
The Method of Analysis 
The method of analysis of the outcomes of the two selections has three stages. 
The first is the presentation of the analytical framework to be used to analyse the 
selections. This is assessed in chapter one, and outlines the individual and situational 
criteria that will be analysed, to assess their influence on the outcome of the selections. 
All of the component factors of each criteria are demonstrated here. The second stage 
is the application of the analytical framework to the two selections. This is assessed in 
chapters two to seven. Chapter two analyses the Conservative Party's history of 
leadership selection from 1902, to the selection of Home in October 1963, This sets 
I 
the context for the study, and demonstrates the different situational parallels and 
distinctions between the selections over the period. This, therefore, acts as a contextual 
introduction to the analysis of the two selections. The third chapter assesses the 
careers, party status and personalities of the candidates, and therefore, analyses the 
first individual criteria. 
Chapters four and five apply the analytical framework to the selection of 
Macmillan. Chapter four analyses the candidates' actions during the Suez Crisis, which 
4 
formed the selection process, because the den-ýise of Eden was widely expected. 
Chapter five applies the Situational Interpretation to the selection. This chapter 
analyses the influence of the situational criteria of the situation, the selection 
procedure, and the candidates' fulfilment of acceptability, electability, and 
governability. Chapters six and seven apply the analytical framework to the selection of 
Home. Chapter six assesses the importance of the candidates' actions during the 
selection procedure, and chapter seven applies the Situational Interpretation to the 
selection. 
The final stage is the assessment of the outcomes. This forms the conclusion to 
the study, and brings together the results of the investigation into the two selections. ZP C, Cý 
The conclusion will demonstrate a full explanation of the outcomes of both selections, 
and assess the different influence of the individual and situational criteria in 
determining the outcomes. The study will finish with a discussion of the parallels and C, 
distinctions between the two outcomes, and will assess what they demonstrate about 
how the Conservative Party selects it's leaders in different situations and 
circumstances. 
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Chapter One 
The Analvtical Framework 
This chapter has two sections. The first assesses the Interactionist 
Interpretation of political leadership and leadership selection, and the influence this has 
had on the development of the analytical framework. The second section discusses the 
analytical framework. This is outlined in abstract form, and is then applied to party 
leadership selections in the British Conservative and Labour parties between 1957 and 
1997. The two main components of the analytical framework will be discussed. These 
are the Individual Interpretation, which assesses the importance of the candidates' 
party status and their actions, and the Situational Interpretation, which assesses the 
influences on the selection. The situational factors are the circumstances that the 
selection occurred in, the selection procedure used, and the importance of each of the 
three core criteria that must be met in leadership selections: Acceptability, Electability, 
and Governability. The section will finish with an analysis of party leadership selection 
in the British Conservative and Labour Parties between 1957 and 1997. Five specific 
selections from that period are analysed using the framework to demonstrate its 
application. 
The Interactionist Interpretation of Political Leadership 
The Development of the Interactionist Inteii2retation 
The Interactionist Interpretation of political leadership has resulted from the 
synthesis of the 'Great Man' and the Determinist/Situational schools of political 
leadership. ' Recent analysis has stressed the importance of personality's interaction 
1 The term 'Interactionist Interpretation' is derived from Elgie's use of the 'interactionist approach' in 
R. Elgie, Pofitical Leadership In Liberal Democracies, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995). The term I 
6 
with the enviromnent in understanding political action and behaviour. 
2 The 
t) 
Interactionist Interpretation developed from the realisation that 'Great Man' theories, 
and Situational Interpretations were insufficient to account for political leadership and 
the emergence of political leaders. It developed from the assumption that political 
leaders do matter, and that individuals do make a difference within the political 
environment. However, the Interactionist Interpretation does not assume that 
individuals play the dominant role in the leadership environment, but takes as its 
central assumption that 'all leaders are constrained in the extent to which they are able 
to act freely'. 
The 'Great Man' School of Political LeaderLhiR 
The 'Great Man' school of political leadership has a long tradition, dating back 
to the nineteenth century, and stresses the importance of great figures who emerged at 
certain times to have a major impact on the course of history. Thomas Carlyle was a 
theorist of the 'Great Man' school, and he stressed the importance of these men. He 
made four assertions. The first was that some people were born great, and greatness 
was an innate God-given quality. The second, was that such people were objectively 
great, and it was not just that everyone thought they were great. The third, was that 
their greatness enabled them to change the course of history. The final assertion, was 
that they changed the course of history for the good, and were moral people. 4 Carlyle 0 
wrote in 1840 
have used is phrased as the 'Interactionist Interpretation' as it fits more clearly my framework of 
analysis. 
2 A. C. Elms, Personality in Politics, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. iv; and F. I. 
Greenstein, Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence. Inference, and Conceptu-alization 
(Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1969), pp. 28-29 
3 Elgie, Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies, p. 5 
4 Elgie, Political Leadership in Liberal p. 6 
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Universal history, the history of what man has accomplished in 
this world, is at the bottom the history of the Great Men who 
have worked here. They were the leaders of men, these great 
ones ... all things that we see standing accomplished 
in the world 
are properly the outer material result, the practical realisation and 
embodiment, of thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into 
the world: the soul of the whole world's history, it may be justly 
considered, were the history of these' 
The 'Great Man' school emphasised the impact of outstanding individual I 
figures on the course of history, and believed that these figures were more important 
than the environment in which they operated. Romantic philosophers like Frederich 
Nietzsche agreed with Carlyle's ideas, as they believed that a sudden decision by a 
6 
great man could alter the course of history. William James stated that developments 
in society were due to great men who initiated movement, and prevented others 
moving society in another direction. 7 This school believes eras of history are directly 
associated with 'Great Men'. For example, the Reformation is associated with Luther 
and Calvin, the Russian Revolution with Lenin and Stalin, and fascism with 11itler and 
Mussolini. Eighteenth-century rationalists believed that luck must be added to the 
personal qualities of great men if they were to determine the course of history. 
s T. Carlyle, Heroes and Hero Worship, (Boston: Adams, 184 1) in Elgie, Political Leadership in 
Liberal Democracies p. 6 
6 B. M. Bass, Bass and Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theorv. Research and Managerial 
Applications (London: Collier Macmillan, 1990), p. 37 
7 W. James, 'Great Men, Great Thoughts and their Environment', Atlantic Monthly, 46,1880, 
pp. 441-459 in Bass, Handbook of Leadershi , p. 37 
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There are obvious problems with the theories expounded by the 'Great Man' 
school. Firstly, it excluded the impact of 'great women', and it also did not specify 
what was a 'morally good' action. Most importantly in the context of the Interactionist 
Interpretation, it 'exaggerated the influence that individuals exerted on the course of 
events and is irrelevant in the context of modem political leadership, because it takes 
no account of the many factors, institutional, social and historical, that act as 
constraints on political leaders'. 8 
The Determinist/Situational School of Political Leadership 
The Determinist or Situational school of analysis stresses the absolute 
importance of the situation or environment on determining political leadership, thus 
directly opposing the 'Great Man' school. The Determinist school argued that 'the C7 
course of history was determined by the impersonal interplay of social and cultural 
forces over which individuals had little control'. 9 The Determinist school states that 
leaders have power because they are in the right position, or they have the abilities 
required by the situation at that moment. " It disparages the 'Great Man' school as it 
believes it neglects the great impersonal forces of history, and saw the school as a 
misplaced personality cult. This school has argued that leadership does not really 
count, and is merely an epiphenomenon. " The school of cultural determinism 
developed to oppose the ideas of men like Carlyle. Herbert Spencer, a cultural 
determinist, wrote in 1873 
I 
8 Elgie, Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies, p. 5 
9 Elgie, Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies, p. 6 
10 D. G. Winter, The Power Motive ' (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. II 11 J. Blondel, Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis, (London: Sage, 1987), p. 18 
9 
If it be a fact that the great man may modify his nation in its z;, 
structure and actions, it is also a fact that there must have been 
these antecedent modifications constituting national progress 
before he could be evolved. Before he can re-make his society, 
his society must make him ... If there is to be anything like a real 
explanation of these changes, it must be sought in the aggregate 
of conditions out of which both he and they have arisen 12 
Elgie has argued that the school of Social Determinism implies that individuals 
are powerless, and that all individuals would act the same way in the same situation, 
which is a contention he disagrees with. He claims that this school of analysis is 
reductionist in its approach to political leadership, and therefore does not explain the 
leadership process fully. Elgie's contention is difficult to dispute. Political leadership is 
much more complex than either the 'Great Man' or Determinist schools suggest. These 
levels of analysis give no recognition to the importance of a power motive, or any 
personality variable, that would influence the course of events. Blondel has asserted 
that the enviroment introduces constraints and provides opportunities, and is thus of 
overriding importance. It is the 'raw material, substance and framework'. " 4: 1 
The Utility of the Interactionist Inteipretation 
The Interactionist Interpretation that results from the synthesis of these two 
levels of analysis is the dominant paradigm for the study of political leadership today, 
12 B. Kellerman, Political Leadership: A Source Book, pp. 13-14 in Elgie, Political Leadership In 
Liberal Democracies, p. 7 
13 Blondel, Political Leadership, p. 30 
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and it explains a considerable amount about the emergence of political leaders. The 
Interactionist approach developed, because both the 'Great Man' and Determinist 
schools were reductionist, in emphasising only one aspect that influences political CI 
leadership. For Elgie, the essence of the Interactionist Interpretation is that it 
emphasises 'the extent to which political leaders are able to influence the decision- 
making process [and] is considered to be contingent upon the interaction between the 
leader and the leadership environment in which the leader operates. ' 14 The 
Interactionist Interpretation combines the personal and systemic demands of the 
leadership process. 
Three elements comprise the interaction process of political leadership. The 
first are the ambitions and styles of political leaders, the second are the institutional 
structures of the societies they lead, and the third are the needs of the society. The 
Interactionist Interpretation believes that the environment in which leaders operate will 
both structure their behaviour, and limit their freedom of action. 15 Elgie has 
demonstrated this in Political Leadership In Liberal Democracies. He has analysed the 
roles of Presidents and Prime Ministers in six countries, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, 
Germany and the United States. 
Elgie's prime aim was to assess the extent to which the leaders in these 
countries can shape the decision-making process, or whether it was shaped for them. 
I-fis main conclusion was that, in all six countries, the leadership process was 
influenced most significantly by institutional structures. However, this does not mean 
that leadership is determined in advance, and 'institutionalism'is neither deterministic 
14 Elgic, Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies p. 7 
15 Elgie, Political Leadershiv in Liberal Democracies, p. 8, and p. 191 
I/ I 
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nor reductionistic'. 16 By pinpointing the three central elements of the Interactionist C. 
approach to political leadership, Elgie has illustrated the necessity of an inclusive 
approach to the study of political leadership, as many factors are involved in exercising 
it. The institutional approach to politics is an important aspect of the Interactionist 
Interpretation. The approach shows how 'institutions help to determine the nature of 
the leadership process', and how the institutional structure of a society is primarily 
responsible for structuring the interaction between the leaders and their environment. 17 
The Influence of the Interactionist Inte[pretation on the AnalZical Framework 
The Interactionist Interpretation's emphasis on the importance of political 
actors within the environment' in which they work, has had a major influence on the 
development of the analytical framework used in this study. The three core 
components of the Interaction process of political leadership: the ambitions and styles 
of political leaders, the institutional structures of the societies they lead, and the needs 
of the society, are embodied in the two interpretations that are central to the analytical 
framework. The ambitions and styles of the candidates are embodied in the Individual 
Interpretation, which analyses the candidates' party status, and their actions and 
conduct. The institutional structures of the society, and the needs of the society are at 
the core of the Situational Interpretation. This analyses the selection procedures used 
(the institutional structures) and the circumstances surrounding the selection, and the 
need for acceptability, electability and govemability (the needs of the society). Society 
is taken here to mean both society in a general sense, and the Conservative Party in a 
specific sense, as the forum in which the selections were made. 
16 Elgic, Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies, p. 19 1, and 206 
17 Elgie, Political Leadership in Liberal p. 203 
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The Interactionist Interpretation, by its inclusive and non-reductionist 
approach, also advocates a full assessment of both individual and situational factors, 
and this has led to the inclusive approach used in the analytical framework. This means 
that a full assessment of all the influencina factors on the leadership selections of 1957 0 
and 1963 is evident in tfiýs study. 
The Analytical Framework 
This section outlines the two Interpretations that are used to analyse the two 
leadership selections. These are the Individual Interpretation and the Situational 
Interpretation. The analysis is not meant merely to demonstrate whether one 
interpretation was more valid than the other, but to use them to show whether any of 
the different components within the two interpretations were more important than the 
others. For instance, is party unity always the principal dominant objective, or does the 
imminence of an election, and the obvious need to win that election, or a need to 
rescue a party's reputation for governmental competence, override the importance of 
this objective? These graduations of the importance of the component factors of each 
interpretation, are a significant part of the analysis of the two leadership selections, and 
the section will finish with an account of how the two leadership selections will be 
assessed using the analytical framework. 
The analytical framework was developed from the use of a number of sources 
consulted during the literature review of material on leadership selection, leadership 
selection in British political parties, and party leaders in Britain. Use was also made of 
archival material which highlighted significant aspects of importance in leadership 
selections, especially in the Conservative Party. The following diaggram sets out the 0 
13 
analytical framework used in the study. The aim of the analysis is to illustrate if any of 
the components of the Individual and Situational Interpretations had a determinant role 
in the selections of 1957 and 1963. This is why the framework is set out with the core 
situational criteria at the foundation of the framework, and the wider individual and 
situational criteria connecting to it. 
14 
Diagram One- The Selection of Party Leadersý Anal3jical Criteria " 
Party status 
Their actions 
towards the 
leadership selection 
-Effect of campaign 
for the leadership 
FC, Fmal aspects of 
Procedure 
Informal networks 
of communication 
- Broad 
internal/external 
requirements 
- Often determinants 
on other criteria 
e. g. imminent election 
goal = good leader 
lo govern - to implemcm pdicic. s andprogrammes 
To win electloný atidjorin a government 
To relain mamialti imitv as a cohesiveparty 
" The development of this table was influenced bý Stark's analvsis of the 'Hierarchý of Strategic 
Part) Goals'. which stressed the importance of unity, victorý and policy. This is in L. P. Stark, 
Choosing A Leader. Party Leadership Contests in Britain from Macmillan to Blair. (London: 
Macmillan, 1995). p. 125) 
15 
The Individual Inteipretation 
777e Party Status of the Candidates 
This section considers the importance of the candidates' position in their party, 
and more specifically in the Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet. A significant aspect is 0 
whether any of the candidates occupied the three 'great offices of state', the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Foreign Secretary, or Home Secretary, or their shadows 
in opposition. This needs consideration to illustrate if occupation of these positions 
gave the candidates an advantage over opponents who did not occupy these offices. 
The seniority and status these positions give to politicians appears to give them an 
advanta, (. ),, e in leadership selections. Of the 53 candidates to stand in leadership 
selections in British political parties from 1963 to 1994,26 had served in the 'Great 
offices of state', and only 9 of the 53 lacked Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet experience. '9 
This illustrates two matters of significance. First, that Cabinet or shadow Cabinet 
experience is essential for leadership candidates, and second, that experience in one of 
the 'great offices of state', is often an essential requirement. 
The level of progression or decline in a candidate's career at the time of a 
selection must be addressed. If a candidate's career was progressing towards an 
achievement, or an occupation of the great offices of state, this appears to give them 
an advantage over candidates who may have previously occupied one of the most 
senior positions, but whose career paths had moved into less senior positions at the 
time of a selection. The Parliamentary position of candidates in terms of whether they 
were members of the House of Commons, the traditional career path to the 
Premiership, or whether they were members of the House of Lords, may have an 
19 Stark, Choosing A Leader, p. 85 
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influence on the outcome. These issues raise aspects of great significance. First, that if 
a candidate has experience of office as Chancellor, Foreign Secretary, or Home 
Secretary, but no longer occupies one of those offices, then their chances of attaining 
the leadership will be reduced. The level of this reduction of their chances will depend 
on how far they have fallen away from the summit of political office. The clearest 
example of this is the candidacy of R. A. Butler in the Conservative Party selections of 
1957 and 1963. Butler was Chancellor from 1951 to 1955, but was Leader of the 
Commons and Lord Privy Seal at the time of the selection of Harold Macmillan in 
1957, who had replaced Butler at the Treasury in December 1955. In 1963, Butler was 
First Secretary of State, and de facto Deputy Prime Minister, having previously been 
Home Secretary from 1957 to 1962. Butler's career at the time of both selections can, 
therefore, be perceived to have been in decline away from the principal offices of 
goverment. The failure of Dennis Healey's candidacy in the 1980 Labour Party 
selection is another example. Healey had been Chancellor in the 1976-79 Labour 
government, and the May 1979 election defeat may have led him to be perceived as 
having experienced a step away from the principal offices of state, and reduced his 
status. On similar lines, the failure of Kenneth Clark in the 1997 Conservative Party 
selection of William Hague can be explained in this way. Clark had been Chancellor in 
the 1992-97 Conservative administration, and the massive election defeat of May 1997 
may have reduced his status. 
The level of 'insider' status of a candidate is of great importance in an analysis 
of leadership selections, and therefore requires definition. The move from 'outsider' 
status to 'insider' status in a political party seems to develop over a number of stages. 
A politician is an 'outsider' at the start of their careers as a junior back-bencher. If they 
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do not progress beyond back-bench status, thev remain political 'outsiders' in the 
partv. The first stage of 'Insider' status is an attainment of a junior government 
position, as a Parliamentary Private Secretary, or an Under- Secretary. The second 
stacre is promotion to ministerial or Cabinet rank. The attainment of one of the 'great 
offices of state' marks the final stage, and a full achievement of 'insider' status. This t) I 
marks the ultimate step in 'insider' status in a political party. This level of progression 
is displayed in the following diagram. Ic 
Dia! ýram Two: Levels of Progression from 'Outsider' to 'Insider' Status in a Political 
Party 
'outsider .............. 'insider': first ta e ------- * 'Insider- second stag 
junior back-bench MP Junior government position Ministerial and Cabinet 
position 
, great offices of state' 
This section analyses the different status of the candidates in both selections by 
analysing the above criteria, and assesses the importance of their party status in their 
selection. This part of the Individual Interpretation is analysed in chapter three. 
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7he Candidates and their Actions 
This section analyses the importance of the candidates' actions and conduct 
during the selections. The issues for consideration here are first, the reaction of the 
candidates to the possibility of their candidature, and how this affected their conduct in 
the rest of the selection process. Stark has correctly identified three aspects that need 
consideration in analysing candidates' decisions to stand. The first aspect is whether 
the candidates' participation in the selection was expected. The 1963 selection was 
unique in this respect, as the situation was complicated by the passage of the Peerage 
Act in July 1963. This Act allowed peers to renounce their peerages, and stand for 
election to the Commons. This meant that both Lords Home and Hailsham became 
candidates in the 1963 selection, when they were not previously expected to stand. 
This was especially the case with Home, who did not enter the contest until late in the 
controversy. In many selections, candidacies can be foreseen and predicted, but the 
eventual victor can often be perceived as a shock. Examples of this include Thatcher's 
victory in 1975, and Major's in 1990. Another significant point here is that selections 
occurring when a party is in goverment can attract more candidates than those in 
parties in opposition, as the new leader is certain to become Prime Nfinister. However, 
as Stark has pointed out, this is unconfirmed by the data of selections in Britain from 
1963 to 1994. He notes that selections in governing and opposition parties have 
averaged similar numbers of candidates. These are 4.0 in governing parties, and 3.5 in 
opposition partieS. 20 
The second aspect is the apparent (or declared) motivation behind the 
candidacy. There appear to be three broad motivations for standing in a leadership 
20 Stark, Choosing A Leader, p. 95 
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selection. First, the candidates believe they can win. This is the dominant motivation, 
and Stark's analysis has shown that 36 of the 53 candidates in British contests from 
1963 to 1994 stood to win. However, in only 6 of the 16 contests over that period, did 
all the candidates stand to win. These were the 1963 Conservative contest, the 1967 
Liberal contest, the 1976 Liberal contest, the 1982 SDP contest, the 1988 Liberal 
Democrat contest, and the 1990 Conservative contest. 21 It is a matter of great 
significance to note here, that the Conservative Party's informal method of selection C. 
before 1965, was designed to find candidates who could win, and were thus not 
determined by any other motive. The formal election procedure by a secret ballot of 
NTs opened the procedure to candidates of all three motivations. This was certainly 
the case with John Redwood's candidacy in the 1995 Conservative Party contest, as he 
stood primarily to enhance his reputation as a possible 'leader-in-waiting'. This was 
illustrated by his candidacy in the 1997 election, following Major's resignation. 
The second motive is that candidates want to enhance their reputations and be 
seen as a 'leader-in-waiting', as preparation for a future contest. This appears to be the 
second most dominant motive, and examples of this include James Callaghan's 
candidacy in the 1963 Labour Party contest, Geoffrey Howe's and James Prior's in the 
1975 Conservative contest, and as already noted, John Redwood's candidacy in 1995. 
The third, is they wish to attract attention to themselves, to enhance their reputation as 
politicians rather than as 'leaders-in-waiting', and also to attract attention to a 
particular issue that they are committed to. This is the least common motive, and the 
following examples have been cited: Enoch Powell in the 1963 Conservative contest, 
Bryan Gould in the 1992 Labour contest, and Anthony Meyer in the 1989 
21 Stark, Choosing A Leader, p. 100 
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22 Conservative contest. Another motive that appears to be less common is the wish to 
remove an incumbent ftom office. This motive could be applied to Anthony Meyer in 
1989, and Nlichael Heseltine in 1990. However, this motive is often in alignment with 
other motives, particularly the belief in victory, and this was the case with Heseltine's 
candidacy in 1990. The third aspect concerns whether the leadership selection rules 
were a factor in the candidate's decision to stand. This is particularly the case with the 
Conservative Party's selections before 1965, where only the motivation of winning was 
of prime significance, as the party's senior figures would not consider candidates with 
other motives as viable leadership candidates. 2' 
Another significant area for consideration are the 'campaigns' of the 
candidates. As the Conservative Party selections of 1957 and 1963 were 'magic circle' 
selections, campaigns were not as important as in formal elections. The actions of the 
candidates during the selection process is of obvious significance to their candidature 
as perceptions of them could change dramatically during the selection process. 
Teadership selections resolved by the magic circle typically did not involve anything 
which could easily be recognised as a 'campaign'. This was one of the informal C, 
selection systems supposed virtues: candidates were not seen to be competing against 
one another. 24 This, however, changed with the 1963 Conservative Party selection, as 
the announcement of Macmillan's intention to resign during the Party Conference at 
Blackpool created a situation where the candidates could 'campaign' for the 
leadership, and turned the Conference into a US-style leadership convention. This 
development played a major part in the downfall of the informal system, and its 
22 Stark, Choosing A Leader p. 99 
23 Stark, Choosing A Leader, p. 85 
24 Stark, Choosing A Leader, p. 106 
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replacement by a formal election procedure of the party's NTs in 1965. The motives 
and impact behind these actions will also be assessed. 
Leadership campaigns are of great importance in leadership elections, as it 
gives the opportunity for the candidates to compete for the support of the selectorate. 
Stark has asserted that leadership campaigns only matter if the outcome of the contest 
would have been different if the ballot for the election had taken place before, rather 
than after, the campaigning. 25 However, this analysis is restrictive, and ignores the 
importance of campaigning 
.,. 
Stark is correct in asserting that campaigning is only 4D 
important if it affected the result of the selection, and the 1963 Conservative Party 
selection illustrates the effect that campaigning can have on the result of a selection. ZD 
This was because Hailsham, Butler and Maudling's chances of success were adversely 
affected by their 'campaigning' at the Party Conference. Home's conduct at the Party 
Conference left him in a stronger position, as he did not appear as a candidate and did 0 
not overtly campaign, but he nevertheless performed well at the Conference. What 
Stark's assertion does ignore is that all campaigns can be said to have some effect, as 
they all either improve or weaken candidates' chances, and it is only the level of that 
effect that differs in impact. This is especially the case in Conservative Party selections 
since 1965, as the campaigns of Margaret Thatcher in 1975, John Major in 1990 and 
1995, and William Hague in 1997, all contributed significantly to their victories. The 
1975,1990 and 1997 selections show this as the outcomes were not predicted before 
campaigning began, and in 1995, Major's campaign appears to have consolidated his 
support in the party. The candidates' actions and conduct in the two selections are 
analysed in chapters four and six. 
'5 Stark, Choosing A Leader, p. 117 
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The Situational Interpretation 
Ae Situation and its Requirements 
The influence of the situation and circumstances that the party found itself in 
will be assessed here. These will be shown to set the basic terms and requirements that 
the successful candidate must fiilfil when he or she succeeds as party leader. The 
aspects of the situation that are assessed are first, the state of the party. If the party 
was disunited and low on morale, then the new leader must reunite it and invigorate it. 
The second concerns whether a general election was imminent. If an election was 
imminent, then the candidates must demonstrate that they had the necessary qualities 
to appeal to the electorate. This is always an important attribute, but becomes of most 
significance in selections near to a general election. The third concerns the party's 
reputation. If the party had lost a reputation for governmental competence, then the 
new leader must demonstrate the necessary ministerial skills, experience and 
effectiveness to improve the party's reputation. An important analytical distinction will 
be made in the assessment of this factor. This is between the different importance of 
competence and effectiveness. The new leader must demonstrate an effectiveness at 
leading from the front. This is of more significance than competence, as competence 
does not necessarily endow the candidate with an ability to direct and dictate as head 
of a govemment. 
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ne Selection Procedure: Formal Aspects and Informal Networks 
i) Formal Aspects 
The procedure by which leaders are selected is a significant aspect of leadership 0 
selection. The most important aspect of the selection procedure is that it should 
produce a satisfactory outcome -a good leader. A leader of a political party has many 
important functions, and must fulfil the roles of 'Election-winner, party-unifier, 
Cabinet-maker, Cabinet-manager and inter-party broker', among others. 26 This 
illustrates the importance of the analytical framework developed in the study, as the 
first concerns electability, the second, acceptability, and the final three, govemability. 
The circumstances surrounding a selection will determine the exact importance of each ZD 
criteria, but as the former Liberal leader, Lord Grimond, once stated, 'The trick of 
being a "good" leader is to be on the stage when the audience is ready to like your sort 
of performance'. 27 The selection system should be practical and flexible, and be able to 
meet the needs of a political party at a particular time, but the most important aspect is 
producing the right outcome. It must also be regarded as legitimate by the participants, Z' 
the party and the public. The 1963 Conservative Party selection of Home signalled the Cý 
downfall of the Conservatives informal system of 'emergence', as the nature of 
Home's selection undermined the system because of the atmosphere of conspiracy that 
surrounded it, and the adverse reaction it inspired in Home's opponents, the Labour 
Party and the public. The acceptability and the credibility of the system had collapsed. 
An important factor is whether the system has an influence on the types of 
leaders that were selected. Punnett has argued 'the particular method that a party uses 
26 R. A Punnett, Selecting The Party Leader. Britain in Comparative Perspective, (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 11 
27 The Independent, 29 July 1988 in Punnett, Selecting The Partv Leade p. 12 
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to select its leaders is likely to affect the types of persons that emerge, and the abilities 
they bring with them' . 
2' This is certainly true, and is of most interest when applied to 
the Conservative Party's method of selecting its leaders before 1965, as there was no 
definite procedure, so the method used in each selection until 1965 was designed to 
find the right person for the situation that the party found itself in. The methods used 
by the party in the two selections of 1957 and 1963 analysed in this study, involved 
informal consultation within the upper echelons of the party - what could be termed 
the party hierarchy, to find the leader most acceptable to the party. The party hierarchy 
is the group of senior and influential figures at the apex of the party, in both the 
Parliament (the House of Commons and House of Lords), and the party in the country. 
This group of senior figures and party managers play a major role in the key decisions 
that are taken in the management and co-ordination of the party, such as the selection CP 
of a new leader. An important fact that must be noted is that this group is not a 
monolithic block - its membership varies depending on the decision that must be taken, 
and the pressures of the situation that the party finds itself in. However, certain key 
figures always appear to be constant members of the party hierarchy. These are the 
Prime Minister, the Chairman of the 1922 Committee of Conservative backbenchers, 
the Chief Whip in the House of Commons, the Chief Whip in the House of Lords, the 
party chairman and the chairman of the NUCUA, and constituency associations. 
What Macmillan termed in 1963 as 'the customary processes of consultation' 
did not exist, as there were no clearly defined rules to the procedure. The new leader 
gemerged' as the right man to unite the party, manage it and lead it to victory in the 
General Election. This final requirement became of particular importance if a General 
" Punnett, Selecting The Party Leade p. 2 
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Election was imminent. Leadership selection procedures are dynamic processes, and 
the Conservative Party before 1965, altered its method of selection to meet the 
requirements of each situation that the party found itself in. There were core principles 
on which each selection was built, but the procedure was meant to be flexible, so as to 
meet the requirements of each situation. This means that the formal aspects of the 
procedures used in 1957 and 1963 are an important part of the analysis of the outcome 
of each selection. It is interesting to note that each political party in Britain has 0 
changed its leadership selection procedure on more than one occasion since the two 
leadership selections of 1957 and 1963. After Home's resignation in 1965, the 
Conservative Party formally elected its new leader, Edward Heath, using an election of 
its NVs by secret ballot. This was a change Home was instrumental in instituting, as he 
saw that the procedure by which he was selected was tainted beyond repair. The 
Conservative Party used this system of a secret ballot of the party's Ws until the 
election of William Hague as successor to John Major in June 1997. Following his 
election, Hague introduced a system of one member, one vote (OMOV) for the 
election of future Conservative leaders. The Labour Party introduced an electoral 
college process for the election of party leaders in 1981, and the Liberals (and 
subsequently, the Liberal Democrats after the merger of the Liberals and the Social 
Democratic Party in 1988) elected new leaders by a ballot of party members from 
1976. This shows the importance of analysing the selection procedure in each 
selection, as the characteristics of the system influence the outcome ffindamentally. 
f 
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ii) Informal Networks of Communication 
The informal networks and lines of communication within political parties are 
of importance in leadership selections, and this is particularly the case with the 
Conservative Party's methods of selection before 1965. Punnett has noted the 
importance of informal networks in selection procedures, as 'the formal rules of a 
leader-selection system do not necessarily reveal how the process will actually 
operate. '29 These informal networks exist in two broad forms. The first are those 
within the party itself These serve as lines of communication within the party 
hierarchy, and help to find the leader who is most acceptable to the party. 'No matter 
how democratic and open a leader-selection system may appear on the basis of the 
formal rules, in practice it may be managed by an elite. )30 There are also lines of 
communication within the party that link the upper reaches of the party to the back- 
benches and grass-roots organisations. The 1922 Committee of back-benchers in the 
Conservative Party and its executive, serve to communicate opinion to the leadership 
stratum, and the NUCUA serves the same purpose for the constituency membership. 
The second set of lines of communication are those between the party and the press. 
These often serve as a means of the party hierarchy filtering information to the press in 
situations like the 1963 Conservative Party selection, when the party hierarchy wanted 
to prepare the party and the public for the emergence of Home. These are also 
significant in the opposition that can develop to the emergence of one particular leader, 
and act as feeders 'Of information to the opponents, particularly if the press is in 
sympathy with the opponents. 
29 Punnett, Selecting The Party Leader p. 10 
30 Punnett, Selecting The Party Leader, p. 10 
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Stark has argued that 'the outcome of a contest has little to do with who is 
making the choice', and it is the qualities of the candidates and the situation in which 
the contest arises that determines who wins. He argues that different electorates appear 
to apply the same criteria of acceptance, electability and competence in leadership 
selections, and 'the fact that leadership selection rules determine the composition of 
the leadership electorate does not mean that the rules determine the outcome of 
contests'. Thus, he argues that 'there is little support for the view that how parties 
choose their leaders determines who they will choose' .3' This assessment appears to 
be restrictive, and ignores the importance that different selection procedures can have 
on the outcome of selections. The most prominent example of the effect a selection 
procedure can have on a selection is the 1963 Conservative Party selection of Home. 
Home would not have been elected in a ballot of the party's Ws, the system used to 
select Home's successor, Edward Heath in 1965, and if that system had been used in 
1963 the likely victor would have been Butler or Reginald Maudling. 
Yhe Acceptability Criterion 
This is the first of the core criteria that must be met by candidates for the 
leadersl-ýip, if they are to be serious contenders. This criterion means the attribute of 
acceptability in the party, and the consequent ability to unite it. It denotes acceptability 
to the party principally, and public acceptance is a secondary consideration to this. 
Various aspects of this must be analysed. The first is the extent to which candidates are 
acceptable to the party in a general sense. If the candidates arouse hostility, or have a 
history of arousing hostility in the party, this will affect their fulfilment of this 
31 Stark, Choosing A Leader, p. 131, and pp. 137-138 
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requirement. The second is the extent of opposition to the candidates in the party. 
Whether the opposition is from a small or a large section of the party, is of obvious 
significance in this respect. The third aspect is from what area of the party this 
opposition comes from. If it is from a section that has major influence in the party, this 
will affect candidates' fulfilment of the criteria. However, if it is from a small and 
insignificant grouping, this may not affect the level of the candidates' acceptability in rp 
the eyes of the selectorate who determine the decision. 
This factor has been termed the 'first-order criterion' and is certainly of 
massive significance, as disunited parties do not operate effectively in government, and 
do not win general elections. As Stark has suggested, 'in assessing the relative merits 0 
of leadership candidates, a party's highest priority is to select someone who will 
preserve the unity of the party'. However, as Stark argues, this is not the only 
consideration in selecting a leader, and the level of determinant importance of this 
criterion depends on the extent of disunity in the party at the time of the selection. 
'Only in extraordinary circumstances does this unity goal become an explicit 
consideration'. Stark offers the example of the selection of Michael Foot as Labour 
Party leader in 1980, as a selection when a party was in almost complete disunity, and 
acceptability was the decisive criterion. 32 The selection of William Hague as 
Conservative Party leader in June 1997 following the Conservative's worst election 
defeat since 1906 can also be cited as an example, as the party was an almost complete 
state of disunity. 
Rather than the ultimate detern-dning factor, the acceptability factor can be 
termed as the base criterion which must be achieved, if a candidate has any chance of 
32 Stark, Choosing A Leader, p. 126 
29 
being successful in a leadership klection. It is the first goal but not always the decisive 0 
one, as many factors are taken into account in the selection of a party leader. However, 
in many cases, if a candidate fulfils the acceptability factor, then he or she usually 
becomes leader, even if other candidates better fulfil the other criteria. 
The Electability Criterion 
This factor is often of prime significance in leadership selection, especially if the 
selection occurs at a time when a general election is imn-dnent. This criterion revolves 
around a perceived ability to win general elections, as judged by the party hierarchy. 
Electoral appeal is of obvious importance to leadership candidates, and is a major 
factor in the decision of the selectorate. If parties do not win elections they do not gain 
or retain power, and are ineffective as a party or potential party of government. This 
factor has been correctly tenned 'the second-order criterion', as it is the second 
fundamental factor that candidates must achieve in order to gain the leadership. 
Acceptability is the first as disunited parties do not win elections, and then electability 
comes to the fore, as parties do not gain power if their leader is unelectable. The 
aspects that candidates must achieve in order to be seen as electable include first, a 
good public image that reaches out to the electorate generally and, most significantly, 
does not offend any significant section of the electorate. Secondly, candidates must be 
good public performers and communicators. This is distinct from an ability to perform 
in the House of Commons, and an ability on a public platform is of more importance. 
Third, is good public visibility. A candidate that currently holds one of the 'great 
offices of state' would find this easier to achieve, as he or she would be widely known 
to the electorate, because of the status and public visibility of the post. A failure to 
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fulfil these aspects seriously affected a candidates chances of gaining the leadership. 
This was especially true if a candidate was not widely known to the electorate, or 
perhaps more significantly, it offended a section of it and aroused hostility in the 
country. 
Different circumstances obviously require different leaders, and a specific 
circumstance that increases the importance of electability, is whether a selection takes 
place when a general election is imminent. However, other circumstances affect the 
types of leaders that will be chosen based on their level of electability. Some examples 
of this from formal leadership elections, include the election of John Major as 
Conservative Party leader in November 1990, in succession to Margaret Thatcher. 
Major was chosen, as Thatcher's increasingly conflictorial style was offending 
Conservative voters, and causing party disunity. A general election was due in 1992, 
so the party removed Thatcher from office, after the challenge of Michael Heseltine 
against her leadership, as it was felt she would not win the next general election. Major 
was chosen for his more conciliatory and voter-fiiendly image, that signified a change 
of style, not substance, that contributed to the Conservative Party's fourth successive 
election victory in April 1992. Another recent example is the election of Tony Blair as 
Labour Party leader in 1994. Blair was elected after the death of John Smith, as he 
offered a new image that denoted a sea-change from 'old Labour' to 'new Labour', as 
the image of 'old Labour' was perceived to have contributed to the party's poor 
electability from 1979, and this was exacerbated after the party's fourth successive 
defeat in April 1992. 
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The Governability Criterion 
This factor is the ability, or perceived ability, to implement policy prograrnmes 
and manage government affairs - to govem the country. Significant aspects that come 
under consideration here are whether a candidate has wide and extensive ministerial 
experience, especially in the domestic arena. For parties in opposition, a senior position 
on the opposition front-bench would denote governability. This would count heavily in 
a candidate's favour, as it would enhance their reputation in the party as an effective 
Mnister. Secondly, concerns whether a candidate has held, or is currently in 
occupation of one of the three 'great offices of state'. Current occupation of one of 
these posts is a major advantage to candidates, and this is more significant than having 
previously held one of the posts, as this signifies that a candidate's career is in decline, 
away from the summit of government. An aspect of major importance is the 
candidates' reputation for effectiveness, as compared to competence. Competence in 
government illustrates an ability to fulfil a role as a Minister, whereas effectiveness 
denotes a more dynamic reputation. This is an ability to make things happen, and more 
importantly, to lead from the front, to direct affairs, as compared to just fulfilling a role 
in office. Demonstrating this attribute significantly enhanced a candidate's reputation, 
and their chances of gaining the leadership. 
The Assessment of the Two Leadership Selections using the Anal3jical Framework 
The analytical framework outlined in this chapter will be applied to the two 
leadership selections of 1957 and 1963, and will account for the selections of Harold 
Macmillan in January 1957 and of Sir Alec Douglas-Home in October 1963. This 
assessment will be based primarily around the candidates' fulfilment of the three main 
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criteria of acceptability, electability, and governability, but will demonstrate the 
importance of the other influential factors, such as the status of the candidates, their 
actions during the selections, the immediate requirements of the situation, the selection C' 
procedure, and the informal networks of communication used in the selection 
procedure. The analysis will, therefore, offer a full explanation of the two selections by 
considering both the criteria that candidates are assessed on, and the other influences 
on the decisions that are made. The analysis takes into account both internal and 
external factors, direct and indirect factors, and assesses the importance of the 
differences of the situations surrounding the two selections. 
The assessment of the candidates' fulfilment of the three core criteria will 
demonstrate which of the criteria Macmillan and Home fulfilled, and therefore show 
which, if any, was considered the most important by the selectorate in that selection, 
and if any was the determining factor. The criteria will thus be levelled in importance in 1.12 
each selection. It is important to note that all the criteria are of vital consideration in 
leadership selections, so it will not be the case that any are discounted in importance, 
but the analysis will demonstrate whether any were considered of more importance 
during the selections. This multi-layered approach to the analysis will offer the fullest 
explanation of both outcomes. 
The assessment of the wider influential factors will serve to emphasise the 
distinctions between each selection, and analyse the role of external factors such as the 
circumstances surrounding the selections, and the nature of the influence of the aspects 
of the selection procedure, both formal and informal. These will be shown to set the 
basic terms of reference for the core acceptability, electability, and governability 
criteria. 
The Analytical Framework and Party Leadership Selection in Britain: 1957-1997 
The following table sets out an analysis of leadership selections in the British 
Conservative and Labour Parties from 1957 to 1997, using the three core situational 
criteria of Acceptability, Electability and Governability. It is based on a range of 
primary sources and secondary sources on leadership selection in Britain. 
Table One: The Acceplahility, Electabihýv, and Govertiabdhý- Criteria and ParlY 
Leadership Selection in the British Conservative and Lahour Parties: 195 17-199 
1957 Conservative Acceptability Macmillan Macmillan 
Electability Macmillan 
Governability Macmillan/Butler 
1963 Labour Acceptability Wilson Wilson 
Electability Wilson 
Governability Wilson 
1963) Conservative Acceptability Home Home 
Electability Hailsham/Home 
Governability Butler/Maudling 
1965 Conservative Acceptability Heath/Maudling Heath 
Electability Heath. /Maudling 
Governability Heath/Maudlinc, 
1975 Conservative Acceptability Whitelaw Thatcher 
Electability Whitelaw 
Governability Whitelaw 
1976 Labour Acceptability Callaghan Callaý, -han 
Electability Callaghan 
Governability Callaghan 
1980 Labour Acceptability Foot Foot 
Electability Healey 
Governability Healey/Foot 
1983) Labour Acceptability Kinnock Kinnock 
Electability KinnocUHatterslev 
Governability Kinnock 
1988 Labour Acceptability Kinnock Kinnock 
Electability Kinnock 
Governability Kinnock 
1989 Conservative Acceptability Thatcher Thatcher 
Electability Thatcher 
Governability Thatcher 
The format for this table is based on a similar anal-N-sis bv Stark in Choosing A Leader. p. 132. 
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1990 Conservative Acceptability Major Major 
Electability Major/Heseltine 
Governability Major/Hurd 
1992 Labour Acceptability Smith Smith 
Electability Smith 
Governability Smith 
1994 Labour Acceptability Blair Blair 
Electability Blair 
Governability Blair 
1995 Conservative Acceptability Major Major 
Electability Major 
Governability Major 
1997 Conservative Acceptability Hague Hague 
Electability Hague/Clarke 
Governability I Clarke/Howard 
The table shows that in the fifteen contests between 1957 and 1997, the 
winners of the contests most often met the acceptability criterion, as fourteen of the 
fifteen winners met this. Only in the 1975 Conservative contest did the winner not 
meet the acceptability criterion, and sioficantly, the victor, Margaret Thatcher, did 
not meet any of the criterion in that contest. This contest is thus unique in leadership 
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selections since 1957 . The next most commonly met criterion was electability, and 
thirteen of the fifteen winners met this. Only in the 1975 Conservative, and 1980 
Labour contest was this criterion not met. In both instances, the parties were in a state 
of disunity and weakness after an election defeat, and the dominant need was for 
Unity. 35 Governability was the least met criterion, and eleven winners met this. Winners 
met all criterion in eleven contests. Only in the 1963 Conservative, 1975 Conservative, 
1980 Labour and 1997 Conservative, were all criterion not met by the winners. Thus, 
acceptability was the most common criterion to be achieved by eventual victors in 
leadership selections from 1957 to 1997, with 93.3% of victors achieving this criterion. 
34 For an analysis of the 1975 Conservative Party Selection, see chapter one, pp. 40-43 
35 Punnett, Selecting The Party Leader, p. 61 for an account of the state of the Conservative Party in 
the 1975 leadership election, and p. p. 91-94 for the state of the Labour Party in the 1980 leadership 
election. 
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Electability was the next most common, with 86.6% of victors achieving this. 
Governability was the least conunon with 73.3% of victors fulfilling this criterion. The 
following table displays this data. 
Table Two: Totals of Winners of Leadership Selections, 1957 to 1997, and their 
fuyi'lment of the Acceptability, Electability, and Governability Criteria 
Criteria Winners fuIrilling each Percentages of winners 
criteria in leadership fulfilling each criteria (%) 
selections from 1957 to 1997. 
Total = 15 winners 
Acceptability 14 93.3 
Electability 13 86.6 
Governability 11 73.3 
All three criteria 11 73.3 
What these figures show is that all, or virtually all, winners in leadership 
contests must be acceptable to the party, and this is the base criterion on which they 
are fundamentally judged. However, virtually all candidates must also be perceived to 
be electable to be successful, and candidates are also judged strongly on their I 
experience as a senior member of the government or opposition. Despite the 
acceptability criterion being met by the most winners, the difference between the 
figures of winners who met all three criteria (73.3%) is not a major difference, and 
points to the significance of achieving all three in leadership selections. It appears that 
the exact circumstances of the selections affect the importance of each criterion, but all 
are of fundamental importance in determining the outcome of leadership selections. 
This analysis illustrates a number of points of significance. First, that if 
candidates are to win the contest, they must be acceptable to the party, and offer 
prospects of uniting it, or retaining unity. Second, that candidates must be seen as 
electable and present a good public image, and be a good public performer. Third, 
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, governability 
is an important attribute in most cases, and if candidates have experience 7 
as a member of Cabinets or Shadow Cabinets, this gives them a clear advantage. It is 
also clear from the contests of 1957 to 1997 that experience in one of the 'great offices 
of state', or the shadow positions, gives candidates a distinct advantage. 
The analysis of the contests using the three core criteria also shows that being 
the strongest candidate on all three criteria most often has resulted in that candidate 
being elected, but it is possible to reach conclusions on whether any of the criteria are 
more important than any of the others. Despite the fact that most victors met the 
acceptability criterion, this does not mean that this is the most important. The 
closeness of the numbers meeting the electability criterion to those who attained C) 
acceptability (thirteen to fourteen), shows that both appear to be of equal significance 
in leadership selections, and of more importance than the governability criterion. 
Governability is still of real significance in leadership selections, shown by eleven of the 
fifteen winners attaining this, but it is apparent that acceptability and electability are of 
more importance in leadership selections than goverriability. 
Rather than the criteria being seen as separate objectives to be met in 
leadership selections, it is more useful to see them as part of a progressive level of 
suitability for the position. If candidates cannot unite parties (acceptability), they 
cannot win elections as the electorate rarely votes for disunited parties (electability), 
and if they cannot win elections, they are not in a position to govern (govemability). 
The criteria form part of a leadership sequence that must be fulfilled for the leader to 
be successful. The relative importance of the criteria in specific leadership selections 
are often, therefore, determined by the exact circumstances of the situation that the 
party finds itself in. The imminence of a general election increases the importance of 
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electability, for instance. This demonstrates how the wider individual and situational 
criteria set the terms of reference on which the core criteria are judged. It is useful to 
see the three criteria as part of the stages towards the party's attainment of a 
successful leader. Acceptability is the core criterion, the foundation upon which a 
successful candidacy is built. Electability follows on from this at the next level, leading r) 
towards a successful leadership. Governability moves the leadership candidacy onto 
the final level, that of governance. 
The Individual and Situational Criteria and Specific Leadership Selections in Britain, 
1957-1997 
The following section relates the broad data on leadership selection in Britain CO 
from 1957 to 1997, using the acceptability, electability and governability criteria, to 
specific examples to illustrate how the analysis can be used to explain the outcomes of 
leadership selections. The selections chosen for use are the 1965 and 1975 
Conservative Party selections, and the 1980,1983 and 1992 Labour Party selections. 
These five selections have been chosen for a number of reasons. First, they illustrate 
selections that used different formal procedures - the 1965 and 1975 Conservative 
selections used a secret ballot by the party's NTs, and the 1980,1983 and 1992 
Labour selections used a ballot of the Parliamentary Party in 1980, and an electoral 
college of the Parliamentary Labour Party, the unions and the constituency parties in 
1983 and 1992. Second, they illustrate how different situations and circumstances, and 
how candidates' reputations can affect selections. 
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777e 1965 Conservative Party Selection 
The selection of Edward Heath to succeed Sir Alec Douglas-Home ifi July 
1965 was the first formal leadership election in the Conservative Party. Heath was 
elected by a secret ballot of the party's NTs, and despite not achieving the required C, 
majority, became leader after Reginald Maudling, his only rival, decided not to stand in 
the required second ballot. On the three core criteria, acceptability, electability, and 
governability, Heath and Maudling were of equal status, and the wider individual and ZD 
situational factors determined the outcome. 
The party status of the candidates was significant. Following the election defeat 
in 1964, Home had appointed Heath as Shadow Chancellor, and Maudling Shadow =1 
Foreign Secretary. This was a'significant promotion for Heath, and a demotion for Z. 7 
Maudling that affected his status and his prospects of succeeding Home. Maudling had ID 
been Chancellor in the Macmillan and Home administrations, and was widely 
discredited after the election defeat for his failure to provide an upturn in the economy 
to coincide with the election. 36 Maudling's appointment as Shadow Foreign Secretary 
signified a downturn in his leadership prospects, as Home was a former Foreign 
Secretary, and as party leader, took the dominant role in foreign affairs. 
Heath's promotion to Shadow Chancellor signified that he was seen as the 
'leader-in-waiting', and was favoured by Home to be his successor. His handling of 
the opposition's response to the government's Finance Bill in 1965 impressed 
Conservative NVs and improved his position, though Maudling was the favourite Zý 
because of his wider ministerial experience. 37 The conduct and campaigning of Heath 
16 See I Campbell, Edward Heath. A Biography, (London: Cape, 1993), p. 166 for details of the effect 
of Heath and Maudling's appointments in the Shadow Cabinet in 1964 on their leadership prospects. 
37 A. Watkins, The Road To Number Ten: From Bonar Law to Tony Blair, (London: Duckworth, 
1998), p. 186; Fisher, The Tory Leaders, p. 130; and I Ramsden, The Winds of Change: Macmillan to 
Heath, 1957-1975, (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 235-236 
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and Maudling was significant in the result. Maudling appeared to take a diffident 0 
attitude to the selection at the outset, whereas Heath organised his campaign well. 
'Heath's campaign was efficient, well organised and much brisker and more aggressive ZP 
than Maudling's'. 38 Ramsden has noted the importance of the press reporting on the 
difference of the two men's styles, and that Butler and Macleod switched their 
allegiance ftom Maudling to Heath because of his aggressive campaigning and style. '9 0 C) Cý Cl 
This illustrates the significance of the campaigning in determining the outcome. It was 0 
also important in that the party was selecting a Leader of the Opposition, not a Prime 
Nfinister. The party needed someone who displayed a combative style to take on 
Harold Wilson, rather than an emphasis on ministerial experience, as the party wanted 
Ca political bully'. 
40 
Maudling's relaxed attitude convinced many Conservative NTs that Heath was 
the better option to take on Wilson . 
41 Maudling's campaign has been described as Zý 
lethargic, as he did not even canvass his colleagues in the Shadow Cabinet. His tactics 
were to rely on a reaction to Heath's role in Home's downfall, and to portray 
Maudling as the family man, against -Heath the bachelor. Given the outcome, his 
42 
strategy was not successful . 
This signifies the importance of the candidates' 
personalities, the situation and circumstances, as the Conservatives needed a leader 
who would provide strong opposition to Wilson in the Commons and the country, as 0 
38 N. Fisher, The Tory Leaders. Their Struggle For Power, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), 
p. 125 
" Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 237 
40 Ramsden, The Winds of Change, p. 238 
41 See Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 166; and D. R. Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home. (London: Sinclair- 
Stevenson, 1996), pp. 386-390 for Home's support of Heath and the decline of Maudling's position 
regarding the leadership. Maudling denies he was diffident and 'lazy' towards the 1965 selection and 
states that he did not overtly campaign for the leadership as he felt the opportunity should be offered 
to him, rather than fighting for it. Fighting for the leadership would have made his task as leader far 
more difficult. For details see R. Maudling, Memoirs, (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1978), 
pp. 136-137 
42 Fisher, The Tory Leaders, pp. 124-125 
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an election was imminent due to the narrowness of Labour's election victory. 43 As the 
two candidates were equal on the three core criteria, their status and conduct, and the 
situation surrounding the selection played a major role in determining the selection of ZP C. 
Edward Heath in 1965. As The Economist's Alistair Burnett noted, the party picked 
Heath as the man 'most likely to bullock their way back into power'. 44 
Yhe 1975 Conservative Party Selection 
This contest is unique in leadership selections between 1957 and 1997, as this 
was the only contest that saw the eventual victor not meet any of the three core criteria 
of acceptability, electability and governability. Margaret Thatcher's victory can be 
accounted for by the circumstances of the selection, and the reputations and conduct of 
the other candidates, principally William Whitelaw, Thatcher's main opponent in the 
second ballot. There was a wide feeling in the Conservative Party that Edward Heath 
could no longer continue as Conservative leader after two successive election,, defeats, 
and that Heathite Conservatism had run its course. Thatcher's narrow, but 
nevertheless, impressive, victory over Heath in the first ballot opened the way for a 
I 
contest between Thatcher and other widely tipped successors. Thatcher's victory was 
so impressive, as she was not an expected successor to Heath, and did not have wide 
governmental experience. An important situational factor was the circumstances of the 
contest. It has been widely acknowledged that there was 'a dearth of talent at the top' 
in 1975, as Maudling and Powell were no longer contenders. Whitelaw was the 
43 Fisher has argued that this contest centred. on the difference of personalities of Heath and Maudling. 
This is in The Tory Leaders, p. 126 
'4 Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 238 
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beneficiary of tl-ýis, but he was too loyal to Heath to exploit it, and felt that as Party 
Chairman, appointed by Heath, he could not oppose him. 45 
Thus, the circumstances of the discrediting, of the Heath administration and his 
brand of Conservatism, and the growing desire for a move to the right, led to cý Zý 
Thatcher's victory in the first ballot, and the momentum of that victory carried her 
through to defeat Whitelaw decisively in the second ballot. In the second ballot, 
Thatcher gained 52.9% of the vote, to Whitelaw's 28.6%. The reputation of the 
candidates was important in the selection, as Thatcher campaigned vigorously in the 
first and second ballots. This persuaded many NPs to vote for her in the first ballot as 
her campaign team, led by Airey Neave, told NVs that her candidacy was only a means 0 
of removing Heath, and then someone else would win the second ballot. Thatcher was 
presented as the 'stalking horse', designed not to beat Heath, but to take enough Cl 
support away from him to open the contest up to Whitelaw . 
4' However, Thatcher's 
widely unexpected victory over Heath led to the momentum that carried her through to 
victory over Whitelaw in the second ballot. Whitelaw's reputation was also significant 
in Thatcher's victory. He was seen as an 'alternative Heathite', and with the move 
away from Heathite Conservatism that was signified by Thatcher's victory in the first 
ballot, this meant he could not gain the necessary support to beat Thatcher with this 
reputation. Conservative NTs had been coerced to move to a new brand of 
Conservatism, after the two election defeats of 1974 
45 Fisher, The Tory Leaders , p. 154 46 Rarnsden, Winds of Change, p. 443 and 449. Ramsden notes the importance of Neave's role and the 
under-estimation of Thatcher's chances of victory. 
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In the mood of the moment the fact that, after Heath's fall, he 
[Whitelaw] was the established candidate may not have been to 
his advantage. He was too closely identified with the old regime 
and with the old policies to be acceptable to those who wanted 
to the leadership to have a new look. 47 
Similarly, Ramsden has noted that, '[Thatcher] acquired great credit simply by 
having forced the party into the decision it had now taken, to get rid of Heath; the 
votes on the first ballot proved to Ws that without her determination they would have 
taken a decision that most of them did not actually want' . 
48 This explains much about 
the decision to select Thatcher as Heath's successor. She offered a new approach, and 
different policies, and the only real alternative to Heath, Whitelaw, was trapped by his 
loyalty to him and his identification with the Heath regime. Whitelaw's loyalty to 
Heath also determined the nature of his conduct, and led him to have a minimal and 
ineffective impact on the contest, despite being the best equipped candidate on the core 
criteria. Ramsden has also noted that the candidates in the second ballot were 'tainted 
by their cowardice' for not standing against Heath in the first ballot . 
49 This denotes the 
importance of the circumstances surrounding the election, and the state of the party, 
and explains why the three core criteria of acceptability, electability, and governability, 
proved to be of little importance in the determination of the outcome. The acceptability 
criterion came into play in the second ballot, as the other candidates now appeared to 
47 Fisher, The Tory Leaders ' p. 174 41 Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 451 
49 Fisher, The Toly Leaders, p. 153; Watkins, The Road to Number Ten, p. 190; and Ramsden, Winds 
gf Change, p. 451 and 454 
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offer a threat to party unity, as if there had not been a second ballot, the party would 
have united around the new leader after the first ballot. 
1980 Labour Party Selection 
The eventual victor in this contest, Michael Foot, fulfilled the acceptability and 
governability criteria, and his victory can also be explained by the circumstances of the 
selection, and the reputation of Denis Healey, his main rival. Foot was the most 
acceptable candidate, as Labour Ws and union leaders were opposed to Healey's 
election, because of his reputation as Chancellor in the 1976-79 Labour administration. 
Healey had introduced measures which were controversial with Labour NTs and union 
leaders, such as the measures during and following the RAF crisis of 1976.50 This 
shows the importance of Healey's reputation and party status in his failure to succeed 
Callaghan. This led the initially reluctant Foot to be persuaded to stand by union 
leaders. 5' 
Healey had more governmental experience than Foot, but his reputation was 
affected by his role in the previous Labour government that had been defeated in 1979. 
Foot was Deputy Leader to Callaghan in the 1976-79 goverment, and was loyal to 
Callaghan. Healey's reputation was in decline, while Foot's remained stable after the 
election defeat. A significant factor in Foot's victory was his popularity with the party 
outside Parliament. This was important, as Labour planned to introduce an electoral 
college for the election of party leaders, which would be comprised of NTs, union 
leaders, and constituency parties. Foot was the most acceptable with union leaders, 
50 Watkins, The Road to Number Ten, p. 150 
5' Callaghan has noted that Foot told him he did not intend to be a candidate. This is in M. Jones, 
NEchael Foot, p. 446 in Watkins, The Road to Number Ten p. 152. For details of the pressure put on 
Foot to stpd by union leaders, see Watkins, The Road to 
ýumber 
Ten, p. p. 152-156 
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and the party in the country, and was a well-liked NT. He played on the movement to 
an electoral college, and it contributed to his victory, as he would have won a contest 
under the proposed electoral college system. 52 
Ae 1983 Labour Party Selection 
This contest used the electoral college system, under which NTs had 30% of 
the vote, union leaders had 40% of the vote, and constituency officials had 30% of the 
vote. The winner of this contest, Neil Kinnock, was seen as the 'acceptable face of the 
left' by NUs and union leaders, and he fulfilled the acceptability, electability, and 
governability criteria. His main rival, Roy Hattersley, fulfilled the electability criterion, 
but Kinnock was the widely expected victor from the outset of the contest, especially 
by the left of the party, who were in the ascendancy. 53 The acceptability factor appears 
to have played the dominant role in the selection of Kinnock as leader, and Hattersley 
as deputy leader, as their alliance seemed to offer the best prospects of uniting the C) 
party, as Kinnock represented the left and Healey the right. This alliance has been 
described as 'the dream ticket'. This was of major importance because of the divisions 
in the Labour Party after the massive election defeat of 1983, and points to the 
importance of the circumstances surrounding the selection. 54 Kinnock gained a clear 
victory, showing his acceptability to the party. He gained 71 % of the total vote, and 38 
of the 46 unions represented supported him, 75% of Ws voted for hin-ý and almost all 
of the constituency parties. 55 
52 This account is based on Punnett, Selecting The Party Leader, pp. 91-94; and Watkins, The Road to 
Number Ten pp. 152-156 
53 Watkins, The Road to hLumber Ten, p. 162 
54 Watkins, The Road to Number Ten, pp. 162-164 
55 This account is based on Punnett, -Selecting 
The Party Leade , P. I 11; and Watkins, The Road to Number Ten, pp. 161-165. 
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777e 1992 Labour Party Selection 
John Smith succeeded Neil Kinnock by a massive majority, following 
Kinnock's resignation after the April 1992 election defeat. Kinnock himself felt Smith's 
election was inevitable, and advised the other contender, Bryan Gould, a close 
associate of Kinnock's, against standing, as 'Smithy had got it all sewn Upi. 56 Smith 
fulfilled all three core criteria, and from the beginning of the contest was regarded as 
the likely victor. He received the immediate backing of the leaders of the three largest 
uruons. 
This contest was not surrounded by the difficult circumstances of party 
disunity. It was not a battle between the left and right of the party, as Kinnock's 0 
reforms of the party had shifted the party to the right. Sn-dth represented the desire to 
continue that process in an long-term effort to regain power, following the party's 
fourth successive election defeat. The only other candidate, Bryan Gould, was not a 
serious contender, and the contest was over differences in tone and style, not policy. 
57 
The election of Margaret Beckett, a left-winger, also suited the circumstances of the 
election as the Strýith-Beckett alliance could be presented as a 'dream ticket' of left and 
right, securing harmony and balance in the parliamentary party. 's Smith fulfilled the 
three core criteria, and was the most senior and experienced of the candidates, and 
represented the Labour Party's desire to continue the process of reform to gain a more 
moderate image, and regain power at the next general election. 59 
56 B. Gould, Goodbye To All That, p. 253 in Watkins, The Road to Number Ten, p. 166 
57 Watkins, The Road To Number Ten, p. 168 
51 Watkins, The Road to Number Ten, p. 167 
59 The details of this contest are in Punnett, Selecting The Party Leader pp. 115-118; and Watkins, 
The Road to Number Ten, pp. 165-175 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the analytical framework to be used to analyse 
the Conservative Party selections of 1957 and 1963. The abstract section on the 
framework showed that a wide range of individual and situational factors must be 
considered in an analysis of any leadership selection. This section, and the analysis of 
leadership selection in Britain from 1957 to 1997, has shown that successful candidates 
must be assessed as being successful on the three core situational criteria of 
acceptability, electability, and governability - they must demonstrate an ability to unite 
the party, to win elections and govern effectively. However, the wider individual and 
situational criteria, such as the selection procedure, the reputations and actions of the 
candidates, and the circumstances surrounding the selection, must be analysed as they 
often play a central, if not determinant role, in the outcome of leadership selections. 
As has been stressed, they set the basic terms of reference on which the core criteria 
are judged. This shows the significance of using an inclusive, interactionist approach to C, 
analyse all the individual and situational factors that contribute to the outcome of 
leadership selections, and this will be demonstrated by the analysis of the 1957 and 
1963 Conservative Party selections using this analytical framework. 
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Chapter Two 
The Conservative Party and The Selection of Its Leaders 
This chapter has five sections. The first is a summary of the Conservative 
Party's selection of its leaders from 1902 to 1965. The second analyses the functions 
of Conservative Party leaders. The third discusses the formal aspects of the selection 
procedure. The fourth analyses the importance of the informal networks of 
communication used in the selection procedure. The final section analyses the 
situational parallels and distinctions in the outcomes of the selections from 1902 to 
1965 
The Selection of Conservative Party Leaders: 1902-1965 
This century the Conservative Party has had a variety of experiences in the 
selection of its leaders. The nature of the experience often depended on whether the 
party was in opposition or in power, whether there was an obvious heir apparent, and 
whether there was contention over who should become leader. This section has two 
parts. The first discusses those occasions when the leaderslýiip passed to obvious heir 
apparents while the party was in power, and the changeovers were swift and easy and 
illustrated the benefits of the system. These occurred in 1902,1921,1922,1937 and 
1955. Interestingly, three of these (Austen and Neville Chamberlain, and Anthony 
Eden), were failures as party leader. The second part discusses those selections which 
involved competition for the leadership. This is defined as being the case when there 
were two or more candidates considered in the selection. These occurred in 1911, 
1923,1957 and 1963. 
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The Succession of Clear Heir Apparents 
1902: Arthur Bat(our 
In 1902, Lord Salisbury resigned as Prime Minister and was succeeded by C, 
Arthur Balfour, his nephew. Balfour was the obvious successor to Salisbury, as he had 
a good reputation as a Nlinister, and few opposed his succession. King Edward VII 
commissioned Balfour to form a government, and two days later he was acclaimed 
leader of the party by a meeting of Conservative Peers and NIPs at the Carlton Club. ' 
192 1: Austen Chamberlain 
In March 1921, Bonar Law resigned as party leader because of ill health. The 
Conservatives were still part of the Coalition that had been formed during the First 
World War. The party, however, took the same govemmental approach, as if they 
were in goverment as the single ruling party, because of their dominant position in the 
Coalition. Prime NEnister Lloyd George appointed Austen Chamberlain Leader of the 
Commons, and on 21 March 1921 a meeting of MPs at the Carlton Club acclaimed 
2 him as Leader of the Unionists in the Commons. 
1922: Andrew Bonar Law 
The next leadership selection took place in October 1922, after the Carlton 
Club meeting which broke up the coalition government. Lloyd George then resigned as 
Prime Nlinister, and advised the King to send for Bonar Law, as Austen Chamberlain 
had resigned because of his wish to continue the coalition. In an unprecedented step 
1 'Appendix 1. Conservative Party Leadership Selection This Century. Geoffrey D. M. Block. 3 
February 1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3 
2 'Appendix 1. Conservative Party Leadership Selection This Century. ' Geoffrey D. M. Block. 3 
February 1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3 
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for the party, Law insisted on being approved as party leader before accepting the 
3 
Premiership in discussions Akrith Lord Stamfordham, the King's Private Secretary. On 
23 October 1922, the meeting took place at the Hotel Cecil, and Law was selected 
unanimously. He then immediately kissed hands with the King on accepting office. 
1937: Neville Chamberlain 
On 28 May 1937, Neville Chamberlain was asked by the King to succeed 
Stanley Baldwin, following the latter's resignation. The succession was rapid as 
Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer from 193 1, was the unopposed successor to 
Baldwin. On 31 May 1937, a meeting of the party at the Carlton Club endorsed him as 
leader. 5 
1955: Sir Anthony Eden 
On 6 April 1955, Sir Anthony Eden succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister, 
after Churchill had resigned the previous day. Like Chamberlain, Eden was the long 
recognised crown prince and had waited many years to succeed Churcl-0. He was 
endorsed as party leader at the party meeting on 21 April 1955 at Church House. 
3 For an analysis of the role of the Stamfordham and Law discussions and the reasons for Law's 
request, see chapter two, pp. 65-66 
4 'Appendix 1. Conservative Party Leadership Selection This Century. ' Geoffrey D. M. Block. 3 
February 1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3 
5 'Appendix 1. Conservative Party Leadership Selection This Century'. Geoffrey D. M. Block. 3 
February 1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3: and Watkins, The Road to Number Ten, p. 39 
11 'Meetings Held To Elect The Conservative Leader'. Geoffrey D. M. Block. 3 February 1965 CPA 
CCO 
_20/39/3; and 
Watkins, The Road To Number Ten, pp. 62-63 
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Successions Involving Competition for the Leadership 
1911.: Andrew Bonar Law 
The 1911 leadership selection was unique as the Conservatives were in 
opposition, and it was the first time there had been a vacancy in the leadership of the 
party in the Commons in opposition since Disraeli had assumed the leadership in 
7 1849 . 
In November 1911, Balfour resigned because of attacks on his leadership, and Cý 
the divisions in the party over tariff reform. Balfour was also widely regarded as a 
failure as party leader. As the party was in opposition, there was one leader of the 
party in the Commons and one of the party in the Lords. Lord Lansdowne was already 
leader of the Lords, but there was considerable disagreement as to who should succeed 
Balfour as leader of the Commons. 
There was also disagreement over how the leader should be chosen. There 
were two candidates, Austen Chamberlain and Walter Long. Long declared that the 
correct procedure was for the issue to be decided by a meeting of the Privy 
Councillors, but this was a minority view. Neither of the two candidates could gain an 
overall consensus of support throughout the party, as Long was widely viewed as 
being incompetent, and Chamberlain was distrusted as a Liberal Unionist, and for his 
position on tariff reform. They were also 'champions of two interests': Long of rural 
Conservatism and moderate protectionism, and Chamberlain of Liberal Unionism and 
tariff reform. ' This explains their candidacies, and also their failure to attain the 
leadership, as they were considered as feasible leaders by the supporters of the issues 
they represented, but could not unite the whole party behind their candidacies. The 
' V. Bogdanor, 'The Selection of The Party Leader', in A. Seldon/ S. Ball (eds. ), Conservative 
Century. The Conservative Party in Power Since 1900, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 70 
1ý A. Seldon, 'Conservative Century' in Seldon/ Ball (eds. ), Conservative Century, p. 27 
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issue needed to be resolved swiftly because the party conference was due to be held in 
Leeds the following week, and the party's senior figures wanted to keep the 
conference out of any decision on the leadership. The view that was most popular was 
that a meeting of all Unionist NPs should be summoned to elect a leader, and this 
should be convened hastily. Lord Balcarres, the Conservative Chief Whip, declared on 
9 November, the day after Balfour announced his resignation, that the Conservative 
Ws objected to an alternative vote system, and wanted the candidates reduced to two, 
and then settled by consultation. 9 
Bonar Law, however, insisted on standing. Law was little-known, but was a C, 
compromise candidate who offered better prospects of uniting all sections of the 
party. 10 As we have seen, Long and Chamberlain could not unite the party, whereas 
Law was in a better position to do so, as he had supported Balfour in his call for a 
referendum on tariff reform before the general election of December 1910, and could 
not, therefore, be accused of disloyalty. " On 13 November 1911, at a meeting of 
Unionist NTs at the Carlton Club, Long and Chamberlain withdrew from the contest. 
This occurred after they agreed privately to do so before the meeting, to allow Law to 
come forward, as they both saw that they could not unite the party behind their 
candidacies. They then proposed and seconded Law as leader of the party in the 
Commons. 12 Law was the right choice in the circumstances, as he offered the best 
prospects of guaranteeing party unity, and Lloyd George stated at the time, 'The fools 
have stumbled on their best man by accident'. 13 
9 Balcarres Diary, 9 November 1911, in Vincent (ed. ), The Cra"ford Em-ers (Manchester: 1984) in 
Bogdanor, 'The Selection of The Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball, (eds. ), Conservative Century, p. 71 
10 'Appendix 1. Conservative Party Leadership Selection This Century. ' Geoffrey D. M. Block. 3 
February 1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3 
11 Bogdanor, 'The Selection of the Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball (eds. ), Conservative Centuly, p. 73 
12 For analysis of the significance of the Long and Chamberlain meeting, see chapter two, p. 64 
"I Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902-19401 (London: Longman, 1978), p. 91 
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1923: Stanley Baldwin 
The selection of Stanley Baldwin on 28 May 1923 followed the resignation of zlý 
Bonar Law as Prime Minister, because of recurring ill health. There were two 1-5 
candidates for the leadership: Baldwin, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Lord 
Curzon, the Foreign Secretary. King George V selected Baldwin after taking advice 
through Lord Stamfordham, and Lords Balfour and Salisbury, which suggested doubts 
about the suitability of Curzon. 14 Curzon had seemed to have the stronger claim, as he 
had been acting Prime Minister during Law's illness, and was the most senior figure in 
the Cabinet. Stamfordham told Curzon that he had not been selected as he was a peer, 
but Punnett has labelled this as an excuse rather than the real reason, yet fails to offer 
an explanation for this. However, Bogdanor suo, ests that Curzon may have been seen 1,9 
as a stalking horse for the return of Austen Chamberlain as leader, and this would have 
been viewed as treachery by the Conservative back-benchers, who had stood by Law 
and Baldwin after the removal of Lloyd George. 15 One possible explanation is that a 
memorandum supporting Baldwin was drafted by J. C. C. Davidson, which was given to 
Stamfordham by Law's Private Secretary, and the King took this as a statement of 
Law's own views, but the importance of the Davidson Memorandum can be . 
discounted. 16 The King's own views, and the advice of Balfour, and Lord Derby who 
was vehemently opposed to Curzon, were decisive in the outcome. The explanation for 
the appointment of Baldwin is that the King had doubts about appointing a peer in the 
" 'Appendix 1. Conservative Party Leadership Selection This Century. ' Geoffrey D. M. Block. 3 
February 1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3. For analysis of Balfour and Salisbury's advice, see chapter two, pp. 
68-69 
Bogdanor, 'The Selection of the Party Leader', in Seldon/Ball (eds. ), Conservative Century, p. 74 
Punnett, Selecting The Party Leader p. 35. For an analysis of the role of the Davidson 
Memorandum, see chapter two, pp. 65-66 
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current circumstances, and feared a provocative, class-war gesture to Labour, as there 
were no members of the Labour opposition in the Lords. 
On 23 May, a party meeting of peers and MPs was held at Hotel Cecil, at 
which Baldwin was unanimously endorsed as party leader, after Curzon had proposed 
the motion. Baldwin had been an anonymous figure before the fall of the coalition, but 
his role in the downfall of Lloyd George greatly improved his reputation, and he 
became a key Nfinister in Law's administration as Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
Baldwin also had a moderate image, and was seen to be in a better position to preserve 
the unity of the party that Law had achieved following the departure of Austen 
Chamberlain. 
1957: HaroldMacmillan 
17 
In January 1957, when Anthony Eden resigned in the aftermath of the Suez 
Crisis, there were only two obvious candidates for the party leadership: Harold 
Macmillan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and R. A. Butler, the Leader of the 
Commons and Lord Privy Seal. Despite this, and the fact that Butler was almost 
unanimously expected to succeed Eden, the succession of Macmillan was relatively 
swift. Eden resigned as Prime Nfinister on 9 January, and Macrnillan was chosen by the 
Queen on the afternoon on 10 January. " The Queen consulted Lord Salisbury, Lords 
Chandos and Waverley, and Winston Churchill, who all expressed a preference for 
Macmillan. Salisbury conveyed the feelings of the Cabinet, who he had consulted along 
17 For the detailed analysis of this selection, see chapters four and five 
18 A. Howard, RAB. The Life of R. A. Butlerp (London: Cape, 1987), p. 246. For details of the wide 
expectation of Butler to be Eden's successor; and 'Appendix 1. Conservative Party Leadership 
Selection This Century'. Geoffrey D. M. Block. 3 February 1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3. For the 
chronology of the succession. 
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with Lord Kilmuir. Eden, however, did not directly advise the Queen, but supported 
Butler to succeed him. 19 
There was a massive majority in the Cabinet in favour of Macmillan, and only 
three Butler supporters have been identified. 20 A new feature of this selection was the 
Cabinet consultations, and the limited weighing of the opinions of the party, that were 
reported to the Monarch. The lin-fted consultations of wider party opinion were 
undertaken by the Chief Whip, Edward Heath, and the Chairman of the 1922 
Conunittee, John Morrison, of the opinions of Conservative MPs, and of Oliver Poole, 
the Chairman of the Party Organisation, of party organisers. Salisbury delivered these 
to the Queen along with the Cabinet consultations. Kilmuir has stated that the views of 
Cabinet ministers were the decisive factor in the selection of Macmillan . 
21 The 
consultations also showed that Butler aroused hostile opposition in some sections of 
the party, especially the 'die hard' Imperialist wing, after his appeasing stance during 
the Suez Crisis. Macn-dllan, on the other hand, had no such opposition to him, and was 
the unity candidate. Macmillan was elected as leader of the party at a meeting at 
Church House on 27 January 1957.22 
1963: Sir Alec Douglas-Home 23 
The leadership selection of October 1963 condemned the informal system to its 
downfall, and a major factor in this was the length of time it took to settle the 
"' Avon Papers. AP 20/33/12 Eden to Adeane, 12 January 1957 in B. Pimlott, The Queen: A 
Biography of Elizabeth II (London: Harper Collins, 1995) p. 259 
20 A. Home, Macmillan 1894-1956 (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 468; and Howard, RAB, p. 247 
21 'Appendix 1. Conservative Party Leadership Selection This Century'. Geoffrey D. M. Block. 3 
February 1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3, and Lord Kilmuir, Political Adventure: Memoirs, (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 286 
22 'Appendix 1. Conservative Party Leadership Selection This Century'. Geoffrey D. M. Block. 3 
February 1965 CPA CCO 20/39/3 
23 For the detailed analysis of this selection, see chapters six and seven 
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leadership question. The cue for the selection was Macmillan's prostate illness, which 
led him to signal his intention to resign on Tuesday 8 October. 24 The issue was not 
resolved until Home kissed hands with the Queen on agreeing to form an C) 
administration on Saturday 19 October . 
25 This longevity was central to the discredit 
that was heaped on the party after the leadership had been decided. 
The 1963 leadership selection had two aspects that made it unique in the 
history of the Conservative Party's selection of its leaders. The first was that the 
situation was complicated by the announcement of Macmillan's intended resignation 
during the Party Conference in Blackpool. This turned the Conference into a quasi- 
U. S. Presidential campaigning forum, a situation that had previously always been 0 
successfiffly avoided. The second was the more formal attempt to canvass the views of 
the whole of the party, through consultations of the NTs, peers, candidates and party 
members. This opened the door to greater accountability, and the unsatisfactory 
outcome of the selection, and its effect on the party's image, meant a new system of 
selection was inevitable. 
The Functions of Conservative Party Leaders 
The leader of the Conservative Party holds a unique position in British party 
politics, as their authority far surpasses that traditionally bestowed on their Labour and 
Liberal Democrat counterparts. Kelly has argued that the leader's authority dominates 
three areas of the party machinery. Firstly, policy is at the sole discretion of the leader. 
He or she has the final word on policy, and no 'official' constraints exist, even though 
24 R. Shepherd, The Power Brokers: The Tory Party and its Leaders, (London: Hutchinson, 1991), 
p. 152 
'-' Punnett, Selecting The Party Leade , p. 43 
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there are many sections of the party that influence policy discreetly. Party Conferences 
and party meetings do not have a formal influence on policy. Secondly, the leader 
chooses the Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet. Thirdly, the leader shapes the organisation 
of the party, inside and outside Parliament, by his or her appointment of the Party 
Chairman. 26 The leader thus shapes and defines the upper echelons of the party. 'The 
Conservative Party has always entrusted its leader with great authority. He is free to 
choose his Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet and he appoints the chairman and officers of 
the party. M Fisher thus concurs with Kelly's argument, and shows the extent of the 
power bestowed on the leader of the party. 
Bogdanor has correctly suggested that the Conservative Party leader has five 
tasks. They must, firstly, be competent and efficient as a senior member of the 
government or opposition. Secondly, they must be perceived as an electoral asset, and 
thirdly, they must have the support of the Conservative back-benchers. Fourthly, they 
must retain the support of the party in the country. However, 'Above all, a 
Conservative leader must not split the party' . 
2' For this reason, candidates for the 
leadersl-ýp who are perceived as being divisive, do not gain the post. These tasks show 
the importance of the analytical criteria of acceptability, electability, and governability, 
as the first task is governability, the second electability, and the final two concern 
acceptability. 
Nigel Birch, Financial Secretary to the Treasury from 1957-1958 in 
Macmillan's first government, once asserted that the party's organisation instituted a 
system of 'leadership by consent', wl-kh meant that the leader was leader, only as long 
"R Kelly, 'Power in the Conservative Party. Towards a New Assessment', Politics Review, 1, (4), 
April 1992, p. 26 
" Fisher, The Tory Leaders, p. 1 
28 Bogdanor, 'The Selection of the Party Leader' in Seldon/ Ball, Conservative Centurv. . 94 
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as the party wanted him to be leader. 29 Mckenzie has suggested that the impression of 
absolute power in the leader is ffýsleading, and that the Conservative Party's leaders 
have traditionally been in a much more insecure position than the leaders of the Labour 
Party. 3' This is correct because if a leader is not successful, he or she will be quickly 
jettisoned and replaced. 
'The Leadership of the Conservative Party is a subject which gives rise to a 
considerable popular and even academic mythology. ' There are two conventional 
viewpoints about the Conservative Party leadership. The first is that the party 'is and 
always has been oligarchical' .31 According to this view, the people who matter in the 
party are the influentials, or 'the men in grey suits', and the introduction of the formal 
election procedure in 1965 has not changed the party's essential power structure. The 
second viewpoint is that the party was once oligarchical, but the new electoral 
procedure of 1965 changed all that. Thatcher or Major, and perhaps Heath, would not 
have been elected under the old system of emergence. " One feature that has certainly 
remained constant over the course of the century is that if the party finds itself in 
difficulty, the leader takes sole responsibility for the party's fortunes. 'The leader leads 
and the party follows, except when the party decides not to follow; then the leader 
ceases to be leader. 0' This illustrates the power the leader of the Conservative Party 
holds, and also the insecurity of the position. 
29 Birch, The Conservative PLT! y p. 42 in R. Mckenzie, British Political Parties, (London; Heinemann, 
1964), p. 21 
'0 Mckenzie, British Political Parties, p. 22 
31 Bogdanor, 'The Selection of The Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball (eds. ), Conservative Century, p. 69; 
and 95 
32 Bogdanor, 'The Selection of The Party Leader' in Seldom/Ball (eds. ), Conservative Centu , p. 
96. 
The inclusion of Heath as an exainple is my choice. 
33 Mckenzie, British Political Parties, p. 145 
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The Formal Aspects of the Selection Procedure 
The Conservative Party's selection of its leaders before the institution of formal 
leadership elections in 1965, did not have any specific formal election rules, and 
different methods were used to select the party's leaders, depending on the 
circumstances surrounding the selection. The only formal aspect to the selection 
process that was a constant feature of all selections, was the party meeting that 
endorsed the selection made after the informal networks and consultations had 
determined the new leader, and if the party was in power he had been appointed Prime 
Nfinister. These informal networks and consultations dominated all the selections 
where an heir apparent did not exist. 'In 1902,1921,1922,1937,1940 and 1955 there 
was no need for any procedure to be devised, since there was an obvious heir 
apparent'. 34 In 1922, Bonar Law, contrary to tradition, was endorsed as leader at the 
party meeting before becoming Prime Minister. " This denotes the importance of the 
adaptability of the party's selection system, and how the nature of the selection was 
determined by the circumstances surrounding it. " 
An interesting development over the course of this century has been the 
changing composition of the party meeting, and this evolved to give a wider Zý 
endorsement from the party to the new leader. Before 1922, the meeting only 
consisted of Conservative NIPs and Peers, but in 1922, prospective Conservative 
candidates were also invited. This, however, was not a binding precedent, and was not 
repeated in 1923. In 1937, Conservative NlPs, Peers, prospective candidates and 
34 Bogdanor, 'The Selection of the Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball (eds. ), Conservative Century, p. 69; 
and Mckenzie, British Political Parties, pp. 51-53 
35 Memo by Stamfordham, Windsor Castle, Royal Archives, K. 1814/1 in Bogdanor, 'The Selection of 
The Party Leader', in Seldon/Ball (eds. ), Conservative Century, p. 70 
36 For an analysis of the 1922 selection, see chapter two, pp. 65-68 
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members of the Executive Committee of the National Union, were invited to the 
meeting to endorse Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister and party leader. From 
1955, National Liberal Peers, NTs and candidates were invited, and this remained the 
composition of the party meeting until 1965 . 
37 'At no stage in this process of 
evolution was the Party Meeting seriously considered as an electoral college nor was 
its composition considered from this point of view', demonstrating its role of 
endorsement, not election. " Humphrey Berkely, Conservative NP for Lancaster in 
1964, who had pressured Home for a change to the party's selection system following C) 
the 1963 controversy, noted of the system traditionally used in the party 
In the past and until 1963 despite differences in tenninology as to 
the leadership and differences in the composition of the electoral 
college, the same procedures so far as the party is concerned 
have in practice been applied. Soundings of influential people 
have been taken, a contest has been avoided, and when the party 
has been in power, a Prime Minister has already been appointed. 
The Leader was then presented, amid universal acclaim, to the 
electoral college, most of whom, until 1963, had not been 
consulted. 
39 
37 'Appendix 1. Conservative Party Leadership Selection this century'. GeoMey D. M. Block. 3 
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Before 1965, the Conservative Party took a governmental approach to the 
selection of its leaders, which meant the method of selection used depended on 
whether the party was in power or in opposition. 40 Until 1922, the party only had a 
formal leader when there was a Conservative Prime Minister in office, or when an ex- 
Prime Minister remained as leader in the Lords or Commons. When in opposition, the 
party did not have a leader of the whole Parliamentary Party, but had a leader of the 
House of Conunons and a leader of the House of Lords. If the party returned to 
power, it was for the Monarch to choose who would become Prime Minister. If the 
party had only recently left office, then the former Prime Minister retained his 
dominant position. 
These methods of leadership selection emerged from the practices of nineteenth 
century politics, from a time when the party did not have an extra-Parliamentary 
organisation . 
41 This only developed towards the end of the nineteenth century, as mass 
democracy developed. The party's practices thus evolved from a time when the views 
of the party outside Parliament were not considered to be important. Two features of 
the Conservative Party's leadership selection emerged from the practices of this time. 
The first was the exercise of the Royal Prerogative which required the Monarch to 
chose the Prime Nfinister. He or she would seek advice and make informal 
consultations, but the choice was essentially that of the Monarch. The party hierarchy, 
however, guided the Monarch towards their preferred candidate. 
The second feature was the weighing of opinion in the party by party notables. 
This was the informal manner by which the party's preferences could be communicated 
to the Monarch, and is considered in detail in the next section. This practice of 
'o P=ett, Selecting The Pagy Leader, p. 28 
41 Punnett, Selecting The Party Leader, p. 33 
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weighing opinion in the party had a long and honourable tradition, and was perceived 0 
Z) 
as being effective. It ran against conventional democratic practices, but analysts of 
Conservative Party leadersl-ýp selection have agreed on two distinct advantages of the 
older system. 42 The first is that the method was swift and easy. The selection of 
Macmillan to replace Eden in January 1957 took a day to resolve, for example. The 
second advantage is that a consensus can emerge more easily than in a ballot of Ngs 
and wider party figures, and thus can maintain party unity as a leader who is generally 
acceptable to all sections of the party is selected. 
The informal networks and consultations, therefore, rather than any formal 
procedure, were the most important aspect of the selection process until 1965. 
'Meetings, elections, votes, majorities: they play little part in Conservative culture, as 
anyone knows who has studied the perplexity of Conservative NVs when they are 
confronted by an election of any description within their own party'. 43 
The Informal Networks of Communication 
Apart from the selections of 1902,1921,1937 and 1955, where heir apparents 
to the leadership were clear and obvious, informal networks played a vital and 
determinant role. In each of the other selections, the Monarch consulted senior party 
figures or privy councillors, or the outgoing Prime Minister, and then invited the 
candidate they identified as the most suitable, to form a government. The Monarch 
normally consulted the outgoing Prime Nfinister. The exceptions in the Conservative 
Party's selection of its leaders are 1923 and 1955 - the succession in 1955 was 
42 Bogdanor, 'The Selection of The Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball (eds. ), Conservative Centurv p. 71; 
Mckenzie, British Political Parties, p. 45; and Punnett, Selecting The Party Leader, p. 34 
41 Watkins, The Road To Number Ten, p. 9 
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obvious, and in 1923 Bonar Law was too ill to be consulted, and he asked to be 
excused from offering advice. 44 The outgoing Prime Ministers to offer advice were 
Macmillan in 1963, and Eden in 1957. 
The Monarch also consulted any senior party figure or privy councillor, that 
was felt to be able to offer valuable advice in determining the choice. For example, 
Lords Chandos and Waverley, and Churchill in 1957, and Balfour and Salisbury in 
1923 . 
45 Therefore, the party hierarchy played a major role in the informal networks. 46 
Their advice, especially that of senior party figures and former party leaders in the 
selections before 1957, was often crucial in the decisions that were taken. One feature 
that is apparent is that the Monarch was not bound to ask a retiring Prime Minister for 
a view as to his or her successor, and the precedent of 1957, when Eden's advice was 
not influential, shows that the Monarch does not have to accept those views. 47 This 
illustrates that in most cases the advice of an outgoing leader was not deemed to be 
crucial to the decision, and the advice of the party's 'elder statesmen' was of more 
significance. The only exception to this was Macmillan's role in the 1963 selection, as 
he was determined to play a central role in the selection of Home, and felt that role 
was essential for Home to become leader. 
If a Prime Minister resigned or died with no obvious successor, 'the electoral 
machinery of the party concerned will be used to choose a new party leader, and that 
person will be summoned to the palace and appointed Prime Nfinister'. " This 
illustrates the vital role of the informal networks in the party, as before 1965 they were 
the 'electoral machinery' of the party. The reason for the use of the informal networks 
44 V. Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 79 
45 Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, p. 79 
" For a definition of the party hierarchy and its composition, see chapter one, p. 24 
47 Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, p. 94 
48 Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, p. 84 
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was 'because the crown was anxious to appoint somebody who would be acceptable to 
the party', and the party hierarchy felt this was a more effective method of finding the 0 
most acceptable candidate than a formal leadership election. 49 Until 1957, the 
consultations were limited to a small number of advisers, but in 1957, the Cabinet were 
consulted as part of the procedure for the first time, and the consultations in that 
selection were more exhaustive. In 1963, this was entrenched further as the 
consultations covered all sections of the Parliamentary party, and consultations were 
undertaken of the views of the party in the country. The informal networks became 
more extensive because of the difficult circumstances surrounding the selection. There C, 
was also growing pressure for greater accountability by the party and the public, 'But 
despite these more extensive soundings there was still criticism that the leader was 
effectively chosen by a 'magic circle' of senior figures in the party. so 
There was no set pattern or uniformity to the informal consultations of each 
selection, and they, therefore, fitted the situation and circumstances that surrounded 
each one. The consultations were of an undefined nature, and there were no written 
rules or conventions. A certain degree of consistency can be found across the 
selections, but this was more due to situational parallels, than a uniform pattern in the 
nature of the informal consultations. This undefined nature meant that the practice was 
adaptable, and allowed the party to face different situational requirements. On 18 
November 1964, Sir NEchael Fraser, the General Director of the CRD, wrote to Lord 
Blakenham, the Party Chairman, during the development of the formal leadership 
election procedure 
'9 Fisher, The Tory Leaders ' p. 
6 
50 Fisher, The Torv Leaders, pp. 6-7 
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Because of the sort of party we are, no system of election or 
selection will in fact succeed unless the actual process has really 
been resolved by private negotiations before it takes place. In any 
new arrangements we make, therefore, it is most important not 
to think that they can do the job for us from scratch. 51 
This view denotes the tradition in the party of the use of informal networks in 
the selection of the party's leaders, and the vital role they were felt to have. The 
examples of the informal networks in the party's selection of its leaders before 1965 
include those during the 1911 selection of Bonar Law. These were the agreement 
between Long and Chamberlain, the other two candidates, to stand aside for Law, and 
the offer made by Balcarres to undertake 'soundings' in the party of opinion on who 
should succeed Balfour. Balcarres offered to make soundings of opinion to see if there 
was a majority for one candidate, and 'if so, whether the others might be persuaded to 
withdraw so that the party meeting might be offered just one name'. " The decisive 
action in the outcome, however, was Long and Chamberlain's private agreement to 
withdraw if another candidate came forward. They did so after Chamberlain offered to 
withdraw to settle the deadlock, but only if Long also agreed to, and 'once that offer 
was made, Long could hardly refuse'. Many Conservative MPs at the party meeting 
expressed dismay at the choice being made by private agreement, but it followed in the 
tradition of the party's leadership selection in using informal networks to settle the 
succession. 
53 
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In 1922, the discussions between Stamfordham and Law to persuade Law to 
succeed as party leader were significant. Following Lloyd George's resignation, 
Starnfordharn was at once despatched to ascertain Bonar Law's views. Law told him 
he was no longer leader of the party, and that the party was 'broken up'. He declared 
that until he knew he had the party's support, he could not accept office. Law then 
stated that he would need to be present at a meeting of the 'whole party', to discover if 
he had its full backing. Stamfordham told him that the King was sending for Law 
'independently of these party considerations', and that the King had a duty to form a 
government as soon as possible after accepting Lloyd George's resignation. He also 
told Law that unless a new government was formed, the Irish Treaty would not be 
ratified, and would lapse. Law still maintained that he needed to be elected leader of 
the party at a party meeting. Following a considerable amount of discussion between 
the Palace and Law, the King accepted that he should be elected at a party meeting, 
and he told the King he would consult with 'those who might help him form a 
government'. On 23 October, Law was elected leader at the party meeting and was 
then appointed Prime Minister, reversing the usual procedure to fit the circumstances 
that the selection took place in. 54 
In 1923, the Davidson Memorandum, the soundings undertaken by 
Stamfordham, and the Balfour and Salisbury consultations were the informal 
communications. According to Fisher, Bonar Law preferred Baldwin, but did not 
express this view. 55 The King decided, after consulting both Lord Balfour, the only 
other living Conservative ex-Premier, and a Conservative elder statesman, Lord 
Salisbury (the son of the former Prime Nlinister), to appoint Baldwin. There was no 
5' Watkins, The Road To Number Ten, pp. 8-10; and Mckenzie, British Political Parties, p. 35 
55 Fisher, The Tory Leadersl p. 28 
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attempt at a systematic canvass of the Cabinet or of NTs, pointing to the importance 
of informal networks in the decision. 
Watkins has stated of the Davidson Memorandum, 'Law had nothing to do 
with it. Indeed, it misrepresented his views'. Ramsden has argued that Bonar Law gave 
no formal advice to the King, but 'may have known' of the Davidson Memorandum, 
which was supposed to represent Law's view that Baldwin should succeed him. 56 
Clark has argued that Davidson's objectives were clear, as he had long been 'intimate' 
with Baldwin, more so than he was with Law, but had nothing in common with 
Curzon, 'nor any prospect of promotion, nor of keeping a job in government at all'. He 
believes that the crucial assertion in the Davidson memorandum was 'Lord Curzon is 
regarded in the public eye as representing that section of privileged Conservatism 
which has its value but in this democratic age... 
). 57 
The Davidson memorandum was delivered by Colonel Waterhouse, Bonar 
Law's Private Secretary to Stamfordham, on May 20, when he informed Starnfordham 
of Law's resignation. It was said by Stamfordham's note on the succession in the 
Royal Archives, to have 'practically expressed the views of Mr. Bonar Law". Blake has 
argued that 'there is no internal evidence in the document to suggest that it expressed 
Bonar Law's views'. Davidson stated that it was written, as he was requested by 
Stamfordham to give the 'point of view of the averac,, e back bencher in the House of 
Conunons'. Davidson believed it did correspond with Law's own views, but the 
memorandum was an expression of Davidson's views only. 58 Stamfordham advised 
56 Bogdanor, 'The Selection of the Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball (eds. ), Conservative Centu , p. 
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the King to send for Curzon, so the Davidson Memorandum could not have influenced 
his views strongly, and the King's decision was formed by his own belief that the 
circumstances were wrong for a peer to be Prime Nlinister. 9 However, the Davidson C) 
Memorandum was not decisive, while the advice of Balfour was influential, as it 
confirmed the King's own assessment that Baldwin was the best candidate in the 
circumstances. 60 
'In those days the accepted method of settling the succession lay in 'soundings' 
of opinion by the King's private secretary, Lord Stamfordham' . 
61 Balfour urged that 
Baldwin should be appointed for 'one over-riding reason: the Prime Nfinister ought to 0 
be in the House of Commons'. The King decided after Balfour's advice, which were 
conformity with his personal judgement, to send for Baldwin. 62 Lord Salisbury stated 
that Curzon's candidacy should not 'lightly be ignored', but his advice was not 
influential. Balfour recorded his observations, and his belief that Baldwin should 
succeed Law, in a memorandum for the record confirming his views. He also stated 
that he 'understood from Stamfordham, that these views were probably in very close 
conformity with those already held by His Majesty' . 
6' The fact that Curzon was a 
peer, and none of the members of the Labour opposition were in the Lords counted 
against Curzon, but the choice was only made to suit these circumstances, and did not 
mean that Lords would permanently be excluded from consideration for the party 
59 Blake, The Conservative Party, p. 212 
60 For an explanation of this point, see chapter two, pp. 52-53 
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leadership. 'It is clear that the principle reason for the choice of Baldwin was the 
difficulty of having a peer as Prime Minister'. 64 
The examples of the use of informal networks of communication in the 
selection of the party's leaders, has shown that they were the vital component of the 
selection procedure, where a clear heir apparent did not exist. They helped to inform 
the Monarch, or confirm his or her own judgement, of who was the best candidate in 
the circumstances surrounding the selection. 
The Outcomes: Situational Parallels and Distinctions 
The first clear trend in the selections is that if there was a clear heir apparent, 
no procedure was needed or used, and that person succeeded automatically. The 
examples of this are Balfour in 1902, Austen Chamberlain in 1921, Bonar Law in 
1922, Neville Chamberlain in 1937, and Anthony Eden in 1955. The second is that the 
informal practices used in the selections allowed it to be adaptable, and meet the needs 
of different situations and circumstances surrounding selections. For example, Bonar 
Law was elected leader before becoming Prime NEnister in 1922, contrary to tradition C I- 
when the party was in power, because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the 
selection. 
The informal consultations became more extensive if the party had to select a 
new leader in a time of severe difficulty. For example, the party meeting in 1922 to 
elect Law as leader before he became Prime Mnister, for the reasons explained 
earlier . 
65 Another example is the Cabinet consultations in 1957, and the informal 
canvasses of party opinion by Heath, Poole and Morrison. This was the first time the 
64 Blake, The Conservative Party, p. 213 
65 See chapter two, pp. 65-66 
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Cabinet had been consulted, and this was because of the severe state of disunity in the 
party after the Suez Crisis. This was entrenched further by the selection of Home in 
1963, when the informal consultations of the Cabinet, Conservative NTs, the Lords, 
and the constituency parties, took a more formal nature. This was because the party 
was in a severe state of disunity, and the party hierarchy wanted to assess party 
opinion fully. The fourth trend is that the party meeting did not elect its leaders, but 
merely endorsed the decision of the party hierarchy and the monarch. As already 
noted, the only exception to this was the 1922 selection of Law. 
It is clear that when the Monarch consulted the outgoing Prime Minister for 
advice on his successor, that advice does not always have to be taken up, and is not 
always decisive. It was in 1963, but in 1957, Eden offered his opinion that Butler 
would be a worthy successor, whereas Macmillan was selected. Conversely, the advice 
given by senior party figures to the Monarch was usually decisive, and this was 
especially the case if it confirmed the Monarch's view on a successor. For example, the 
advice of Balfour in 1923, and Churchill in 1957. The next clear trend is the role of 
the Monarch's Private Secretary was often of vast significance in ascertaining the 
views of the party's senior figures on the selection of a new leader. For example, the 
role of Stamfordham in 1922 and 1923, and Adeane and Ford in 1957 and 1963. 
A significant trend is that situational pressures had a highly influential role on 
the nature of the selection, and the system was designed to be flexible enough to cope 
with a wide range of situational variables. For example, the imminence of a party 
conference affected the selection procedure, as it threatened to allow wider party 
opinion to play a role in the selection, a factor successfully avoided by the party 
hierarchy in finalising the choice quickly. This occurred in 1911, and also in 1963 as 
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the selection was controlled tightly, the two instances where the party conference was 
a complicating factor. Both selections produced similar outcomes: the party selected a 
surprise compromise leader to keep the party together, as the other candidates 
experienced substantial opposition to their candidacies. 66 
In 1963, Macmillan's statement of his intention to resign, made by Home 
during the party conference, signalled the opportunity for the party conference to play 
a role in the selection of Macmillan's successor. It also complicated the party 
hierarchy's deliberations on who that successor should be. The role of the party 
conference was important in the 1963 selection as it meant that a 'campaign' for the 
leadership, similar to campaigns in formal leadership elections, was instigated by the 
public platform that the candidates found themselves on. Their actions during the party 
conference had an important bearing on the outcome of the selection, as Home 
improved his candidacy, whereas Butler, Maudling and Hailsham all adversely affected 
theirs. 
67 
The next situational pressure was the wider party political situation, and the 
Parliamentary position of candidates. This was an important situational factor in the 
1923 and 1963 selections, although both had different outcomes. The 1923 selection of 
Baldwin was affected by this as his main rival, Lord Curzon, was a peer and it was felt 
that a peer could not succeed Law at this time. This was because there were no 
members of the Labour opposition in the House of Lords, and a Prime Nlinister from 
the Commons was felt to be more suitable in this situation. In 1963, a key situational 
influence was the institution of the Peerage Act in July 1963. This legislation allowed 
peers to renounce their peerages, and stand as candidates for the House of Commons. 
156 For an explanation of the effect of the party conference on the 1911 selection, see chapter two, p. 51 
67 For the effect of the party conference on the 1963 selection, see chapter six 
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This allowed Home and Hailsham to become viable candidates to succeed Macmillan, 
and therefore, was a factor in the outcome of the selection. 
The imminence of an election has proved to be a strong situational influence on 
the selection of the party's leaders, and this was especially the case with the 1963 
selection of Home. This selection occurred with only a year to go before a general 
election had to take place, and alongside the key situational influence of the wide 
discredit heaped on the Macmillan regime, was a key factor in the outcome. The 
imminence of an election means that electability becomes a key attribute, in an effort to 
gain or secure another term in office. Home's electability was felt to be significant, as 
he was not directly associated with the domestic failures of the Macmillan regime, had 
an inoffensive reputation, and a wide reputation as a competent minister. This was in 
contrast to the other candidates, especially Butler, whose electability was felt by the 
party to be low, because of his direct association with Macmillan. Conversely, the 
1957 selection occurred at a convenient place in the electoral cycle, as the party had 
until 1960 before it had to hold an election. Evidence suggests that Macmillan was 
selected as a stop-gap leader, as Home was in 1963, because of the wide expectation 
that the government would fall because of the Suez Crisis, but Macmillan was the best 
qualified candidate for the situation. 68 
A clear feature is that general acceptance in the party can often be more 
important than widespread enthusiasm for a candidate. This is especially when there 
was substantial opposition to the favoured candidates, and this occurred in 1911 and 
1963. This points to the nature of the party's selection of its leaders: the party often 
took a pragmatic approach, designed to keep ideology and factions out of the party's 
" For a fuller analysis of this point, see chapter five. 
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key decision-making, and it's approach to government. Opposition to candidates was 
deemed to be of more importance than appointing a leader who was enthusiastically 
endorsed in the party. This is especially apparent in selections when the party was in a 
state of severe division and difficulty, as in 1911,1957 and 1963. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the Conservative Party's selection of its 
leaders before 1965 was dominated by the use of informal networks of communication 
to find the best leader. There were no formal rules, and the only formal aspect of the 
procedure was the party meeting that endorsed the choice of the Monarch and the 
party hierarchy. The system was designed to be flexible enough to meet a wide variety 
of situational variables that the party may have met in selecting its leaders, and this was 
its raison d'Etre. The procedures adaptability is also apparent in the different ways the 
system was used in different circumstances. 
The important role of the party hierarchy in the selection of the party's leaders 
has been demonstrated, as they were the foremost actors in giving advice to the 
Monarch, and in undertaking soundings of party opinion. It is also apparent that the 
role of the party hierarchy evolved over the period Until 1957, the informal 
consultations were limited to a small number of the advisors and were randomly 
conducted, but in 1957 and 1963, they had more extensive and more formal roles in 
the soundings of Cabinet and party opinion. It is clear, however, that the informal 
selection procedure was designed to find the most generally acceptable leader, and that 
this was often more important than a widespread enthusiasm for a candidate. This is 
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especially apparent in selections at times of severe difficulty for the party, like the 
selections of 1957 and 1963. 
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Chapter Three 
The Candidates: Partv Status and Personalities 
This chapter analyses the party status and personal qualities of the candidates in 
the two leadership selections. The candidates were Harold Macmillan and R. A. Butler 
in January 1957, and Butler, Lord Home, Reginald Maudling, and Lord Hailsham in 
October 1963. The party status of the candidates discusses the posts that they had 
achieved, and the extent to which they were political 'insiders' or 'outsiders' in the 
party, during their careers prior to the leadership selections they were involved in. This 
aspect is analysed by demonstrating different graduations of 'insider' status, following 
the definition set out in chapter one. ' The section on the candidates' personalities 
analyses the characteristics that were important in their success or failure in the two 
selections. 
The Candidates' Party Status 
Macmillan 
Before 1940, Macmillan was unsuccessful in attaining any significant status in 
the party. He was in many ways a 'frustrated careerist', who from becon-dng an NP in 
1925 remained an obscure back-bencher. Macn-dllan, from the base of his first 
constituency, Stockton-On-Tees, focused on economic issues as a means of gaining 
attention. In publications such as IndustEy and the State (April 1927), Reconstruction: 
A Plea For A National Poligy (December 1933), The Next Five Years (March 1935), 
and The Price Of Peace (May 1938), he attacked the government's policies to deal 
with economic and industrial problems. Macmillan was greatly influenced by the 
' For the analysis of the graduations of 'outsider' and 'insider' status, see chapter one, pp. 16-17 
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poverty, deprivation, and industrial decline in Stockton, which led him to focus on this 
issue. However, despite these efforts, Macmillan remained a political 'outsider' in the 
Conservative Party. He can be classified as an 'outsider' in this period, as he was not 
regarded as a successful back-bencher. Unlike Butler, he did not gain the traditional 
junior posts that gained him the first stage of 'insider' status in the party, such as 
Parliamentary Private Secretary or Under-Secretary. Macmillan was an ordinary back- 
bencher on the outer realms of the Parliamentary Party. 
Macmillan's lack of success led him to consider joining Oswald Mosley's New 
Party in 193 1, but he did not as he believed that remaining with the Conservative Party 
was the best way of furthering his career. 2 That Macn-dllan was tempted to join 
Mosley illustrates the extent to which he was unsuccessful as a party politician in this 
period. He continued his strategy of attacking the government's economic policies in 
The Middle W in June 1938. Macmillan believed this was his political testament, but 
like his earlier work, it was not successful in improving his party status, but did 
influence younger Conservatives, like Hugh Fraser and Edward Heath. 3 
The policy of appeasement towards Nazi Germany gave Macmillan another 
focus of attack in his efforts to kick-start his career. He became one of the anti- 
appeasers, along with Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden. The anti-appeasers were 
not successful, and were not feared as a threat by the Conservative Party hierarchy. 
Macmillan later noted that 'We had no power to change the Government, even if we 
could have rallied at that time sufficient Members to bring about its fall'. 4 The 
declaration of war on 3 September 1939 did not change Macmillan's 'outsider' status, 
2 H. Nicolson, Diaries and Letters 1930-1939, (London: Collins, 1966), entry for 30 May 1930, p. 76. 
Harold Nicolson was a member of the New Party, and Macmillan told him he felt it was better for him 
to remain a Conservative MP. 
3 Home, Macmillan 1894-1956 pp. 107-109 
4 H. Macmillan, Winds Of Change 1914-1939, (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 550 
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but when Chamberlain fell as Prime Minister in May 1940, he held high hopes for an 
up-turn in his career, as Churchill succeeded Chamberlain as Prime Nfinister. 
After Churchill came to power, Macmillan gained his first government post, as 
Under-Secretary to the Nfinister of Supply, Lord Beaverbrook on 29 June 1941. This 
was his first government post after sixteen years as an M[P, and was the most junior 
position in the Ministry. Following that appointment, Macmillan occupied the same 
post at the Colonial Office. In December 1942, he became British Nfinister Resident in 
North Africa. This was a clear promotion for Macmillan, as he had direct contact with 
Churchill and Cabinet status. However, Macmillan remained a political 'outsider', as 
although he had attained the first stage of 'insider' status, he was detached from the 
Westminster scene, and was of low status in the party. The advantages of the post 
were perceived by Macmillan, and he accepted Churchill's offer 'immediately and 
gratefully'. ' He did gain valuable experience in this post, and was a success, as he 
gained a good reputation with Eisenhower, the Allied Commander-in-Chief This came 
to be of great significance during the Suez Crisis. Once the war had ended, Macmillan 
became Secretary of State for Air in the caretaker government before the 1945 
election. He finished the war years with an enhanced reputation, but was still an 
insignificant figure detached from the upper realms of the party. 
During the opposition years of 1945-195 1, Macmillan began to improve his 
status in the party. He became a chief contributor on the Industrial Policy Committee 
that produced The Industrial Charter of 1947, and played a key role in publicising it at 
the meetings with trade unionists and businessmen, which contributed to the 
formulation of the policies. Macmillan produced key documents that were influential in 
5 H. Macmillan, War Diaries, (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. xxi; and H. Macmillan, The Blast 0 
War 193 9-1945, (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 185 
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the final version of The Industrial Charter, such as Industrial Roligy and The 
Government and Indust . Conservative Research Department documents reveal the 
central role he played in the formulation of the IPCs policy proposals, and the 
publicity of them. 6 This helped to increase perceptions of Macn-dllan in the party as a 
politician with good electability. This role also served to decrease Macn-Oan's 
'outsider' chic in the party because of his role on the IPC, but his party status remained 
outside the upper realms of the party. 
When the Conservatives returned to power at the 1951 election, Macmillan 
gained the post of Minister of Housing and Local Government. This was a junior 
position in the Cabinet, and evidence suggests that he wanted a more senior post. This 
appointment, however, illustrates how far away from the summit of the party 
Macmillan was in 195 1. It proved, nevertheless to be a successful appointment for him, 
and its potential was summed up when Churchill told Macmillan on his appointment: 
'It [will] make or mar my political career. But every humble home will bless my name, 
7 if I succeed' . Macmillan's ability as an effective 
legislator and administrator, and his 
electability in publicising the housing drive, improved Macmillan's status in a post of 
vital electoral significance. His role as the man who built 300,000 houses a year 
increased Macrnillan's party status and his visibility in the country, and he was invited 
to give one of the first ever Party Political Broadcasts in 1953. As Ramsden has noted, 
'Macmillan was seen as one of the government's stars, much in demand for 
constituency engagements'. 8 Bracken noted to Beaverbrook that 'Macmillan has 
shown a great deal of good sense in his dealings with the public'. This was illustrated 
6 'The Worker and Industry', initialled 'H. M', The Government and Industry', undated; 'Industrial 
Policy', undated; and 'Suggested Plans and Dates for Areas to be visited by members of the Industrial 
Policy Committee, 5 December 1946 CPA CRD 2n156 
7 Diary entry for 28 October 195 1, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 9* (I 11) 
I J. Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940-1957, (London: Longman, 1995), p. 257 
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when Macmillan visited Exmoor in August 1952 following severe floods which 
destroyed Lynmouth, and the national press acclaimed Macn-dllan's visit. 9 Macmillan 
became more of an 'insider' in the party over this period because of his success at 
Housing, and he further increased this status when he. penetrated the 'inner circle' of 
the Churchill government, when he was promoted to Minister of Defence in October 
1954. Macmillan did not enjoy thýs post as defence matters were dominated by 
Churchill, and he had little success there, but the post improved his status in the party, 
and also his governability as he moved into one of the key foreign policy positions in 
the govemment. 
When Eden succeeded Churchill as Prime NEnister in April 1955, Macmillan 
succeeded him as Foreign Secretary. This significantly improved his status in the party, 
as he now occupied one of the three 'great offices of state, and was on a traditional 
career path to the party leadership. Macmillan now fulfilled the final stage of 'insider' 
status. Macmillan had always coveted the position of Foreign Secretary, and enjoyed 
the job, but did not appreciate Eden's interference in the work of the Foreign Office. 
Macmillan was only at the Foreign Office for six months before agreeing to become 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in December 1955, replacing Butler at the Treasury. Eden 
had first asked Macmillan to consider going to the Treasury before the 1955 election, 
and he was asked again on 23 September 1955.10 This move, after months of stalling 
and negotiation over terms for moving posts, was significant for Macmillan as he now 
occupied another of the three 'great offices of state'. It was the key domestic position 
9 R. Cockett (ed. ), My Dear Max: The Letters of Brendan Bracken to Lord Beaverbrook, 1925-1958 
(London: I-Iistorians' Press, 1990), entry for 7 January 1953, pp. 135-136; and The Times, 20 August 
1952 
10 Diary entry for 3 April 1955, Ms. Macmillan dev. d. 20 (79). and Diary entry for 23 September 
1955 Ms. Macmillan dev. d. 23* (57-58) 
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in the government, and a traditional career path to the leadership that was more 
common than the Foreign Office route. " 
Macmillan's three years at Housing had given him an appetite for 
power and had shown the party something of his flair for 
presentation, hitherto generally unsuspected; from 1954 he 
moved within two years through the Ministry of Defence, the 
Foreign Office and the Exchequer, and so developed an all- 
rounder's claims on the highest post of all. " 
Following the onset of the Suez Crisis in July 1956, Macmillan became one of 
Eden's most important ministers, and, along with Lord Salisbury, was the most vocal 
'hawk' in the Cabinet who supported Eden's aggressive stance towards Nasser's 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. Macmillan was at the core of key 
Nfinisters on the Egypt Committee, and played a major role in the determination of 
policy and planning for the invasion of the Canal Zone. As Chancellor, Macmillan had 
the ultimate responsibility for the safe-guarding of Britain's financial well-being. His 
concerns over the state of the British economy, after the full extent of Britain's 
problems with the oil supply, led him to signal the retreat from the Canal Zone on 6 
November, after it became clear that the US government would not help Britain 
financially unless a cease-fire was called. Macmillan's centrality in this decision shows 
the full extent of his status and position in the party. 
11 The details of Macmillan's negotiations with Eden, and his belief that Butler should not become 
Deputy Prime Minister (which Butler wanted) are in Diary entries for 24 October, 18 November and 
7-13 December 1955, Ms. Macn-dllan dep. d. 24* (2-4,8 1,108v-1 l4v) 
" Ramsden, Age of Churchill and Eden, p. 257 
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This signalling of the cease-fire also served to increase Macn-dllan's status, 
despite his transformation from one of the most aggressive Nfinisters in calling for 
military action, to giving the signal for the retreat, and being 'first in, first out'. This 
was because when Eden went to Jamaica, Butler became the focal point for 
Conservative MPs' discontent, while Macmillan used the situation to promote his 
status regarding his leadership candidacy, if Eden was forced to resign because of the 
crisis. This was especially apparent at the 1922 Committee meeting of 22 November 
when Macmillan delivered a rallying cry to the party's MPs that invigorated their 
spirits. The speech increased his status as a leadership candidate, as it had then become 
clear to the party that Eden was unlikely to continue as leader. Following Eden's 
departure for Jamaica, Macmillan played a key role alongside Butler in re-building 
Anglo-US relations. His long-standing fhendship with President Eisenhower was 0 
rejuvenated in this period, and Macmillan's actions in securing the necessary financial 
help for the British government increased his status with the US government, who 
appeared to favour him over Butler in succession to Eden. At the time of the selection 
of Eden's successor, Macn0an occupied a position of considerable status in the party, 
and was in a prime position to become leader should Eden relinquish his position. 
Butler 
Butler became the Conservative NIP for Saffron Walden at the 1929 general 
election, and rapidly attained his first position of junior rank in the government. In 
August 193 1, He became Parliamentary Private Secretary to Sir Samuel Hoare at the 
India Office, and was promoted to Under-Secretary of State in August 1932. Sir 
Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for India told Lord Willingdon, the Viceroy of 
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India, that he appointed Butler because of his knowledge of Indian affairs. 13 He then 
became Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Labour in May 1937, before moving to the 
same position at the Foreign Office following Eden's resignation as Foreign Secretary 
on 20 February 1938. 
Over the first decade of his career, Butler became a political 'insider' in the 
Conservative Party, as he attained a junior position in the party quickly, and was then 
promoted several times. This can be deemed as the first stage of Butler's 'insider' 
status. His time at the Foreign Office was crucial to his party status, as he gained good 
experience by his close work with Chamberlain and Halifax, and represented the 
Foreign Office in the Commons as Halifax was a peer. 'He became far more of an 
habitu6 of No. 10 than any other junior Nfinister'. This was significant in terms of 
Butler's experience of governability. However, it had a disadvantage as Butler was 
directly associated with the policy of appeasement, and when this failed by the 
outbreak of war, this affected his status with the anti-appeasers in the party, but they 
did not represent a significant section of Conservative NVS . 
14 The 'Munichite' tag 
only affected Butler's party status later in his career, during both leadership selections 
of 1957 and 1963. This tag acted in accumulation with the Suez Crisis and with the 
dissolution of the Central African Federation in 1963, which affected Butler's status 
with the traditionalist right wing of the party. This accumulation of doubts affected his 
acceptability in both selections, but did not affect his status during the late 1930s, as he 
was still a junior member of the government, and obviously not a contender for the 
leadership of the party at this time. In the New Years Honours list of 1939, Butler was 
13 R. A. Butler, The Art of The Possible, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971), pp. 4546 
14 Howard, 
_RAB, pp. 
72-73; and R. Rhodes-James (ed. ), 'Chips': The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993), entry for 13 April 193 9, p. 193. Channon was Butler's 
Parliamentary Private Secretary, and noted the closeness of Butler and Chamberlain. 
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nominated by Chamberlain to the Privy Council, and at thirty-six he was the youngest 
Privy Councillor since Churchill, and Butler was obviously delighted at this award, 
which buttressed his growing 'insider' status. He noted of the honour: 'Greatest 
political honour. Youngest except for Winston' [Churchill]. " 
On 20 July 1941, Butler became President of the Board of Education, and this 
was a clear promotion for him. His work in introducing the 1944 'Butler' Education 
Act significantly enhanced his reputation, and status in the party as a progressive 
Conservative who was likely to play a key role in the rejuvenation of Conservatism 
after the Second World War. Churchill telegraphed Butler on the passage of the Act on 
3 August 1944, and told him 'Pray accept my congratulations. You have added a 
notable Act to the Statute Book and won a lasting place in the history of British 
education'. Ramsden noted that 'The Act was a signal triumph whose passage into Cl 
law ... established 
Butler as a major figure for the future'. 16 Butler's work as Chairman 
of the Post-War Problems Central Committee (PWPCC), which aimed at preparing the 
party for the realities of Post-War Britain also increased his party status, and both 
significantly increased his govemability. 
Following the 1945 election defeat, Butler became a key player in the 
rejuvenation of the Conservative Party, and its adaptation to the conditions of Post- 
War Britain. He is widely acknowledged as the party's Thilosopher-in Chief through 
his work as Chairman of the Conservative Research Department (CRD) and the 
Advisory Committee on Policy and Political Education (ACPPE). This was increased 
by his role as Chairman of the Industrial Policy Committee (IPC) that produced The 
's Notes, 'Privy Councillor', c. May 193 9, Butler MSS RAB G 10 (22) 
16 'Telegram from the Prime Nfinister addressed to Mr. R. A. Butler on the occasion of the Education 
Act receiving Royal Assent and becoming law'. Signed Winston S Churchill, undated BILder MSS 
RAB G 16 (179); Butler, Art of the Possible p. 122; and Ramsden, Age of Churchill and Eden, p. 40 
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Industrial Charter of II May 1947. The Industrial Charter emphasised the party's 
acceptance of the role of the state in the planned economy, and the public ownership of 
coal, rail transport, and the Bank of England. Both were important groups in preparing 
the party's response to Labour's Post-War settlement, and Butler's role as Chairman 
of these influential party organisations showed his growing status in the party. Butler's 0 
governability was also illustrated by his successful chairmanship of both committees. 
11is appointment as Chairman of the IPC was a surprise to him, as Oliver Stanley and 
Oliver Lyttelton, two other members of the IPC, were of more senior status. This 
serves to illustrate Butler's central role in the rejuvenation of party policy after 1945, 
and the consequent status in the party that went with that role. 17 This period served to 
increase his 'insider' status, as he gained more influence in the upper-realms of the 
party. 
However, his role in the 1945-51 period of opposition increased doubts about 
Butler with the right wing of the party. Their doubts first arose during the appeasement 
era. He was seen as a 'wet' and a 'milk and water socialist', who was denigrating the 
party's principles, and this decreased his acceptability with this wing of the party. The 
opposition of the right wing was led by Sir Waldron Smithers, Conservative NT for 
Orpington, who attacked The Industrial Charter in correspondence to Butler, and in 
the press. 18 However, two points must be noted about the effect of this on Butler's 
status in the party. Firstly, this period was far before the two leadership contests that 
he was involved in, and was therefore, not influential in affecting his status in 1957 or 
1963. The circumstances surrounding both selections, and Butler's response to them, 
17 Butler, Art of the Possible , p. 135 18 'Orpington Division - Private and Confidential', Smithers to Butler, July 1947 Butler MSS RAB 
H92 (110), 'Private and Confidential - not for publication -'Industrial of Magna CharterT The 
Conservative Industrial Charter attacked by Sir Waldron Smithers, J. P., M. P. - to the authors of the 
Charter. London, July 1947'. Butler MSS RAB H92 (112-145): and The Times, 12 May 1947 
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were the most influential factors in the outcomes. Secondly, despite misgivings in some 
sections of the party to the conciliatory response adopted to Labour's Post-War 
settlement, many saw the necessity of such a response, and did not oppose Butler for 
playing a key role in directing it. The failure of the right wing opposition to The 
Industrial Charter at the 1948 Party Conference illustrates the lack of effect this had on 
Butler's party status. There were only three votes against The Industrial Charter at the 
Conference, after the members of the IPC submitted an amendment that called for it to 
be accepted only as a basis of Conservative policy, and this was almost unanimously 
accepted. '9 Memories are often long in politics, but not that long. Macmillan noted of 
Butler's role in The Industrial Charter: 'His [Butler's] work in guiding the unfolding of 
the new Conservatism placed him in the first rank of the party's leaders' . 
20 This is a 
correct assessment of Butler's party status, and was illustrated when he was appointed 
Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Conservative's return to power in October 195 1. 
Butler now entered one of the 'great offices of state' with an obvious positive 
effect on his 'insider' status, and his govemability, acceptability and electability, as a 
possible future candidate for the leadership. However, Eden was the clear heir 
apparent in 195 1, and was expected to succeed Churchill sooner rather than later. 
Butler was chosen by Churchill for his moderate image and his ability to deal with the 
'Commons stuff, over the widely expected appointment, Oliver Lyttelton. Sir Robert 
Hall, the Director of the Economic Section based in the Cabinet office, noted in his 
diary that Lyttelton was the expected appointment in the Treasury, and Macmillan 
19 Butler's notes for an essay on the party's evolution after the Second World War, undated CPA CRD 
2/53/1,, and Butler, Art of the Possible p. 148 
11 H. Macmillan, Tides of Fortune 191ý4955, (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 308 
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noted that Lyttelton was also the expected appointment within the party. 2' Butler was 
successful as Chancellor in dealing with the massive deficit that the new government :D 
inherited, and was a popular chancellor with the party and the public. 22 By the autumn 
of 1952, the balance of payments was back in surplus. In January 1953, Party 
Chairman, Lord Woolton wrote to Butler and told him 'you seem to be working 
financial marvels'. 
23 
In June 1953, Churchill suffered a stroke, and as Eden was also recuperating 
from major surgery, Butler became de facto acting Prime NEnister for the period of 
their absence. Tl-ýs was significant for his status, and he came to be seen as a possible 
alternative to Eden as party leader, but Eden remained the obvious successor to 
Churchill. However, the 'establishment plot' against Butler to prevent him from 
succeeding Churchill instead of Eden, with the plan for Lord Salisbury, the Lord 
President, to be the figurehead for the government during their absence, illustrated 
doubts about his acceptability to the party hierarchy. Butler was aware of the plot to 
prevent him succeeding Churchill, as he revealed in 1978.24 However, the plot was 
probably due to the wish to secure the succession for Eden as it was felt to be rightly 
his, rather than a plot directly against Butler. He was pressured by a number of back- 
bench NTs who were opposed to Eden succeeding Churchill, but the vast majority 
appear to have shared the party hierarchy's view that Eden was the right successor to 
Churchill . 
25 However, Butler's conduct during Churchill and Eden's absence improved 
21 Butler, Art of the Possible, p. 156; A. Caimcross (ed. ), The Robert Hall Diaries, 1947-1953 
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), entry for 15 October 195 1, p. 169; and Macmillan, Tides of Fortune 
p. 497 
22 The Balance of Payments Deficit was L700 million 
23 Woolton to Butler, 15 January 1953 Butler MSS RAB G26 (9) 
24 BBC Radio Profile, 29 June 1978 in Howard, 
' 
RAB5 p. 199 
21 Rayner to Butler, 12 July 1953 Butler MSS RAB G26 (63-64). Brigadier Ralph Rayner urged Butler 
to grasp the leadership as he felt Eden was not the right successor to Churchill, and stated that many 
of his back-bench colleagues shared his view. 
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his relationship with Churchill, and his status in the party hierarchy. This point was 
noted by Jane Portal, Butler's niece, who was also Churchill's secretary. 26 
Butler's status in the party began to take a clown-turn, when Eden finally 
succeeded Churchill in April 1955. Following the give-away Budget before the 
election, and its resultant negative effect on the British economy, Eden wished to 
remove Butler from the Treasury, as he felt Butler had lost control of the economic 
front, and was losing his touch as Chancellor. Eden retained him at the Treasury after 
the election victory, but within a few months, had decided to promote Macmillan to 
27 Chancellor. There followed months of negotiation with both men to persuade them 
to take the planned new posts, as they were reluctant to move. Butler's reputation as 
Chancellor worsened in October 1955, as he had to introduce a package of emergency 
measures to restore confidence in the pound, and repealed many of the measures of the 
April Budget. " He also received a hostile reception at that year's Party Conference. 
Butler decided in December 1955 to become Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the 
Commons, a clear demotion in status. 
Butler's move away from the Treasury had a significant effect on his party 
status, as he moved away from the 'great offices of state', and the summit of the party. 
He was still an 'insider', but his influence was decreasing in the upper realms of the 
party. This move also left Butler without a firm departmental footing, as his new posts 
were administrative and presentational. It also signalled a decline in Butler's 
26 Portal to Butler, 28 June 1953 Butler MSS RAB 026 (55). and Portal to Butler, 23 September 1953 
Butler MSS RAB G26 (56-58) 
2' Notes, September 1955 Butler MSS RAB G28 (93). Butler reveals that Eden asked Butler to 
consider a move from the Treasury that month, and discussed the matter at Chequers. Eden asked 
Butler to 'lead the Commons and handle the party'. 
28 Butler increased Purchase tax by a fifth at all levels and increased profits tax from 22.5. % to 27.5%. 
Details of the announcement of these measures are in Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Fifth 
Series. Vol. 545.26 October 1955. cols. 202-230 
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electability, as he was not as publicly visible as when he was Chancellor, and was also 
perceived negatively by his colleagues in the Cabinet and the Parliamentary party. 
The onset of the Suez Crisis in July 1956 marked a further down-turn in 
Butler's party status. As he no longer occupied a senior office, he did not exercise any 0 
significant influence over government policy, and was not at the core of the Egypt 
Comrnittee. Evidence suggests that Butler was deliberately excluded by Eden and the 
party's senior figures because he was distrusted, and did not agree with the aggressive 
policy adopted towards Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. This 
illustrates his lack of status and influence at the apex of the party. 
When Eden became ill and went to Jamaica for recuperation in November 
1956, Butler became de facto acting Prime Minister and took on the responsibility for ZD 
the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone. He also had to instigate the re- 
building of Anglo-US relations, that had been tarnished by the government's attitude 
towards Nasser's actions and the resultant invasion of the Canal Zone. Butler's new 
temporary position served to inflate his status in the party, but it had disastrous 
consequences for his position in the party when Eden resigned in January 1957. 
Butler's exposed position as acting Prime Minister led him to become the focal point 
for the fury of Conservative Ws, who felt betrayed by the withdrawal of the British 
forces, and felt humiliated at the failure of government policy. He was, therefore, in a 
weakened position in the party in January 1957. 
The same loss of status occurred to Butler before the leadership struggle of 
October 1963. He became Home Secretary following Macmillan's appointment as 
party leader in January 1957, and also held the posts of Party Chairman and Leader of 
the Commons before the 'Night of the Long Knives' of 12 July 1962. The posts he 
88 
held in Macn-dllan's goverrunents had adversely affected his party status. This was 
despite Butler occupying one of the 'great offices of state' as Home Secretary, and it C. 
can be deduced that this post is less prominent as a traditional avenue to the 
Pren-ýiership, than the Treasury or the Foreign Office. The posts Butler occupied were 
posts that required senior status and vast experience, but adversely affected his party 
status regarding the leadership for two reasons. First, they aroused opposition in the 
party. This was especially the case with the dissolution of the Central African 
Federation, which Butler was placed in charge of as NEnister for Central Affica in July 
1962. This offended the traditionalist right wing of the party, who were opposed to the 
dissolution of the empire. It exacerbated the doubts about Butler by re-stirring 
memories of accusations levelled at him during the Suez Crisis and the appeasement 
era. These accusations of 'wetness' served as a cumulative effect from the three 
episodes that affected his party status in 1963. The second reason was that the posts 
Butler held were not necessarily posts that attracted the right kind of publicity needed 
for a leadership candidate. The Chancellor can demonstrate a sound handling of the 
economy, and can contribute positively to the party's electoral fortunes, as the 
economy is often the central issue in general elections. The Foreign Secretary is in a 
position to convey a statesman-like image and develop good relationships with foreign 
leaders; and also present a good electoral image as a competent statesman. Butler did 
not occupy one of these two prime positions at the time of the selection, and this 
damaged his leadership prospects. 
Following Macmillan's extensive reformulation of his government on 12 July 
1963, Butler became First Secretary of State and de facto Deputy Prime NEnister, and 
also Minister for Central Africa. In a letter to Macmillan prior to the re-shuffle, Butler 
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pointed out his fears that this move could affect his position and status in the party, 
and compared the situation to that of December 1955. He wrote that 
Without a classical office such as Lord President I shall be out on 
a raft as I was after Anthony Eden's decision in 1955.1 know 
what this means. One has a personal assistant and inadequate 
staff to transact business. I therefore think I shall be out on an 
African limb, since all the work done as Deputy viz. the 
Broadcasting and White Papers and interviews with ITA etc. is 
anonymous, as is the Home Affairs Committee and almost 
everything worthwhile. 
29 
Nevertheless, Butler agreed to take on the position, probably after assurances 
by Macmillan that his status as the most senior minister in the governrnent would be 
made fully clear, and that his position as the most likely successor to Macmillan was 
not affected. 11is move away from the 'great offices of state' did lead to a decline in his 
party status, and in October 1963, Butler was perceived as a spent force. 
Home 
Lord Home had risen slowly through the ranks of the party until he became 
Commonwealth Secretary under Eden. He became Parliamentary Private Secretary to 
Neville Chamberlain in February 1936. Home later became Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office in the caretaker government of 1945 before the massive Conservative 
29 Butler to Macmillan, II July 1962, Butler MS S RAB G3 8 (22) 
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defeat. Like Butler, Home reached the first stage of 'insider' status quickly, but when 
he left the Commons in July 1951 on succeeding to the Earldom of Home, his status in 
the Parliamentary party decreased, as he was now in the Lords. However, he became 
Minister of State at the Scottish Office in October 195 1, and Ramsden has stated that 
Home's success in this job 'was the re-launching of Alec Home's career towards the 
30 
preniersl-ýp'. As Commonwealth Secretary, he was a member of the Egypt 
Committee during the Suez Crisis. When Macmillan came to power in 1957, Home 
remained at the Commonwealth Office, and became one of his confidants, especially on 
foreign and colonial policy. This close relationship with Macmillan was to be central to 
Home's party status at the time of the 1963 leadership struggle, and also showed his 
position as a political 'insider' in Macrnillan's government. 
Problems over foreign policy came to dominate the early years of the 
Macmillan regime, and Home's response to the many problems, including the Seretse 
Khama and the long-running Cyprus problem 'consolidated his position in the upper 
ranks of the Cabinet'. 31 When Lord Salisbury resigned over the release of Archbishop 
Makarios, the spiritual leader of the Greek Community and the advocate of political 
union with Cyprus, Home gained Salisbury's positions as Lord President of the 
Council and Leader of the Lords, further enhancing his status in Macmillan's Cabinet. 
When the resignation of Derek Heathcoat-Amory as Chancellor became widely 
expected in 1959, Macmillan wanted to replace him with Foreign Secretary Lloyd, and 
felt Home would be the potential replacement for Lloyd at the Foreign Office. 32 
" Ramsden, Age of Churchill and Eden, p. 246 
31 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home pp. 190-191 
32 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 194 
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Thorpe has argued that Home's five years at the Commonwealth Office were 
the 'most important of his career to date'. This was because he was now the most 
senior of the younger generation of Conservatives that included Hailsham, Duncan 
Sandys, Selwyn Lloyd, Edward Heath and Iain Macleod. I-Es work at the 
Commonwealth Office also gave him a higher governability rating, as he worked with 
senior international statesman, and gained a reputation as a competent n-dnister in the 
foreign policy arena. Home became Foreign Secretary on 27 July 1960 and 'with this 
promotion, Home entered the innermost circle of Macmillan's Cabinet'. 33 Thorpe has 
argued that 'there was no figure in the Conservative Cabinet who had the necessary 
seniority and knowledge of the wider context of foreign affairs to deny Home the 
succession to the Foreign Office'. It is clear that Butler had the first, but it is not as 
apparent if he had the second. Thorpe's assessment seems to ignore two important 
points. Firstly, Butler was far more senior than Home in the summer of 1960, and it 
was widely known, especially to Macmillan, that he wanted to go to the Foreign 
Office. Secondly, Macmillan wanted a Foreign Secretary he could control, much in the 
way that both he and Eden had treated Lloyd. This subservience that Home would 
yield to Macmillan, unlike Butler because of his status in the party, explains his 
appointment better than an emphasis on seniority. 
This promotion was certainly important for Home, as he entered one of the 
'great offices of state', and occupied a traditional avenue to the leadership. IEs 
'insider' status reached fruition when he entered became Foreign Secretary. When 
Home became Foreign Secretary, he saw Macmillan every day as the Prime Minister 
believed a close relationship between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary was vital 
33 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 204 
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to the successful operation of govemmentS. 34 This increased his visibility and 
reputation with the party hierarchy and its most senior figures. Home's appointment 
was greeted by Conservative back-benchers with amazement because he was an Earl, 
but Thorpe has argued that 'when the dust had settled and unbiased observers realised 
that Alec Home was not an ineffectual aristocrat but a politician of wide practical 
experience, the tune began to change' . 
35 This assessment by Home's biographer is a 
charitable one, and does cloud the wide feeling in the Parliamentary party that he was 
tan earl too far', as Macmillan did have a penchant for having Peers in key offices in 
his goverment, such as Poole and Hailsham. 
Thorpe is correct in asserting that Home's competence as Foreign Secretary 
improved his status. His wide experience of contemporary problems of foreign policy, 
which developed from his time at the Commonwealth Office, impressed his colleagues 
and also leading foreign politicians. Home's experience of government was principally 
in foreign affairs. He had been Parliamentary Private Secretary to Chamberlain during 
the Munich crisis, and later served as a Minister of State, and as Commonwealth 
Secretary in Macmillan's goverment before becoming Foreign Secretary, so his 
qualifications for the post cannot be disputed. Home particularly impressed the party 
hierarchy as Foreign Secretary, by the good relationships he developed with world 
ministers in charge of foreign affairs. One particularly important relationship that 
developed was between Home and Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State from 
November 1960. This was of particular importance during the Cuban missile crisis. 
" Macmillan conveyed this in a letter to Home on 21 July 1986 in the Home Archive in Thorpe, Alec 
Douglas-Home, p. 213 
15 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 2 10 
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Home's status in the party increased after the 'Night of the Long Knives'. 'In a 
Cabinet now weighted towards a younger generation, Macmillan turned increasingly to 
36 Home for disinterested advice'. This was because, for a variety of reasons, 
Macmillan did not trust Butler, principally because he had leaked news of the 
impending reshuffle of 12 July 1962. The majority of the Cabinet were now of the next Zý 
generation of leading Conservatives like Maudling and Heath, who Macmillan did not 
feel as comfortable with. Home's position within the party became more important 
after 12 July, as Butler's position was in decline with his move away from the senior 
offices of state. Maudling, promoted to Chancellor, was seen as one of the younger 
generation, a possible leader-in-waiting who was not yet quite ready for the leadership. 
Home was conveniently placed between the two, and was in a good position for the 
leadership for a number of reasons. First, he occupied one of the two offices that are 
traditional avenues to the leadership, the Foreign Office, and this had many advantages 
for his party status, including an increased seniority and influence, and positive 
electoral connotations. Second, Home was not seen as a possible successor to 
Macmillan, so could increase his status as a politician rather than as a possible leader. 
Third, he was in a position between the Macmillan 'Old Guard' (that included Butler) 
and the 'Next Generation' (that included Maudling and Heath). This was advantageous 
to Home's party status, as the old guard were now discredited and not wanted as 
possible leaders, and the party had doubts about the younger men over whether they 
were yet ready to take over. Home was in a comprornise position in party status 
between the two. 
36 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 255 
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Maudlin 
Reginald Maudling was elected as a Conservative NT in February 1950, 
following a period at the Conservative Research Department following the 1945 
election defeat. Maudling was a secretary on the Industrial Policy Committee that 
produced The Industrial Charter of 1947. In early 1952, he was appointed 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Maudling was unsure 
whether to take the offer, as he was more interested in economic policy, but accepted 
after Butler advised him to do so, as it would a step on the political ladder . In 
November 1952, he was appointed Economic Secretary to the Treasury. 37 He gained 
valuable experience by deputising for Butler at the World Bank and IMF meeting in C. 
1953. It is clear that Maudling reached the first stage of 'insider' status in the party 
very quickly, and this gave him a platform to improve his position in the party. 
When Eden became Prime Minister in April 1955, he promoted Maudling to 
Minister of Supply, his first full ministerial post, and with the post, he became a Privy 
Councillor. Maudling had thus risen to his first ministerial post within five years of 
becoming an MP. When Macmillan became Prime Minister in January 1957, he wanted 
Maudling to continue as Minister of Supply, but Maudling declined and took the post 0 
of Paymaster-General. This involved a demotion from ministerial rank, but Maudling 
has stated that he did not regret his decision, as the work was 'fascinating' . 
3' He 
deputised in the Commons for Lord Nfills, the Minister of Fuel and Power, and also 
assisted Heathcoat-Amory, the Chancellor. 
Maudling became President of the Board of Trade after the Conservative 
victory in the 1959 election, his first Cabinet post. This promotion to one of the key 
" Maudling, Memoirs, pp. 52-53 
38 Maudling, Memoirs, p. 65 
95 
economic briefs in the government increased his status in the party. In October 1961, 
Maudling was promoted to Secretary of State for the Colonies. This involved a move 
away from the domestic economic portfolios that he had occupied before, but was an 
important post because of the rise of African nationalism and the granting of 
independence to the colonies. Maudling's main task was to supervise the transition of 
the colonies to independent status, and the previous Secretary of State, Iain Macleod, 
had come in for criticism from the right wing of the party, for the progressive policy of 
granting independence. Therefore, the post ran a severe risk to Maudling's 
acceptability to the party. A major problem was the Central African Federation, which 
was made the responsibility of Butler in 1962. The effect of the Central African 
problem on Maudling's party status has been well outlined by Ramsden. He argues that 
it served to 'undem-dne the claims of Macleod, Maudling and (once again) Butler to 
become party leader, for in all three cases their policy on Central Africa turned right- 
39 
wingers into implacable opponents'. This post, therefore, clearly affected his 
acceptability with the right wing of the party. 
Following the 'Night of the Long Knives', Maudling was promoted to 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. This promotion confirmed the final attainment of his 
'insider' status in Macmillan's government, as he entered one of the 'great offices of 
state'. Maudling had a good deal of experience at the Treasury after his time as 
Economic Secretary and Paymaster General, and was viewed by Macmillan as a 
progressive appointment. When Macmillan appointed Maudling, he gave him the brief 
of expanding the economy, and reducing unemployment in preparation of the next 
election. However. there 'was a time lag between government changes and the 
" Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 150 
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reaction in the economy'. Ramsden has argued correctly that the recovery did not start 
until the middle of 1963, and before that the worst winter for sixteen years increased 
seasonal unemployment. The overall unemployment figure was three-quarters of a 
40 
million, the worst since 1947 . Maudling was nevertheless successful at presenting 
the economic measures with confidence, something that Lloyd, his predecessor, had 
failed to do. His 1963 Budget was a success and increased confidence in the 
govermnent. 
Maudling himself felt that the strength of his position in the leadership struggle 
was based on this success. In 1963, The Daily Telegraph published a regular poll of 
Conservative Ws views on who they would like to have as leader in succession to 
Macmillan. In the summer of 1963, Maudling had 'a very large majority'. 41 Clearly, 
after his displays of sound control over the economy, he was rated highly by 
Conservative MPs and was felt to be the leading candidate to succeed Macmillan from 
the 'younger men'. This was also the case among his Cabinet colleagues, who felt that 
a change to the next generation of leading Conservative figures, was the best option 
because of the discredit being heaped on older Conservatives, and especially 
Macmillan. Of his standing in the party over the summer of 1963, Maudling noted 'I 
had a remarkable summer of support from the Parliamentary Party, who were likely to 
be in substance if not in form the decisive element I. 42 
On 18 June 1963, 'a wave of hysteria' was created when the officers of the 
1922 Committee presented the case for Maudling's immediate succession. Ramsden 
has described the reasons behind this move: 'The theory behind this was that the party 
" Ramden, Winds of Change, pp. 179-180 
41 Maudling, Memoirs, p. 125 
42 Maudling, Memoirs, p. 126 
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should skip straight to the next generation and play safe by going for a safely married 
man'. He has also noted that Macmillan referred to Maudling as being a good option 
because of his attraction as a 'respectable Wilson'. The Daily Telegraph reported on 
20 June 1963, after interviewing fifty 'representative' Conservative NTs, that their 
votes on the succession were: Maudling - 21, Hailsham - 8, Heath - 6, Butler - 4, 
Powell - 3, Home and Macleod -I each, and undecided - 5. A poll in The Dail 
Express also found Maudling was the clear favourite. " This assessment is significant, 
as it reveals a reason for his attraction to Conservative NVs: His 'clean' image would 
be a distinct advantage to the party. It presented a man of the next generation, not 
tainted by the sleaze accusations against Macmillan's government, that were prompted 
particularly by the Profurno affair. 
However, after the summer, Maudling's prospects began to decline, as his 
support began to dissipate and his position weakened. He has noted that after the 
summer recess, his Cabinet colleagues estimation of him began to drop, and their 
reactions to him became 'less enthusiastically cordial'. Thorpe has stated that 
Maudling's support 'melted away like the morning dew. "' Maudling has also 
recorded an episode at the party Conference in Blackpool which indicated his loss of 
status. He met an unidentified Cabinet colleague in the lobby of the Imperial Hotel, 
who had written to him over the summer stating that Macmillan should go, and 
Maudling should take over. This colleague now told him that he was supporting 
Home to be Macmillan's successor. 45 
" Ramsden, Winds of ChgpZep. 192 
44 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 259 
'5 Maudling, Mcm irs, p. 126 
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This dissipation of Maudling's status can be accounted for by focusing on a 
number of reasons. First, the support was not as widespread as it has been accounted. 
This has been argued by Thorpe, who believed that the support for Maudling in the 
summer of 1963 that was recounted in The Daily Telegraph polls, was not as well 
founded as the polls suggested. He has stated that the polls had a low initial base of 
NTs, and were conducted selectively among younger NTs sympathetic to Maudling. It 
did not convey the views of senior Conservative NTs, who were nevertheless 
influenced by the polls, and began to consider the virtues of a Maudling candidacy. 
Second, the party did want to move to a new generation of leaders, of which Maudling 
was then the leading figure, but did not feel the time was yet right to move, and settled 
on Home as the stop-gap leader to take the party through the forthcoming election. 
Third, Maudling's status began to collapse because of his conduct and the 
characteristics he displayed. He did not appear as a competent public figure; he 
remained too quiet, and did not give the impression by his conduct that he wanted the 
leadership. Macmillan noted he felt Maudling was 'uninspiring'. Along with the 
mistakes he made, especially his poor conference speech on the economy, this explains 
the decline in Maudling's party status. 46 
Hailsham 
Lord Hailsham was Nlinister of Education between January and September 
1957. Hailsham then became Party Chairman and Lord President of the Council, with 
Cabinet rank, and contributed significantly to the party's victory in the 1959 election. 
46 Maudling noted that he could not explain the decline in his support, and this lack of perception is 
indicative of the reasons for his failure. Maudling notes he could not explain his collapse of support in 
Maudling, Memoirs, p. 126 
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The Conference Chairman at the 1957 Party Conference was told by a constituency 
representative that 'the audience gave [Hailsham] the mantle of Churchill. His star rose 
like a rocket'. 47 Hailsham increased his profile and status at the party conference by 
his publicity stunts, including bathing in the sea to the delight of photographers, eating Cý 
giant sticks of rock, and ringing a bell to signal the start of Macmillan's leader's 
address to the conference. However, Macmillan felt he had been upstaged at the 
Conference, his first as leader, and in 1958 his staff made discreet attempts to ensure 
this was not repeated at that years conference. Hailsham did, nevertheless, still ring the 
bell at the 1958 Blackpool Conference. 'Hailsham's main job was thus to rally the 
party morale and in this he was a great success' . 
4' During his tenure as chairman, he 
addressed meetings of constituency leaders, and spoke at a considerable amount of 
constituency meetings and dinners. There is evidence that Hailsham offended certain 
senior figures in the party with his exuberance, and was removed as Chairman after the 
election victory. Hailsham has noted that 'I did not get many thanks. Harold 
Macmillan wrote me a reasonably polite letter of thanks after the result and 
immediately demoted me'. Hailsham has stated that his demotion was due to a mis- 
understanding by Macmillan of his role 'in an entirely private matrimonial matter in 
which I had been called as a witness', but fails to specify the meaning of thiS. 
49 He has 
also recorded that he did not expect to stay as party chairman after the election 
victory, and would not have accepted the offer if it had been made. Hailsham wished 
to leave the goverment altogether, because 'I was fed up with being cold shouldered 
47 Ramsden, Winds of Change, pp. 47-48 
4" Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 49 
49 Lord Hailsham, A Sparrow's Flight: Memoirs, (London: Collins, 1990), p. 324 
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and snubbed after I had given my best and achieved success in a seemingly impossible 
task'. However, Poole persuaded him to remain in the government. 50 
Hailsham then became Minister for Science and Technology and Lord Privy 
Seal. Hailsham, however, was demoted, as he relinquished the position of Lord 
President of the Council. Following Home's promotion to the Foreign Office in July 
1960, he became Leader of the Lords. He led the governments negotiations in the talks 
on the Multi-Lateral Test Ban Treaty in July 1963. However, Hailsham's governability 
stagnated after his chairmanship of the party, and rather than gaining promotion and an 
increase in status, his position in the party did not improve. Hailsham, did not reach the 
same level of 'insider' status as the other candidates, as he did not occupy any of the 
senior domestic or foreign policy Cabinet portfolios. He did not occupy any of the 
cgreat offices of state' during his career prior to the leadership contest. His status as a 
candidate in October 1963 was based purely on his success as Party Chairman, with 
the electability he demonstrated being the prime factor in his position as a candidate. 
By the time of the Blackpool Conference, Hailsham's status in the party was 
high, as it became clear Macmillan favoured him as his successor, and this began to 
dissipate via informal networks to the party, principally through Julian Amery, Maurice 
Macmillan and Randolph Churchill. However, his flamboyant conduct at the 
Conference reduced his status in the party drastically, especially among older and 
traditional Conservatives, who already had doubts about his temperamental suitability 
for the leadership. I-Es status was based largely on style over substance, because of his 
flamboyant image, but after Blackpool his status in the party as a leadership candidate 
had diminished greatly. 
" Hailsham, A Spaffow's Flight, P. 326 
101 
The Candidates' Personalities 
Macn0an 
It has often been suggested that Macmillan's rise through the party to become 
Prime Nfinister in January 1957 was due to his 'killer instinct'. This personality trait is 
often left undefined, and thus in existing analyses of his personality remains 
unsubstantiated, and appears as a vague clich6. This term, therefore, requires definition 
to illustrate why it was a significant factor in Macinillan attaimnent of the leadership. A 
'killer instinct' can be defined as a sense of opportunism, an ability to take chances 
when they appear. It is, therefore, an ability to act decisively. It has often been 
suggested that this 'killer instinct' was the result of Macmillan's wife, Dorothy's thirty 
year affair with Bob Boothby, a colleague of Macmillan's. It is said that this gave him 
'the grit of the oyster' that drove him to gain the party leadership. However, such an 
assessment must remain as conjecture, as Macmillan never stated that the effect of his 
wife's affair led to the development of this attribute. Many of his friends and 
colleagues did believe that the effect of his wife's affair gave Macmillan a 
determination to succeed in politics, but it is still an assumption that cannot be 
proved. 5' 
Nevertheless, Macmillan's decisiveness at certain points of his career, and his 
ability to exploit situations, was of great significance in his progress to the sununit of 
the Conservative Party. Two instances of this were of most importance. The first was 
his conduct during the saga of the December 1955 re-shuffle when Eden wanted to 
51 Pamela Egremont, a close friend of Macmillan's, told this to Alistair Home, Macmillan's official 
biographer, and Butler also told Home that Macmillan'swffe's affair did 'enhance his character'. 
Details of these interviews are in Home, Macmillan 1894-1956, pp. 89-90 
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replace Butler at the Treasury with Macmillan. Butler was determined not to be moved 
unless he became Deputy Prime Minister, but Macmillan saw an opportunity to block 
his request to buttress his own position in the Cabinet. Macmillan also believed that the 
post of Deputy Prime Minister was not necessary in the government, but saw that he 
could surpass Butler in party status if he became Chancellor, and Butler became 
Leader of the Commons, without the title of Deputy Prime Mnister. Only when Eden 
agreed to decline Butler the position did Macmillan agree to move to the Treasury. 
The second instance, which was of more significance, was Macmillan's decisiveness 
during key stages of the Suez Crisis, including the instigation of the cease-fire in the 
Canal Zone, and Ms conduct during the 1922 Committee meeting of the 22 November 
1956, when he confirmed his suitability as Eden's successor. This is considered in 
detail in chapter four. 
One of the key personality traits that Macmillan displayed was his ability as a 
showman, a salesman for the party and its policies. This was demonstrated during his 
promotion of The Industrial Charter in 1947, but came to the fore with great effect 
during Macmillan's time as Minister of Housing from 1951 to 1954. His image as the 
man responsible for the housing drive and the 300,000 houses a year, was vital to 
Macmillan's growing attractiveness to Conservative MPs because it demonstrated his 
electability. Housing was a social issue of major electoral significance in 195 1, because 
of the destruction of houses during the second world war. The 1945-51 Labour 
government's inability to deal with this issue gave the Conservatives the opportunity to 
exploit its full electoral potential in 1951, and Macmillan did this with great aplomb. 
His rapid promotion through the party ranks over the next six years showed the effect tý 
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tbýs quality had on Macmillan's leadership candidacy when Eden retired in January 
1957. 
Butler 
It has often been commented in existing analysis that Butler lacked a 'killer 
instinct', unlike Macmillan, to grasp the opportunities that he had to gain the 
leadership of the party. As with the assessment of Macmillan, this term is often not 
defined, and therefore remains unsubstantiated. However, following the definition set 
out in the previous section, it is clear that Butler did not have the same sense of 
opportunism as Macn-dllan, and was perceived as being indecisive during his career. 
This was especially so during his time as Chancellor from 1951 to 1955. Macmillan 
noted during the controversy over the ROBOT plan to float the pound in 1952, that 0 
'He [Churchill] is evidently disappointed in Butler, who is really Loo agreeable, too 
pliant, and too ready to go from plan to plan, accepting perhaps too readily the 
rejection of each'. 52 This indecisiveness and lack of direction was also commented on 
by Sir Robert Hall, who worked closely with Butler at the Treasury. Hall believed that 
Butler's method of working at the Treasury was to try out a policy, and then discard it 
quickly, if it did not produce immediate dividends. This served to frustrate Ws 
colleagues, and Hall noted in July 1952 that 'I have now lost most of my respect for 
the Chancellor though I still like him and think he is good at some things. But he is a 
weak man fundamentally. I feel stronger than he is and as he is not a very good z: - 
instrument, one tends to discount him'. 53 As Hall worked closely with Butler, as 
Director of the Economic Section at the Cabinet Office, his views are significant. 
52 Diary entry for 29 February 1952, Ms. Macmillan del). d. 10 (2v-3v). Emphasis on original. 
5' Caimcross (ed. ), Hall Diaries 1947-1953 entry for 16 July 1952, p. 240 
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Butler's lack of a 'killer instinct' was displayed during his time as acting Prime 
Minister when Eden and Churchill were incapacitated in the summer of 1953. As he 
was the temporary figure-head for the government, Butler had an ideal opportunity to 
stake his claim and demand the leadership. However, the 'establishment plot' designed 
to protect Eden's position as the heir apparent appeared to intimidate Butler, and he 
54 
merely 'concentrated on the smooth running of the administrative machine. Hehada 
chance to improve his position in the party by making some outstanding performances 
in the Commons, but he does not appear to have done so. John Colville, Churchill's 
Private Secretary, noted in July 1953, of Butler's performance during his opening of a 
foreign affairs debate in the Commons that 'It was a dull speech, yet more dully 
delivered. He is certainly no orator'. 55 
Another personality trait is Butler's inability to inspire the party when it was 
most necessary. Ramsden has noted that this inability became apparent when Butler 
became Leader of the Commons and Lord Privy Seal in December 1955, and that he 
was 'efficient in tl-ýs role if lacking in the inspirational qualities needed in a party 
manager. The management of the Parliamentary party improved, but the impression 
given to the country at large did not. 56 This came most notably to the fore during the 
1922 Committee meeting of 22 November 1956 in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis. On 
that occasion, it was imperative for Butler's leadership candidacy that he gave an 
uplifting performance to Conservative NPs to convince them of his virtues as Eden's 
successor. This is something he failed to do, and is considered in detail in the next 
chapter. This failure counted strongly against Butler's electability rating in January 
Howard, RAB, pp. 199-200 
J. Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955, (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1985), entry for 21 July 1953, p. 332 
" Ramsden, Age of Churchill and Ede p. 291 
105 
1957, and again in October 1963, he failed to uplift the party at the party conference in 
Blackpool. THs was also a significant factor in his failure to succeed Macmillan, as it 
led him to be perceived as a candidate who could not inspire the party in the 
forthcoming general election, and he was viewed as having low electability. This is also 
evidence of Butler's lack of a 'killer instinct', as he was in the best position to grasp 
the leadership in 1963 by convincing the party of his electoral virtues, yet he failed to 
do so. 
A key element of Butler's personality that became apparent over this period 
was that he was a competent minister, but not necessarily a leader. There appears to be 
a clear distinction between competence and effectiveness in political leaders, and by 
1955, Butler was failing to be effective as Chancellor. There is no doubt that he had 
lost his way at the Treasury by the last year of his tenure, and this must have raised 
doubts about his ability as a possible leader of the party. Alongside Butler's reputation 
for indecision, this inability to dictate from the front, and his loss of grip on the 
economic front, was a clear factor in the reduction of his govemability. This was 
something that Eden felt strongly, and was the reason behind his desire to replace 
Butler at the Treasury with Macmillan from September 1955. It can, therefore, be 
assumed that this was also perceived by his Cabinet colleagues, who were the main 
selectorate for Eden's successor. 
Butler's competence as a minister and his governability were the reasons 
belýind Macmillan's appointment of him as Nfinister for Central Africa in July 1962. 
The government had been beset by problems with Central Affica, and he felt Butler 
was the only minister who could deal with it effectively. Macmillan noted that 'Rab 
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[Butler] is wise and wily - both useful qualities in this tangled problem'. 57 However, 
he did not feel that Butler had the necessary qualities to be party leader. Macmillan 
noted on the day Home became party leader that 'All this pretence about Rab's 
[Butler's] "progressive" views is rather shallow. His real trouble is his vacillation in 
any difficult situation. He has no strength of character or purpose and for this reason 
should not be p. M.,. 58 Clearly, Macmillan believed that Butler was a competent 
minister, but not a 'leader. The comments of Hall cited earlier show that he was not 
the only person who believed Butler did not have the necessary personal qualities to be 
party leader. 
Home 
The key aspect in Home's personality that was influential in his selection in 
October 1963 as Macmillan's successor was his inoffensive image. This acceptability 
deemed him the ideal compromise candidate to hold the party together, as it was 
divided over the other candidates. This image was also considered to be a valuable 
asset by the party hierarchy in Home's electability in October 1963, but his status as a 
peer counted against this. Ramsden has noted that 'Home had few personal enemies 
and hardly anyone suspected him of underhand motives ... after the recent claims about 
the lack of integrity in public life, this was Home's strongest suit'. 59 TEs greatest 
achievement at the Commonwealth Office was his ability to hold together the disparate 
elements of a multifarious family, with its differences, feuds and rivalries' . 
60 This 
57 Diary entry for 9 October 1962, Ms. Macn-dllan dep. d. 47 (47) 
58 Diary entry for 19 October 1963, Ms. Macmillan del). d. 5 1* (30). Emphasis on original. 
5'Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 201 
60 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home p. 202 
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enlightens this key attribute that Home displayed: a general acceptance and Cý 
acceptability 
Underneath Iýs insouciant air of calm, Home possessed an 
intuitive feel for what was important and what was secondary. 
Underlying this was his remarkable political skill in knowing 
what would wash with the party and what would be acceptable 
to Parliament ... 
Unlike Rab Butler, he did not see politics as the 
art of the possible; he regarded it as a choice between the 
unpalatable and the disastrous. " 
This illustrates a significant personality trait of Home's: that he knew what 
would be acceptable to the party and what would not, and this was central to his 
acceptability as Macn-dllan's successor in 1963. He had an 'intuitive feel for what was 
62 
politically viable' . 
Thorpe has argued that one of the central reasons that Macmillan 
appointed Home was his 'ability to establish productive political relationships', and this 
was a vital attribute at the Foreign Office in dealing with international statesman. It 
also illustrated Home's governability. 
Thorpe believes that Home had 'done good by stealth' in his career as he had 
not naturally sought public attention, unlike Hailsham. The posts that he held in 
governments from 1951 to 1963 also complemented this, as his posts at the Scottish 
Office and the Commonwealth Office were not posts that attracted public attention. 
Thorpe also believes this was the case with Home's time at the Foreign Office, but this 
61 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 214 
62 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 212 
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must be questioned for two reasons. Firstly, foreign policy was at the fore-front of 
Conservative policy under Macmillan, and when Home became Foreign Secretary, he 
was more in the public gaze. Secondly, the Cuban Missile Crisis thrust Home into the 
public arena, because of the national and international press and television coverage 
that it received. Nevertheless, Thorpe's argument has some merits in explaining a key 
aspect of Home's personality that was of sizc,,, nificance in October 1963. As he had 
'done good by stealth', and also because of his position as an outside candidate for the 
leadership, he was not scrutinised in the same way as the other candidates and his 
weaknesses were not so obvious because of this. The effect of this was due to his self- 
effacing personality and the circumstances of his candidature. 63 Macmillan believed 
that Home's best quality was that he was 'not ambitious in the sense of wanting to 
scheme for power although not foolish to resist honour when it comes to him. He gives 
64 
that impression by a mixture of great courtesy' . 
This personal quality was of vast 
significance in October 1963, because of the scandals that had beset the Conservative 
Party, and Home's 'honourable' image was felt by the party hierarchy to be vital in 
regaining Conservative support. 
MauLling 
A key element of Maudling's personality was his inability to inspire the party 
when it most needed it, and he most needed to do it. This was most apparent during 
his speech to the party conference in October 1963, and counted against the party 
hierarchy's assessment of his electability. This key aspect of Maudling's personal 
failing is analysed in later chapters, but Lamb has noted its significance: '11is lack of C 
63 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, pp. 287-288 
64 Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 15 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (28) 
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enthusiasm and spontaneity in delivering it convinced too many present that he was not 
the type to 'convert the uncornmitted or inspire the faithful' in. an election campaign'. 65 
Pearce has also summed up well this characteristic of Maudling's 
Maudling had a logical n-ýind which worked at very great speed. 
He solved problems, he was generally cultivated, but, no more 
than Nigel Lawson a generation later, could he make a big 
conference speech ... Maudling simply lacked the arts of waiting, 
word-stress, audience-encouragement and pouncing. He sounded 
like plywood with the gift of speech. 66 
This was also a factor in his failure to gain the leadership in 1965. Maudling 
was also perceived as being lazy, and taking too relaxed an approach to the 
campaigning in the 1965 contest with Edward Heath, and did not make any attempt to 
gain the party's support in that election. This has parallels to Maudling's failure in 
1963. Butler noted that he first gained this reputation from his time at the CRD from 
1945-50, as he gave the impression 'of being too much at ease and of not straining 
67 himself to the same extent as the others' . Butler noted the effect of this reputation 
This is a feature he [Maudling] carried into later life, and in a 
way it was a pity, because people were to think that he was too 
65 R. Lamb, The Macmillan Years. The Emerizina Truth, (London: John Murray, 1995), p. 493 
66 E. Pearce, The Lost Leaders, (London: Little Brown, 1997), p. 329 
6' Butler, Art of The Possible, p. 140 
110 
easygoing, perhaps too insouciant. In fact he was extremely 
industrious: able to take jobs in his stride and master them with 
dispatch. But he struck an attitude that was deceptive to those 
who knew him less well, and I feel it did not do him justice. 68 
Butler denotes here the obvious importance of reputation in politics, as only 
close colleagues can deduce a proper assessment of a colleagues character, wHe those 
outside that circle rely on a deduction from rumour and reputation. Thorpe has noted 
that at the time of the 1963 selection, Maudling 'seemed too 'quiet' a figure and some 
felt him to be indolent, though their numbers did not include those at the Treasury, 
who knew that Maudling's incisive intellect enabled him to deal with the agenda in half 
the time it took most people'. 69 Clearly, this was a major disadvantage to his 
candidacy in October 1963. 
Hailsham 
A key element of Hailsham's personality was his exuberance and effervescence. 
This was central to his electability, but he often displayed a poor judgement and over- 
excitement, and led to a perception that he did not have the right temperament for the 
leadership of the party. This was perceived by the American government during the 
negotiations for the Multi-Lateral Test Ban Treaty negotiations in July 1963, in which 
Hailsham played a crucial role as the government's representative. 70 It was also 
illustrated by Hailsham's public outbursts on television during the Profurno Crisis. The 
68 Butler, Art of the Possible ' p. 140 69 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 273 
70 The significance of this is considered in detail in chapter seven, pp. 262-263 
ill 
most dominant example, however, came during the Party Conference at Blackpool 
during the 1963 leadership controversy. FEs obvious delight at Macmillan's backing for 
his candidacy for the party leadership led him to promote himself dramatically as the 
party's prime electoral asset. However, this parading of himself and the campaigning of 
his supporters led to doubts about his temperament that lost him support after the 
conference ended and the decision on Macmillan's successor came to be made. 
Hailsham's effervescent personality was the prime factor in his attractiveness to 
Macmillan, and his belief that Hailsham was the party's best electoral asset in 1963. 
His role as Party Chairman in the 1959 election campaign was central to the 
effectiveness of the Conservative campaign, and contributed to the massive majority 
gained in that election. Macmillan appointed Hailsham as 'a flag waving chairman', and 
he 'devoted his advocate's skills to the presentation of the party's case', and 'revelled 
in the publicity' that he generated as a necessary means of gaining the public's support. 
As Ramsden has noted 'He was certainly a natural for this showman's role' . 
7' This 
quality was the reason why he became Macmillan's favourite to succeed him in 1963, 
and it was only the doubts about Hailsham's judgement and governability that led 
Macmillan to focus his attention on Home after the party conference. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the party status and the personalities of the 
candidates were of vast importance in their candidatures in the selections. The role of 
the party status and the personal characteristics, and how the latter dictated the 
candidates actions during the selections, in the outcomes of the selections is discussed 
Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 49 
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in later chapters, but key themes are demonstrated in this chapter. It has shown that 
party status prior to a selection is more important than a candidate's career status. A 
long career is not seen as a long apprenticeship for the leadership, and the situation and 
circumstances surrounding a selection determines what aspects of a candidates party 
status are of most importance in the selection. An attainment of the various stages of 
'insider' status is important in leadership selections, but in 1957 and 1963, a move 
away from the final stage of 'insider' status, the 'great offices of state', detrimentally 
affected a candidates chances. In the selections of 1957 and 1963, the candidate with 
the most experience, but nevertheless of less status and influence at the time of the 
selections, Butler, did not succeed to the leadership. 
An occupation of one of the 'great offices of state' at the time of the selections 
gave a candidate a considerable advantage in the selections. However, the situation 
and circumstances deemed the exact importance of that status. In 1957 and 1963, 
Butler had moved away from those positions to less senior posts. In 1963, Maudling 
was Chancellor of the Exchequer while Home was Foreign Secretary. While the 
Chancellorship is the more traditional route to the leadership, Home was chosen 
because he was felt to be the best candidate in the circumstances, and because of the 
personal characteristics that each had displayed. He was more acceptable because of 
his image, and Maudling was not felt to be inspiring enough to be a leader to drive the 
party to victory in the forthcon-dng election. 
Personal characteristics and qualities are of vast significance to a candidate's 
chances of gaining the leadership. Their actions during their careers, and most 
importantly, prior to a selection, can demonstrate their political skills, and how they 
would fulfil the three core criteria of acceptability, electability and governability on 
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which candidates are judged in the selections. This was important in both the 1957, 
and 1963 selections as has been summarised here and analysed in greater detail in later 
chapters. In 1957, Macmillan's inspirational qualities were of great importance in his 
successful candidature, and in 1963, Home's general acceptability deemed him 
successful, and Maudling's and Butler's lack of inspirational skills, and Hailsham's 
questionable temperament for the highest office led to the failure of their candidacies. 
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Chapter Four 
The Suez Crisis and the 1957 Leadership Selection: The Candidates' Actions and 
Conduct 
This chapter assesses the influence of the candidates' conduct and actions 
during the Suez Crisis on the outcome of the 1957 leadership selection. As 
demonstrated in the chapter, the key actions came in the latter stages of the crisis and 
its aftermath, principally in November and December 1956. The analysis on the actions 
and conduct of Macmillan and Butler before that serve to set the scene and context in 
which the key actions took place. This acts as an introduction to the complex 
machinations of the Suez Crisis, wl-kh were a central influence on the outcome. 
Butler 
Butler's Conduct during the Onset of the Crisis: Aupust 1956 
Butler was ill with a viral infection during the onset of the Suez Crisis. When 
he returned to work at the end of July, Butler was excluded from the Egypt Committee 
that co-ordinated policy during the crisis. Therefore, his initial absence through illness 
meant he had lost an opportunity to take part in the key decision-making, and Butler 
did not appear to exercise a significant influence on policy throughout the crisis. ' 
Butler always felt that Eden's policy towards Nasser, and particularly his comparison 
of Nasser to I-Etler and Mussolini, was a grave political mistake. For this reason, Eden 
dubbed Butler one of the 'Weak Sisters' in the Cabinet who opposed the use of force. 
However, he always remained loyal to Eden, and did not state openly his opposition to 
government policy during the crisis. 
1 Howard, RAB, p. 231 
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It has been suggested that Butler just turned up at the meeting of 30 July, the 
first after his return from illness, and was listed as 'Minister in attendance'. However, 
this is not a generally accepted view, and there is no evidence in the minutes of the 
meeting to suggest this took place. 2 Selwyn Lloyd, who succeeded Macmillan as 
Foreign Secretary, has asserted that Butler attended meetings of the Egypt Committee 
regularly, but it is an accepted view that he was not at the core of the Egypt 
Committee? 11is seniority in the government and his ministerial experience meant he 
could not be fully excluded, but his role was a peripheral one. Butler seemed to believe 
that he could be a restraining influence on the aggressiveness of Eden, Macmillan and 
Salisbury et al., and felt his doubts about the use of force could be expressed more 
effectively from within the Cabinet, rather than outside it. 
The success of this strategy must be assessed. The fact that military action did 
not start until 30 October, over three months after the onset of the crisis, suggests that 
Butler's strategy was somewhat successful, but there were many other factors that 
acted as a restraint on military action. These included the securing of the necessary 
financial resources for the action, and the international support for an invasion. A 
particularly important factor was the opposition of the United States government to 
military action. It is, therefore, impossible to reach a definite conclusion on whether 
Butler's restraining influence on Eden and Macmillan's aggressive response was 
successful. The delay in military action was probably due to a combination of all the 
restraining factors, both economic and political, but Butler's conduct did have the 
outcome he desired. 
2 H. Thomas, The Suez Affair , (London: Penguin, 1967), p. 50 suggests that Butlerjust turned up at 
the meeting; and C. Brady, 'The Cabinet System and Management of the Suez Crisis', ConteMDOrarv 
gecord, volume 11, number 2, (Summer 1997), p. 67 
I S. Lloyd, Suez 1956: A Personal View, (London: Cape, 1978), p. 85 
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Two aspects were central to Butler's behaviour on the Egypt Committee. 
Firstly, he opposed the use of force, and only believed it should be used as a last resort. 
Secondly, he believed that the dispute should be referred to the United Nations. At the 
Cabinet meeting of 23 August, Butler stated that the party in the country would 
support the use of force, 'if all practicable steps had been taken to try to secure a 
4 
settlement by peaceful means'. At the meeting of the Egypt Committee of 24 August, 
Macmillan noted Butler's uncertainty about the use of force: 'He wanted more time, so 
as to show that every possible method had been tried, before the final decision to use 
force. I argued that if D Day were postponed too often or too late, it would never 
happen. We must be resolved'. 5 At the Cabinet meeting of 28 August, the members of 
the Egypt Committee relayed details of developments to the other Cabinet members. 
Macmillan noted that ministers supported the efforts made by the goverrunent, and 
they particularly stressed that passing the dispute to the United Nations would be 
advisable. Butler felt this 'would help the Party. We could show that we had tried 
everything'. 6 Flis attitude to the crisis during this period had a damaging effect on his 
reputation within the party. I-Iis strategy resulted in him being distrusted. The problem 
was that Butler was not prepared to stand by his convictions, and state openly his 
opposition to the use of force. He would support Eden in Cabinet, and then criticise 
him in the Smoking Room and the Lobby, and this strategy resulted in Butler being 
distrusted. 
4 Lloyd, Suez 1956 p. 134 
5 Diary entry for 24 August 1956, Ms. Macmillan deR. d. 27. (59) 
6 Diary entry for 28 August 1956, Ms. Macrnillan deR. d. 27. (67-68) 
' For an analysis of the significance of this point, see chapter five, pp. 169-170 
117 
Butler's Reaction to the Invasion of the Suez Canal: 30 October 
On 17 October, while the plans for the collusion with France and Israel for the 
invasion of Egypt were being finalised, Butler attended the opening of the Calder Hall 
power station in Cumbria as the government's representative. Eden and the party 
hierarchy wanted him out of the way, because they knew of his opposition to the use 
of force, and felt he would not react positively to the plan. When Butler returned from 
Cumbria on 18 October, he was summoned into a meeting with Eden, and was told 
that it had been suggested in discussions between Pineau, the French President, Mollet, 
the French Prime Minister, and Eden that in the event of confrontation between Egypt 
and Israel, British and French forces should intervene in the Canal Zone, and separate 
the combatants. Butler told Eden of his concerns at the possible public reaction to the 
plan, and suggested that an agreement with France and Israel to free the Suez Canal, 
and then internationalise it, would be more advisable. Eden replied that 'things were 
now moving in the direction he had described', and Butler confirmed he would stand 
by E en 'in a circumstances'. 8 The declaration of support 'in all circumstances' was 
significant, as it tied Butler to the policy, so he could not later claim that he was not 
privy to the plans of the goverment. Eden recalled later in his life that Butler 'never 
once made any criticism of substance at the Cabinet nor even to me privately, as he 
could have done at any time'. ' 
The question that has to be addressed is why did Butler not state his opposition 
to the invasion? Howard's analysis of this issue suggests that 'there is always the 
argument that more can be done to temper a policy from within than by denouncing it 
8 Butler, Art of The Possible, p. 192 
9 Note for Biographer, 9 September 1968, Avon Papers, AP 33nin D. Dutton, Anthony Eden. A Life 
and Reputation. (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 399 
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from without'. He argues that Butler adopted this position in his later life as his 
explanation of why he did not oppose the use of force, and the invasion of the Canal 
Zone. " However, there is no evidence to support this in Butler's Papers or his 
memoirs, but the argument does have some plausibility. It does explain his behaviour 
not just over the question of the invasion, but also his actions in Cabinet and on the 
Egypt Committee. This analysis must remain as conjecture, as there is no clear 
evidence for this having been the motive behind his actions, and it could simply have 
been a lack of courage by Butler to oppose Eden and the 'hawks. 
Butler's Reaction to the Cease-fire: 6 November 
Following the cease-fire of 6 November, the need for the British government to 
rebuild relations with the United States became of paramount importance because of 
their opposition to the use of force, and Butler played a major role in this. The need for 
financial assistance became vital, and he used his friendsbýp with George Humphrey, 
the US Treasury Secretary, in order to secure that assistance. Butler noted in February 
1957 that he was telephoned by Humphrey following the cease-fire, and he offered to 
help the British government, but only if they complied with the UN resolutions, 
showing the weak bargaining position the goverrunent was in. " Butler, and Macmillan 
as the next most senior minister in the government, also maintained contacts with 
Winthrop Aldrich, the US Ambassador to Britain, after the cease-fire. These contacts 
were of great significance to the resolution of Anglo-US tension that resulted from the 
invasion. On 8 November, Butler had spoken to Aldrich privately at an evening 
10 Howard, R_AB, p. 232 
11 Notes, February 1957, and 'Reminiscences ending with Suez', undated Butler MS S G3 1 (70 
89) 
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reception at Downing Street, where Butler 'deplored' the current divisions between 
the British and US governments, and 'he was quite evidently greatly disturbed by the 
course followed by majority of Cabinet although he did not specifically so state'. 12 
Butler told Aldrich that he was the onlY man who could explain the attitudes of the 
members of the British government to Eisenhower. 
On 21 November, Aldrich informed the State Department in Washington that 
he had seen Macmillan and Butler at 10 a. m. that morning, and 'they said that the 
government's policy concerning withdrawal of British troops from Egypt must be 
determined within the next two days'. 13 Butler believed there was no reason why the 
Cabinet should not decide on withdrawal, but they were also still anxious that either 
Macmillan or Butler should see the President as soon as possible, and Aldrich agreed 
with this proposal. Hoover replied on 21 November that a meeting with President 
Eisenhower would not be feasible until 'possibly week of December 3', and the 
withdrawal of the troops must come first. 14 Butler's conduct during the period after 
the cease-fire was vitally important in the resolution of Anglo-US relations. 
Butler's Conduct during the 1922 Comn-ýttee Meeting of 22 November 
Butler's position as a candidate for the party leadership, if Eden was to retire, 
was severely affected by his conduct at the meeting of the 1922 Committee of 
Conservative back-benchers on 22 November. He had to address the meeting in the 
12 N. J. Norris (ed. ), Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), Volume XVI 1955-1957 
(57 1), (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), Telegram from the Embassy in 
the United Kingdom to the Department of State, London, 12 November 1956, pp. 1115-1117 
13 Norris (ed. ), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (598) Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to 
the Department of State, London, 21 November 1956, pp. 1171-1172 
14 Norris (ed. ), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (600) Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in 
the United Kingdom, Washington, 21 November 1956, p. 1173; Butler, Art of the Possible, p. 195; and 
Home, Macmillan 1894-1956, p. 459 
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aftermath of the decision to cease-fire, and the agreement to withdraw from the Canal 
Zone. These decisions caused great dissent in the party, and as Eden was 
incapacitated, Butler took on the responsibility for informing Conservative back- 
benchers of developments. He had also that day defended the government's actions in 
the Commons, an unnerving and exhausting experience, which may have contributed to 
Butler's lacklustre performance in front of the 1922 Committee. He was warned by the 
Chief Whip, Edward Heath, before the meeting that the Suez Group 'might make 
trouble', as they were opposed to him for his reputation as an appeaser, and because 
he was at the forefront of discontent now that Eden's departure for Jamaica for 
recuperation was imn-dnent. 15 
As Eden appeared to be finished as Conservative leader, it was imperative for 
his leadership candidacy that Butler delivered a good performance. He addressed the 
meeting before Macmillan, and gave a speech on a planned overhaul of the 
Conservative Party's publicity arrangements. He also gave an account of the crisis, and 
spoke of the uncertainty of the international situation. He noted the bleak state of the 
party's current electoral prospects, and of the need for the party 'to try to get our 
message across a bit better'. 16 The speech did not inspire confidence in the party's 
NTs. Clark has accurately described the task that Butler needed to fulfil at this 
meeting. 'The problem for the party managers, and particularly for Butler, was how to 
present the reality of military and economic defeat in such language as would, as 
might, allow it to be accepted on the Tory back-benches'. 17 This is something Butler 
failed to do. He had made a 'highly expensive mistake', as he had not given the party 
Clark, The Tories, p. 308 
P. Goodhart, The 1922. The-Story of the 1922 Committee, (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 174; and 
Clark, Ihe Tories, p. 3 10 
17 Clark, Ihe Tories, p. 309 
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what it wanted to hear, and this damaged his chances of succeeding Eden. 18 Ilis 
uninspiring performance and major miscalculation in not uplifting the meeting had dire 
consequences for Butler. 
This meeting was a significant factor in the failure of Butler to become leader, 
but as the choice of Eden's successor was predominantly the Cabinet's, his conduct at 
this meeting of the 1922 Committee could only have had an indirect, though powerful, 
influence on his failure. However, junior ministers had been specially invited to the 
meeting, and Parliamentary Private Secretaries reported the results of the meeting to 
ministers. The Cabinet was, therefore, fully aware of the nature of the performances of 
the two candidates, and it can be strongly assumed that their performances did affect 
the Cabinet's views on who should succeed Eden. This is not the view of Goodhart, 
one of the secretaries of the 1922 Comn-dttee, but this is a naive assumption, as the 
negative performance of Butler must have confirmed, and even increased, doubts 
about him in the Cabinet. 
19 
Butler's Conduct as Acting Prime Mnister: 23 November to 14 December 
On 23 November, Eden departed for Jamaica on medical advice to recuperate 
after the strain of recent months. Butler played a large part in the planning for this, 
while Macn0an opposed the trip. Butler's papers illustrate this conflict of opinion. He 
recorded after the crisis and leadership issue had been settled 
Is Howard, RAB, p. 241 
19 Goodhart, The 1922, p. 175 
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I had for some time had very close relations with Horace Evans 
and the other doctors. Terrible bedroom scenes occurred prior to 
the decision to send Anthony Eden off to Jamaica. In and during 
these, Harold Macmillan showed great spirit, and said that the 
Prime NEnister should on no account go to Jamaica as he would 
never recover. I, on the other hand, having been brought up in a 
more orthodox school, thought that a change was essential. As I 
was informed that a clinic was not necessary, I thought a British 
Colony would d020 
This account raises some issues of major interest concerning Butler's role in 
the decision that Eden should recuperate in Jamaica. Firstly, he played a pivotal role in 
the decision by stressing that a 'change was essential'. Butler may have emphasised 
this as he felt that Eden needed to be removed from the scene while Butler and 
Macn-dllan attempted to rebuild the Anglo-US alliance, as Eisenhower was reluctant 
even to speak to Eden. Butler may have had his own leadership prospects in mind, but 
this has been discounted by many people, including Howard, who stress that he was 
caught unawares by the rapidity of the demise of Eden. This view is confirmed by 
Butler's papers, which show that he wanted Eden to remain as Prime Nfinister until at 
least July 1957. Butler's lack of perception of the state of Eden's position illustrates 
that he did not see an opportunity to enhance his leadership credentials. 
The decline of his reputation in the party during the crisis was compounded 
when Butler became acting Prime Minister in Eden's absence in November 1956. The 
20 'Reminiscences ending with Suez', undated Butler MSS RAB G31 (89) 
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major consequence of his conduct was that he became the 'scapegoat' for the failure of 
government policy, wl-&h had great significance in the outcome of the leadership 
selection. Macmillan noted of Butter's new role that, 'the main responsibility fell on 
Butler, supported by the rest of us, as best we could' . 
21 Butler's papers reveal that he 
received many letters of support from fiiends and colleagues, though notably not from 
senior ConservativeS. 22 He now had to take on the responsibility for trying to repair 
the damage that the crisis had caused. The US News and World Report of 14 
December ran the following headline: 'RAB BUTLER'S JOB - BAILING BRITAIN 
OUT', and this sums up the enormity of his task. 23 Butler has recorded the depth of 
Ws new responsibilities 
I was left in charge of the government, with the odious duty of 
withdrawing the troops, re-establishing the pound, salvaging our 
relations with the U. S. and the U. N., and bearing the brunt of 
the criticism from private members, constituency worthies and 
the general public for organising a withdrawal, which was a 
collective responsibility. 24 
Butler also noted an important consequence of his new role, as 'It was of 
course unfortunate that I was left as Head of the Government during a period when 
withdrawal from Suez was imminent' . 
2' He was conscious of his scapegoat role, but 
21 H. Macmillan, Riding The Storm 1956-1959, (London: Macmillan, 197 1), p. 170 
22 Chuter Ede to Butler, 20.11.56 Butler MSS RAB G30 (63) 
23 US News and World Report, 14 December 1956 Butler MSS G30 (75) 
24 Butler, Art of The Possible, p. 194, and 'Reminiscences ending with Suez', undated Butler MSS 
RAB G31 (89) 
25 Notes, February 1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (70) 
124 
could do nothing to avoid it or mitigate its consequences. Captain 'Cub' Alport, a 
former colleague of Butler's at the CRD, had warried him of the possibility of this 
when Eden departed for Jamaica. He told him 'the only thing I would say is that it is 
vital always to take account of the forces of boldness and resolution which the last 
few weeks have released in the Parliamentary Party & the country generally'. 26 The 
Imperialist wing, especially the Suez Group who advocated an aggressive response to 
Nasser, were the foremost opponents of retreat, and focused their dissent on Butler 
when he took on the responsibility for that when Eden went to Jamaica. 27 On the 
same day as Eden's departure, the order was given for the withdrawal of one British 
battalion from Port Said. On 26 November, Butler spoke to Aldrich prior to the 
Cabinet meeting of that day. He told him that he believed in the 'ultimate 
indestructibility' of Anglo-US relations, and that the relationship was essential to 
Western civilisation . 
2' This illustrates that the re-building of the 'special relationship' 
was deemed to be crucial, and Butler's actions were directed by this objective, 
alongside the vital need to keep the party together in Parliament. 
Aldrich reported to the State Department that he felt it imperative Butler and 
Macmillan should be invited to Washington, adding that Butler would probably be too 
busy to go himself, but Macmillan would go. The extent of Butler's new 
responsibilities meant he was confined to working on regaining some stability on the 
domestic political scene. This had an important consequence, as it allowed Macmillan 
to use his contacts with the US goverment to his advantage in preparing his 
26 Alport to Butler, 20.11.56, Butler MSS RAB G30 (65) 
27 For a detailed analysis of the views expressed by the Suez Group, and their effect on Butler's 
position as a leadership candidate, see chapter five, pp. 166-169 
28 'Confidential. The Suez Canal Crisis - Diary of events - 1956' CPA CRD 2/34/28-, and Norris (ed. ), 
FRUS XVI 1955-195716141Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department 
of State, London, 26 November 1956, pp. 1196-1197 
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leadership candidacy. Butler was allowed no such opportunity. On 27 November, 
Aldrich called Butler, and 'found him considerably encouraged by his talk yesterday 
with Humphrey' . 
29 Butler indicated that his impression of the outcome of the meeting 
was that 'as soon as the British can announce a definite date for complete withdrawal 
of forces from Egypt the US door will be open for urgent consideration of the various 
problems which have arisen between US'. 
30 This illustrates the prime need to secure 
US financial support, and the role of Butler and Macmillan in securing that assistance. 
Butler's Conduct during the Withdrawal from the Canal: 3-14 December 
On 3 December, Lloyd announced the decision to withdraw British forces 
gwithout delay' in the House of Commons, and on 8 December, the first phase of the 
Anglo-French withdrawal began. 3' The reaction to the announcement was fierce, and 
there was clear anger, frustration and division in the party. There was a considerable 
amount of criticism levelled at Butler for not making the announcement of withdrawal 
himself Conservative back-benches felt strongly that he should have taken this role, as 
Lloyd's standing in the Commons had fallen so low. Butler wound up the debate, and 
was now in the firing line of Conservative MPs' anger. Patrick Maitland, NIP for 
Lanark, noted that 'The Lord Privy Seal's [Butler's] remark, winding up the debate, 
that "we intend the arrangements shall be as satisfactory as they can be... " left room for 
a great deal of doubt'. 32 Butler told the Conunons that 'to be obsessed with talk of a 
29 Norris (ed. ), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (619) Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to 
the Department of State, London, 27 November 1956, p. 1204 
30 Norris (ed. ), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (619) Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to 
the Department of State, 27 November 1956, p. 1204 
31 R. Rhodes-James, AnthoLiy Eden, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), p. 586 
32 'Confidential. Conservative Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. Record of a Meeting held in 
Room 10 at the House of Commons at 4 p. m. on Wednesday 14 November 1956' CPA CRD 2/34/2 
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stranglehold which one side may exercise over the other gets us nowhere; we must 
think rather in terms of a partnership in which each side has much to contribute and 
each can help the other to ever-increasing prosperity'. 33 
Rhodes-James supports the justification for the criticism against Butler, and 
believes it would have been better for his reputation if he had done so, as 'the decision 
did Butler much harm, with the Party in such an evil mood, casting around for 
34 
scapegoats' . This was exacerbated 
by the fact that there was little criticism of Eden 
in the constituencies, nor of Macmillan, and 'this left Butler isolated and vulnerable, 
and his enemies were swift to vent their own emotions upon him. It was very unjust, 
but justice in politics has an uncomfortable habit of being very rough' . 
3' Eden returned 
from Jamaica on 14 December, but the US government would no longer work with 
him. The roles Butler and Macmillan played in the partial rejuvenation of the Anglo- 
US relationship was acknowledged in a letter from Humphrey to Butler, who told him 
want you both [Butler and Macmillan] to know how very appreciative I am of our 
relationship and our confidence in each other. I think it has helped matters with both 
our countries'. On 23 December, the last British and French troops withdrew from 
Port Said. 36 Butler was now reviled by many in the party because of his conduct 
during the crisis, and particularly as the acting Prime Nfinister at the time of retreat and 
withdrawal. 
33 'Notes for Lord Privy Seal's Winding-Up Speech, 6 December 1956' CPA CRD 2/34/29 
34 Rhodes-James, Anthony Eden p. 586 
35 Rhodes-James, Anthony Eden, p. 586 
36 Humphrey to Butler, 18 December 1956 Butler MSS RAB G30 (67). and 'Confidential. The Suez 
Canal Crisis - Diary of events - 1956' CPA CRD 2/34/28 
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Macmillan 
Macmillan's Reaction to the Onset of the Crisis and his Role on the Egypt Comn-ýttee: 
Auo-, ust 1956 
Macn0an reacted strongly to Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
Company, and encouraged Eden in his forceful attitude to the crisis. He described 
Nasser's speech declaring the nationalisation of the Canal Company as, 'very truculent 
37 
- an Asiatic Mussolini, full of insult and abuse for U. S. and UW. Macmillan became 
one of the most vocal 'hawks' in the Cabinet, and was a key player on the Egypt 
Committee. He noted on 27 July, 'P. M. has appointed a "SueZ' committee of the 
Cabinet - himself, Salisbury, Home [Commonwealth Secretary] and myself - with other 
ministers turning up as required. We met for 2 hours, 7.15-9.15 and settled a lot of 
matters I. 
38 
Macmillan's conduct on the Egypt Committee was an important aspect of the 
British government's response to the crisis, and he also played a key role in informing 
the US government of the British government's belief in the necessity for the use of 
force. On 30 July, Macmillan met Robert Murphy, the US Deputy Under-Secretary of 
State, who had been deployed by President Eisenhower to assess the British 
Government's attitude to the crisis. Macmillan expressed to Murphy that if Nasser was 
allowed to get away with this, Britain would be finished as a world power. He declared 
that the government had decided to remove Nasser from office, and to use force if 
necessary, and the government saw no alternative . 
39 He asked Murphy to make this 
clear to Eisenhower. Macmillan had worked with Murphy in North Africa during the 
37 Diary entry for 27 July 1956, Ms. Macmillan, dep. d. 27. (9) 
38 Diary entry for 27 July 1956 Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 27 (10) 
39 Norris (ed. ), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (33) Telegram from the Embassy in London to the Department 
of State, 31 July 1956,2 a. m., pp. 60-62 
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Second World War when Macmillan was British Minister Resident, and Murphy was 
his opposite number, fulfilling the same role for the US government. Murphy 
immediately reported this conversation to Eisenhower via a telegram to the US State 
Department, and Eisenhower was so alarmed by his account, he promptly despatched 
Secretary of State Dulles to London. 
Macmillan's intention was undoubtedly to fhghten Murphy enough for him to 
inform Eisenhower of the government's intention to use force. As he expressed in .s 
diary entry for that day, 'We did our best to frighten Murphy out of his life. We gave 
the impression that our military expedition was about to sail (it will take at least 6 
f ý. 40 weeks to prepare it, in act) Macmillan recorded the following day, 'It seems we 
have succeeded in thoroughly alarming Murphy. He must have reported in the sense 
which we wanted, and Foster Dulles is coming over post-haste. This is a very good 
development'. 41 He continued in the same tone to Dulles as he had expressed to 
Murphy on 31 July, and talked of the potential loss of the British position in the 
Nfiddle East, and the need for the British government to act firMly. 42 This illustrates 
that Macmillan believed that the US government needed to be kept informed of how 
serious the British government was in its 'hawkish' attitude to the crisis. 
Macmillan's role in the planning for government policy far exceeded the 
parameters of his responsibilities as Chancellor, and illustrates his pivotal role in the 
Suez Crisis. On 18 August, during the First London Conference, Macmillan dined with 
Dulles where he restated his view that 'Britain was finished unless Nasser could be 
brought to accept in some form an effective international participation in the practical 
40 Diary entry for 30 July 1956, Ms. Macmillan, dep. d. 27. (12) 
4' Diary entry for 31 July 1956, Ms. Macmillan, dep. d. 27, (13) 
42 Norris (ed. ), FRUS XPVI 1955-1957 (46) Memorandum of a Conversation, 11 Downing Street, 
London, I August 1956,6.30 p. m., pp. 108-109 
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operation of the Suez Canal'. He noted of Dulles' attitude that 'I cannot help feeling 
that he really wants us to "go it alone", and has been trying to help us by creating the 
right atmosphere'. 43 On 21 August, he had a private conversation with Dulles at 
I 
Eden's reception for the US officials at Downing Street. Macmillan asked him if he 
planned to remain as Secretary of State, if Eisenhower was re-elected on 6 November. 
Macmillan told Dulles that he was thinking of returning to the Foreign Office 'in the 
reasonably near future', and Dulles' decision would affect this as they had previously 
worked well together during Macmillan's spell at the Foreign Office. Dulles replied 
that he had no definite plans, but would probably remain as Secretary of State if 
Eisenhower was re-elected. " It is apparent that Macmillan was trying to gain US 
support, but the exact motives for his actions remain unclear. Macmillan may have 
wanted a return to the Foreign Office, or may have been vying for US support for his 
leadership candidacy, if Eden was forced to resign because of the crisis. 
At the Cabinet meeting of 23 August, Macmillan declared that 'if Nasser 
succeeded, our position in the Middle East would be undermined, our oil supplies in 
45 jeopardy, and the stability of our economy gravely threatened'. On 26 August, he 
subnýtted his Treasury paper, The Econonýc Consequences of Colonel Nasser, wl&h 
stated that if the oil situation was lost, Britain and Europe were finished. 46 In the days 
prior to the subn-ýission of this paper, Macn-Oan's concern at the oil situation is 
apparent in his diary entries. On 24 August, he wrote, 'without oil and the profits of oil 
we could not exist', and the following day noted that the government was faced with a 
"3 Macmillan Diary, 19 August 1956 in Home, Macmillan 1894-1956, p. 417 
44 Norris (ed. ), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (108) Memorandum of a conversation between Secretary of 
State Dulles and Foreign Secretary Macmillan, 10 Downing Street, London, August 21 1956, pp. 248- 
249 
45 Lloyd, Suez 1956, p. 117 
46 Treasury paper, 26 August 1956 in Home, Macmillan 1894-1956, p. 419 
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terrible dilemma, of taking action with the possible consequence that the Canal would 
47 be closed . This would mean that Britain and 
Europe would have 'had it'. Macmillan, 
however, believed that force should be used, and hoped that Britain's friends in the 
Nfiddle East would stand by them. 48 
Tl-ýs led Macmillan to continue the policy of frightening the US goverrunent, 
and making them aware of the seriousness of Britain's problems. He noted on 15 
September that 'we must (if we possibly can) keep the Americans with us, or we shall 
have no chance of getting out of our financial mess. At present, they only want to lend 
us some money. That isn't really much good to us. We want some contribution to the 
difference in between'. 49 This was the nature of Macmillan's strategy in dealing with 
the US government throughout the crisis, and was exacerbated when the extent of Z) 
Britain's oil problems became apparent. 
On 19 September, Douglas Dillon, the US Ambassador to Paris, reported to 
Dulles the results of conversations he had with Macn0an and Salisbury. He reported 
that they still held the attitude that military action was the only solution to the problem, 
and this should begin as soon as was politically feasible. Macmillan also 'repeated his 
very strong language of a month ago saying that success by Nasser would mean the 
end of Great Britain and must be opposed at all costs'. Dillon added that this was 
meant in an economic context, and Macmillan stated 'England was prepared to sell all 
of her foreign assets, including all her American securities if necessary to gain victory. 
He said the present affair was a case of all or nothing'. Dillon suggested that if this was 
the view of the government, military action would probably start in a month. 
47 Diary entry for 24 August 1956, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 27. (57) 
48 Diary entry for 25 August 1956, Ms. Macmillan dev. d. 27, (60-61) 
49 Diary entry for 15 September 1956 Ms. Macmillan del). d. 27 (102) 
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Macmillan and Salisbury felt two things needed to be achieved. First, a reduction in the 
opposition of Labour to the use of force, and secondly, closer co-operation with the 
US. 50 Two characteristics were central to Macmillan's conduct throughout this phase 
of the crisis: his belief in the need to use force, and the need to gain US support to 
solve the oil problem that was a major concem for the British goverrunent. 
Macmillan's conduct, however, was not aimed at improving his position as Eden's 
successor. It was not then clear that Eden would resign as the crisis had not reaped its 
full consequences, and he had not seen the 'window of opportunity' that came later in 
the crisis. 
Macmillan's Conduct during his Meeting vAth Eisenhower in Washington: 25 
September-1956 
From 20 September to 1 October, Macmillan visited the United States to 
attend the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund. Macmillan's diary note 
for 24 September illustrates his persistent concern at Britain's financial state, as 'the 
state of our reserves and the pressure on Sterling make me very anxious. If this 
situation goes on too long, it may well overcome us, and be driven to devaluation or 
bankruptcy'. " He repeated the fears on 4 October that, 'without oil and the profits 
from oil, neither U. K. nor Western Europe can survive'. 52 This shows how the oil 
problem had not lessened, but had escalated during his visit to the US. 
Macmillan met Dulles at the State Department in Washington on 25 September 
at 3.40 p. m., with Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador to the US. Their 
50 Norris (ed. ), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (233) Memorandum from C. Douglas Dillon to the Secretary of 
State, London, 19 September 1956, pp. 521-522 
51 Diary entry for 24 September 1956, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 27, (119) 
5' Diary entry for 4 October 1956, Ms. Macmillan del). d. 27. (18v). Emphasis on original document. 
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discussion centred around the problem of the payment of dues for the Suez Canal, but 
Macmillan stressed to him that Nfiddle East oil was vital to the British economy. 53 
Macn0lan also had a private talk with Dulles, which 'dealt chiefly with Suez'. Dulles 
expressed to him that he felt economic and political measures could work just as 
effectively as military action. He replied, 'the present military situation was such that 
they could without undue expense hold action in abeyance'. 54 Dulles also reminded 
Macmillan 'frankly of how he and the President had helped us in May 1955. They had 
an Election now themselves, and like us, were fighting on the cry of "peace and 
prosperity". He hoped that peace could be kept - at least until November 6th! '. 
5' An 
interesting conundrum is what effect did this declaration have on Macmillan's 
thinking? This was a clear warning against the use of force until at least 6 November, 
yet the invasion that began on 30 October suggests that it did not have an effect on his 
thinking, or at least on Macmillan's influence on government policy. The evidence 
suggests that Eden was desperate for military action to begin, with or without the 
support of the US goverment. 
Of greater significance is Macmillan's visit to Eisenhower at the White House 
the same day. Eisenhower told Dulles afterwards that he and Macmillan did not discuss 
the crisis in great detail, yet Macmillan informed Eden that the President supported the 
British Government's wish to 'bring Nasser down', and Eisenhower accepted that 
Britain must win. 56 Macnullan had told Eisenhower, 'we could not play it long, 
53 Norris (ed. ), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (263) Memorandum of a conversation, Department of State, 
Washington, 25 September 1956,3.40 p. m., pp. 577-580 
54 Diary entry for 25 September 1956, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 27, (2v-3v)-, and Norris (ed. ), FRUS XVI 
1955-1957 (265) Memorandum of a conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and Chancellor 
of the Exchequer Macmillan, Department of State Washington, 25 September 1956, pp. 580-581 
55 Diary entry for 25 September 1956 Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 27 Qv) 
16 Norris (ed. ), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (264) Editorial Note, p. 580; Diary entry for 25 September 1956, 
Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 27. folio 121; and Report to Eden, 26 September 1956 in Home, M-acmillan 
1894-1956P p. 430. This account is also in Lloyd, Suez 1956, p. 149 
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without aid on a very large scale - that is, if playing it long involved buying dollar 
oiI7.57 Eden had just returned from Paris where he had come under pressure from the 
French Government to act swiftly', and Macmillan's account had a major effect on .s 
thinking. The account Macmillan gave to Eden starkly contradicts Eisenhower's 
account of the meeting to Dulles in a telephone conversation soon after the meeting. In 
his report of the meeting with Eisenhower, Macmillan wrote that Eisenhower accepted 
that Britain must win, and he felt Eisenhower was 'determined to bring Nasser 
down'. 58 This is contradictory to the account Eisenhower gave to Dulles 
President said that Mr. Macmillan talked very much more 
moderately [about the Suez] than he had anticipated. He 
cheerfully admitted that the issue was Nasser rather than the 
Canal (said if they closed up the Shell oil refinery, England would 
have been much worse off). He said that Macmillan was far less 
bitter than he had been a few weeks ago'9 
It is impossible to determine who was giving the more accurate account, but 
Macn-dllan's account was written a day after the meeting, whereas the conversation 
involving Eisenhower and Dulles took place directly after it, so Macmillan had time to 
devise an alternative account to deliver to Eden. His diary entry for that day conforms 
to the account he gave to Eden, in stressing that 'On Suez, he [Eisenhower] was sure 
57 Diary entry for 25 September 1956, Ms. Macmillan del). d. 27. (12 1). Emphasis on original 
document. 
58 Macmillan to Eden, 26 September 1956 in Home, Macmillan 1894-1956, p. 430 
59 Norris (ed. ), FRUS 1955-1957 XVI, (264) Editorial Note, p. 580 
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that we must get Nasser down. The only thing was, how to do it'. 60 These 
contradictory accounts of the meeting suggest that Macmillan was possibly playing a 
double game with Eden and the American Government, but it could also have been just 
a misinterpretation by Macmillan of Eisenhower's attitude. He did deceive Eden by not 
informing him exactly of what had been discussed at the meeting. Nevertheless, Eden 
as the foreign affairs expert in the Cabinet, would have been fully aware of the nature 
of the US goverment's response to the crisis, but he was no doubt encouraged by 
Macmillan's favourable account of the meeting. Macmillan might have been 
deliberately deceiving Eden, and it can be assumed that if this was occurring, it was 
designed to enhance his own prospects as a candidate for the leadership of the party, if 
Eden was forced to retire. However, Macmillan could also have just misinterpreted 
Eisenhower's attitude, as Cham-dey has argued. He explains MacnUan's 
misinterpretation of the US government's attitude as being determined by the long held 
belief in the British government that was instituted by Churchill - that the differences 
between British interests and US intentions did not exist, and Ministers refused to face 
up to them when they did. 
Charmley believes that 'Once in Washington he [Macmillan] continued to 
interpret what the Americans told him through the star-spangled spectacles customarily 
donned by Churchillian acolytes when observing America'. 61 He believes that 
Macmillan did not conspire against Eden in giving him a misleading account of the 
meeting. He explains the differing accounts by the fact that when Macmillan and 
Eisenhower worked together in Algiers during the Second World War, he dealt with 
60 Diary entry for 25 September 1956, Ms. Macmillan del). d. 27. (12 1) 
6' J. Charn-dey, Churchill's Grand Alliance. The Anglo-American Special RelationshiR. 1_940-1957, 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1995), p. 331 
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Eisenhower by projecting his own views on him, and Eisenhower then usually followed 
his advice. Macn-dllan believed this had occurred on 25 September, and gave Eden an 
optimistic account of the attitude expressed by Eisenhower, which was nevertheless 
false in expressing the President's commitment to a compliance with the use of force. 62 
This argument has a good degree of plausibility, and does help to explain the differing 
interpretations of the meeting. This charitable interpretation of Macmillan's conduct 
seems correct. It was too early for him to have seen the 'window of opportunity' to 
enhance his chances of succeeding Eden, which occurred after the 6 November 
Cabinet meeting that signalled the cease-fire in the Canal Zone. 
Macmillan's Role in the Cease-fire of 6 November: 'The Window of Opportunity' 
Following the invasion of the Canal, on I November the British Government 
was warned that the US government was contemplating oil sanctions against Britain 
and France. Selwyn Lloyd has recorded that at the second meeting of the Egypt 
Committee that day, 'Macmillan threw his arms into the air and said "Oil sanctions! 
That finishes itii). 63 Eden informed Eisenhower on 5 November that 'it is no mere 
form of words to say that we would be happy to hand over to an international 
organisation as soon as we possibly can. As you can imagine, no one feels more 
strongly about this than Harold [Macmillan] who has to provide the money'. 64 
On 6 November, Cabinet discussions continued on whether the military 
operation against Egypt should continue. Macmillan settled that argument by telling 
the Cabinet that there had been a severe run on the pound, which had originated in the 
62 Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance, p. 333 
63 Lloyd, Suez 1956, p. 211 
64 Norris (ed. ), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (499) Message from Prime Minister Eden to President 
Eisenhower, London, 5 November 1956, pp. 984-986 
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US. He declared that Britain's gold reserves had fallen by LIOO million ($280 million) 
over the last week, and since the start of the crisis they had lost one-eighth of their 
reserves. 65 He contacted George Humphrey, and was told that the US government 
would only assist them if they ordered the cease-fire by midnight. Assistance would 
come via US support for an RVEF loan to buttress the pound, and at 5 p. m. (GMT), 
allied high command ordered the cease-fire. Before the Cabinet meeting, Macmillan 
had told Lloyd that 'in view of the financial and economic pressures we must stop . 
66 
This 'u-turn' by Macmillan, from being the foremost 'hawk' in the Cabinet to being the 
Nlinister responsible for signalling the retreat, led to accusations of deceit and betrayal. 
Harold Wilson, the Shadow Chancellor, described Macmillan's conduct during the 
crisis as 'first iri, first OUt). 
67 
Macmillan maintained in his memoirs that the losses for the first few days of 
November were $279 million, and 'was partly due to the effect on Sterling of the clear 
split between the allies' . 
68 The possibility of oil sanctions was a critical factor in his 
decision, as he believed that Britain could ride the financial crisis but not oil sanctions, 
indicating the pivotal influence of the oil problem. Kunz has argued convincingly that 
Macn-Oan deceived his Cabinet colleagues and Eden by citing 'a clearly erroneous 
figure. '69 The evidence she offers for this is that the loss could not have been $280 
million for the week ending 6 November, as Macmillan was told by the Treasury on 7 
November that the loss for the previous week was only $85 million. 70 She claims 
65 Home, Macmillan 1894 -1956 p. 448 
66 Lloyd, Suez 1956 p. 209 
67 Home, Macmillan 1984-1956. p. 449 
68 Home, Macmillan 1894-1956 p. 448; and Macmillan, Riding The Storm 1956-1959, p. 164 
69 D. B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (London: Univ. of Carolina Press, 1991), 
p. 132 
70 PRO T 236/4189 "Note of a Meeting at 11 Downing Street on Wednesday, 7 November 1956" in 
Kunz, Economic 5iplomacy of the Suez Crisis, p. 132 
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further that he deceived the Cabinet by telling them that the reserve losses had 
originated in the United States, whereas this was not revealed by the Treasury or Bank 
of England until 20 November. 'Macmillan knew he was misleading the Cabinet', as 
the only counter explanation possible is that Macmillan confused pounds with dollars, 
and tlýs contention is not convincing to any degree . 
71 Kunz accounts for Macmillan's 
actions by his deduction that his cover up would not be easily or quickly discovered, as 
he had the ultimate responsibility for Britain's finances as Chancellor. Only Butler 
could have challenged the declaration because of his past experience as Chancellor, but 
as he was opposed to the invasion in the first place, Butler accepted Macmillan's 
calculations at 'face value'. 72 Butler noted in February 1957 that 'Harold Macmillan 
was even clearer in his rnind on the need for withdrawal than anyone else. This was 
because of the great strain on Sterling, our isolation from the Commonwealth and 
world opinion and the danger of the effect of United Nations sanctions on our 
economy s. 
73 
Macmillan's conduct on 6 November can be accounted for by two alternative 
explanations. The first is that he knew that it would be pointless to continue the Suez 
expedition, and the British government needed US financial support because of the oil 
situation, so he decided to cut the government's losses. The second is that Macmillan 
had realised that Eden was now finished as Prime Minister, and saw a 'window of 
opportunity' to press his claim for the party leadership. This is the view of Robert 
Rhodes-James, who asserts that the 6 November Cabinet meeting was the occasion 
that led Macn-Oan to see the 'window of opportunity' that he had previously not 
71 Kunz, Economic Divlomacv of the Suez Crisis p. 132 
72 Kunz, Economic Diplomagy of the Suez Crisis, p. 133 
73 Notes, February 1957 Butler MSS G31 (70) 
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expected, and had not worked for. Rhodes-James believes the opportunity just came 
and Macmillan took it. 74 This explains in part why he acted as he did on 6 November. 
Macmillan's sense of opportunism was important, but the severity of Britain's 
escalating financial problems must not be discounted as a determining, factor in his C) 
decision. 
A more cynical explanation linked to this is that this was just one of a series of 
manoeuvres by Macmillan to undermine Eden and force his resignation. There is 
obviously no direct evidence to substantiate this argument, as Macmillan would not 
admit to it. However, Nigel Birch, a loyal supporter of Eden's, maintained that 
Macmillan had pushed 'Eden into Suez in the hope that it would bring about his fall'. 
Home has called this the 'pulled-the-carpet-out' thesis, and states that this view was 
not subscribed to by those who worked closely with Eden and Macmillan, including 
Philip De Zueleta, who was Private Secretary to both, Lord Blake, who helped Eden 
write his memoirs, and Lady Avon, Eden's widoW. 7' However, Birch became an 
implacable opponent of Macmillan after his forced resignation from the Treasury in 
January 1958, and this may explain his view of Macmillan's conduct. This cynical 
interpretation places a strategy or plan on Macmillan's actions that does not appear to 
have existed. The oil situation dictated Macmillan's actions, but it is also apparent that 
he had seen the 'window of opportunity' that the situation presented. Macmillan's 
actions had the desired outcome as it undermined Eden's position, and improved his 
position as a candidate for the leadership should Eden retire. 
74 Interview with Robert Rhodes-James featured in 'Reputations: The Macmillans. Portrait of a 
Political Marriage'. Blakeway Productions for BBC TV. First shown 14 March 1996. 
75 Home, Macn-dllan 1894-1956 p. 461 
139 
The 'window of opportunity' argument can be further substantiated by 
Macmillan's actions prior to, and following, Eden's departure for Jamaica on 23 
November. These were particularly effective in buttressing his candidacy to succeed 
Eden. After the 6 November cease-fire, Macmillan persistently attempted to persuade 
representatives of the US government to allow him to visit the US to negotiate with 
Eisenhower and Dulles. This could be viewed as part of his plan to press his claim to 
replace Eden, but could also be accounted for by the urgent need to sort out the oil 
problem. On 9 November, Macmillan spoke to Aldrich to discuss whether he should 
ask the US State Department for permission to leave for Washington immediately to 
consult Humphrey about the question of oil imports to Britain. Aldrich advised 
Macn-dlIan not to raise this matter, and to wait until Eden could visit the US himself 
Aldrich gave this advice as the State Department wanted to deal with the oil problem 
through the OEEC, rather than directly with the British government, as British troops 
76 
were still in Egypt . 
Macmillan continued his quest to gain US support to help resolve the British 
government's oil problems. On 16 November, he spoke to Aldrich and said that the 
OEEC meeting in Paris had gone well, and 'it would not be necessary for Great Britain 
to make any special representations to the United States in connection with its 
problems regarding oil'. Aldrich noted that there were two things presently occupying 
Macmillan's mind: the obtaining of fund available to Britain from the INE, and 'the 
possibility of money from the Federal Reserve Bank on the American securities owned 
by the British Treasury'. Macmillan felt these were worth approximately $900 million, 
76 Norris (ed. ), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (571) Telegram from Embassy in United Kingdom to 
Department of State, 12 November 1956, pp. 1115-1117 
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and if the government could obtain two-thirds of the market value of the securities, 
and $600 million ftom the INE fund, that would be sufficient to 'tide Britain over the 
77 difficult period ahead' . 
Aldrich felt that the British government were now prepared to withdraw from 
the Canal Zone, and let the UN settle the dispute between Israel and Egypt. Macmillan 
also discussed the possibility of going to Washington as 'Eden's deputy', to continue 
negotiations as Eden's health meant he would not be able to undertake such a trip. 
Aldrich informed the State Department that 'this might be a hint that some movement 
is on foot in the Cabinet to replace Eden' . 
7' The US Government now saw that Eden 
was in a precarious position, and unlikely to continue as Prime NEnister. This was 
confirmed to Aldrich on 19 November, when Macmillan told him that Eden had had a 
breakdown and would imminently depart the country to recuperate for a fortnight, and 
this would be followed by his retirement. Macmillan told Aldrich that Butler would 
become Prime Minister, Macmillan Foreign Secretary and Lloyd Chancellor, but he 
also noted 'Possibly Macmillan might be Prime Minister'. Aldrich also informed the 
State Department that 'Macmillan is desperately anxious to see the President at earliest 
possible opportunity and apparently consideration being given to appointment of 
Macmillan as Deputy Prime Minister during Eden's absence in order that such a 
meeting might take place at once after withdrawal British troops' . 
79 This action again 
followed Macmillan's strategy of gaining the financial support, and also US support for 
his leadership challenge, if Eden resigned because of the crisis. 
77 Norris (ed. ), FRUS XVI 1955-1957 (583) Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to 
the Department of State, London, 17 November 1956, pp. 1142-1143 
78 Norris (ed. ), FRUS 1955 - 1957 XVI (588) Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to 
the Department of State, London, 19 November 1956, pp. 1142-1143 
79 Norris (ed. ), FRUS 1955 - 1957 XVI (593) Telegram from the Embassy in United Kingdom to the 
Department of State, London, 19 November 1956, p. 1163 
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Macmillan again spoke to Aldrich that evening, and confirmed that Eden would 
be going on holiday for a fortnight, and then he would retire. The first action following Cý 
Eden's departure would be the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone. 
Macmillan asked for 'a fig leaf to cover our nakedness, to secure the majority in 
Cabinet for withdrawal. I-Es actions during this phase of the crisis in negotiating with 
the US government can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, Macmillan was chosen by 
the Cabinet to lead the negotiations with the US government, because of his good 
relationship with both Dulles and Eisenhower, and it was felt this must be exploited in 
order to stabilise the Anglo-US alliance. The second explanation is that he was 
exploiting Eden's health problems to enhance his own leadership credentials, by openly 
campaigning for the support of the US government. It is impossible to reach a definite 
conclusion on this issue, but the securing of the financial support was imperative, while 
Macmillan probably did perceive the benefit of US support for -his leadersbýp 
candidacy. The outcome of these actions was positive for Macmillan. He helped to 
gain the financial support from the US government, and also promoted his leadership 
candidacy, with evidence suggesting that Eisenhower favoured him as Eden's 
successor. 
Macmillan's Conduct durinR the 1922 Conunittee MeetinR of 22 November 
Both Macmillan and Butler addressed this meeting with the 1922 Committee, 
in the aftermath of the decision to accept the cease-fire in the Canal Zone. Butler 
addressed the meeting as acting head of the government, and there is some dispute 
over whether Macmillan was invited to speak at this meeting. Alan Clark has argued 
that he rose to speak during the traditional banging of desks following Butler's speech 
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and interrupted the proceedings. However, Howard maintains that Butler invited 
Macmillan to accompany him, as he knew the reception from the committee was going 
81 
to be hostile, and he needed some support. In his notes on the crisis, Butler states 
'Harold [Macmillan] and I went together to the 22 Committee. We could not tell them 
all the facts'. " Butler thus reveals that they went in unison to the meeting, and implies 
Macmillan was intended to speak to the Committee, in contrast to Clark's assertion. 
Macmillan was present at the meeting in his capacity as Chancellor to explain the poor 
state of the economy in the aftermath of the crisis. 
Butler addressed the meeting first, and was followed by Macmillan, who 
delivered a rallying cry to the party's NVs. He invigorated the Committee with a 
speech that showed impeccable timing, and an acute understanding of political 
psychology. He appeared to offer hope to the party's NTs, whose spirits were low 
after the embarrassments of recent months. Conservative NTs were convinced 
MacmiHan was the man to succeed Eden after his performance at the 1922 Committee 
meeting, illustrating the full effect of the meeting on the outcome of the imminent 
selection. Macmillan, as one MP present recalled, 'made a bid for the leadership which 
we knew was coming into question. It was a real leadership speech'. 82 Butler finished 
his speech, and announced 'now the Chancellor of the Exchequer may care to say a 
word or two about oil'. Macmillan did much more than this. 'It was rhetoric and it did 
border on the 'ham', but he contrived to set their [Conservative NPs] troubles in the 
framework of the long adventure of politics, full of hard knocks but still a game worth 
80 'Alan Clark's History of the Tory Party'. Episode two: The Rank Outsider. An Oxford Television 
Company Production for BBC TV. First broadcast 21 September 1997; and Howard, RAP. P. 240 
81 Notes, dated February 1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (70) 
82 Goodhart, The 1922, p. 175 
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playing more than any other'. 83 This was cone of the classic confrontations in the 
history of the 1922 Committee', and it was a confrontation that Macmillan won. A 
whip present at the meeting recalled that 'Harold [Macmillan] was at his most ebul ient 
and managed to win the day, not only on the merit of what he said (as it seemed to the 
Committee) but also physically in that his expansive gestures nearly caused poor Rab 
[Butler] to fall backwards from the adjacent seat'. 84 Macmillan also cunningly 
conveyed to the party's NTs that he would be willing to serve in a caretaker capacity 
to allow the party to restore some semblance of stability, by emphasising his age and 
his 'advancing years'. This, along with his virtuoso performance, served to 'plant the 
seed' that he would be a viable option as a stop-gap leader, who could restore the 
party's short-term fortunes, and then hand over to a younger leader. 85 
Clark has noted the effect and the outcome of Macmillan's performance at the 
meeting, as 'the applause was long and hard, and members left the room with their 
0 
spirits raised for the first time since the summer. 6 This was what the party needed at 
this time, someone to instil confidence and lift the party after the embarrassments that 
had followed the retreat from Suez. Conservative Ws felt that they needed something 
exceptional because of the severe trouble that the party found itself in, and this 
explains Macmillan's attractiveness to MPs, and the party hierarchy. Ramsden has 
noted an important point about Macmillan's conduct after he became Prime Minister, 
that relates well to the attitude he expressed to Conservative M[Ps on 22 November. 
'Macmillan had recognised that the best way to deal politically with such a national 
83 J. Ramsden, 'Rab did sometimes miss tricks which Macn-dllan managed to take', The Listene 19 
March 1987, p. 23 
84 Goodhart, Ihe 1922, p. 175 
85 Clark, The Tories, p. 3 11 
86 Clark, Re T ýori. es p. 311 
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humiliation was to refuse all apologies, enquiries and witch-hunts, and then to ignore 
the issue altogether by highlighting other things in his speeches and in the party's 
campaignmgý. 97 This was the strategy Macmillan adopted at the 1922 Committee 
meeting, to show the party that the crisis could be quickly forgotten by uniting 
together, and working to erase the memory of the crisis from the party and the 
electorate. 
Macmillan's actions can be perceived as being aimed at deliberately 
undermining Butler's claims for the leadership. This is certainly the view of Lady 
Butler, who believes Macmillan did everything he could to prevent Butler becoming 
Prime Nfinister, and that her husband never recognised Macmillan's jealousy and 
hostility, always taking him at face value. 8' An alternative explanation is that 
Macmillan merely used the meeting as an opportunity to deliver what the party's MPs 
wanted to hear, and so demonstrated his political acumen. This is supported by De 
Zueleta who told Home that by the 1922 meeting, Macmillan 'saw that Eden could not 
go on, and Butler could not possibly take over'. '9 This realisation dictated the nature 
of Macrnillan's conduct, not personal spite against Butler. However, when he was 
chosen to replace Eden on 10 January 1957, the choice was essentially that of the 
Cabinet, so this meeting could only have had an indirect, yet important influence on his 
victory, as ministers were fully aware of the outcome of the meeting. The importance 
of Macmillan's conduct at this meeting in his selection as Eden's successor cannot be 
understated. 
87 Ramsden, An Appetite For Power, p. 362 
88 Interviews with Lady Butler featured in 'Alan Clark's History of the Toly Party'. Episode three: 
From Estate Owners to Estate Agents. An Oxford Television Company Production for BBC TV. First 
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Macmillan's Conduct durinR Eden's Absence: 23 November 1956-9 Januajy 1957 
Macmillan left Butler to defend the government's position in the Commons 
when Eden went to Jamaica, thus exposing him to attacks from both sides of the 
House. However, Butler was acting head of the government and had the responsibility 
for explaining and defending government policy in the Commons, so Macmillan was 
not compelled to support Butler in this task. He only appeared once in the Commons 
after the cease-fire and only then spoke on econon& policy, but was not required to 
do more. 90 Macmillan once noted that Butler, 'asked me to act as his main confidant, 
and we laboured together in complete agreement ... We made it a rule always to attend 
[the House of Commons] together and each to speak on the lines we had agreed'. 91 
His single appearance in the Commons over this period contradicts this claim, but his 
conduct as Chancellor in explaining the government's economic position cannot be 
questioned. 
Butler recorded an interesting observation on the attitude of Macmillan during 
Eden's absence. Butler recalled in February 1957 that 'Macmillan and the younger men 
showed great determination in their view that the situation could not continue'. 92 This 
observation illustrates an interesting development in the attitude of Macmillan. Prior to 
Eden's departure for Jamaica, Macmillan wanted Eden to stay on, but when he 
returned, he wanted Eden to retire. This could be due to the realisation that Eden was 
now finished, and that the manoeuvring for the prime position in the emerging new 
order was beginning. An argument that could be offered to support the theory that 
Macmillan manipulated Butler's exposed position, is that he already knew of the 
90 5s H. C. Debs. Vol. 561.26 November 1956, cols. 1050-1066 
9' Macn-dllarL Ridin The Storm, p. 170 
92 Notes, February 1957, Butler MSS G31 (70) 
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opposition to Butler in the party from those NTs opposed to Suez, and exploited it to 
its full potential. His solitary speech in the Commons during the period after Eden's 
departure for Jamaica suggests this may have been the case. Butler, however, has 
asserted that Macmillan did not conspire against him or Eden. He wrote in February 
1957 
When questioned by historians I should say that there was no 
great plot at the end of Anthony Eden's Preniership as the 
newspapers would sometimes suppose. In some ways I have 
evidence that Harold Macmillan was surprised himself His 
behaviour certainly indicated that he deserves every assistance in 
his heavy responsibilities 93 
Butler's assessment is correct. Macmillan was chosen on merit because of his 
conduct during the latter stages of the crisis and its aftermath, which displayed the 
qualities the party needed in tbýs situation. Macmillan noted after the crisis that once 
Eden had left for Jamaica, 'he could never return and remain as P. M. for long. Apart 
from the appearance of running away from a battlefield the party had been terribly 
shattered. It became clear by Christmas that the P. M. was really-unable to go on'. 94 
This can be interpreted as a further cue for Macmillan's efforts to take the 'window of 
opportunity', as he knew Eden was finished, and this dictated the nature of his 
conduct. 
93 'Reminiscences ending with Suez', undated Butler MSS RAB G31 (89) 
9' Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 28*. (3) 
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Macmillan also noted that 'the only way out was a resignation on the grounds 
of health. It became clear that Eden was a sick man. The strain of recent weeks and 
months had told on him terribly. This reason was not a political excuse. This illness 
was a reality'. 95 The first part of this entry suggests that Eden may have been forced z;, 
out, and his illness was the cover for the real political reasons behind the party's 
removal of its leader. The emphasis on the illness being a 'reality' may also be due to 
Macmillan's efforts to hide the truth. Dorothy Macmillan's nephew, the Duke of 
Devonshire, made the following statement regarding Macmillan's role in the episode in 
1996: 'Uncle Harold's role in it all is extremely interesting. I would only say: it all 
turned out very well for him in the end, didn't it?,. 
96 This illustrates the confusion and 
ambiguity in interpreting Macmillan's actions during the Suez Crisis, and this is 
epitomised by his reputation of being 'first in, first out'. 
Conclusion 
Thýis chapter has demonstrated that the key actions of the two candidates in the 
selection of January 1957, Macmillan and Butler, came in November and December 
1956. The most important of the actions occurred at the 1922 Committee meeting of 
22 November, at which Macmillan convinced the party that he was the stop-gap leader 
who could re-unite the party and revive its fortunes. Butler did not fulfil this, and was 
blamed by the party for the failure of the government's policy during the Suez Crisis, 
as he was head of the government when the policy finally failed. He was the party's 
95 Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macmillan-der). d. 28*. (5). EMDhasis on original document. 
96 Interview with the Duke of Devonshire featured in 'Reputations: The Macmillans. Portrait of a 
Political Marriage'. Blakeway Productions for BBC TV. First shown 14 March 1996. 
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scapegoat, and this was entrenched when he did not make the announcement of the Zý 
withdrawal from the Canal Zone on 3 December. 
The analysis of the candidates' conduct during the early stages of the crisis 
serves two purposes. Firstly, it demonstrates the complex machinations of the Suez 
Crisis, and the influence they had on the outcome of the selection. Secondly, it 
demonstrates that Macmillan did not openly conspire against Eden during September 
and October 1956, as has been suggested in some existing analysis. It is somewhat 
debatable that Macmillan conspired against Eden to any extent during the crisis, but it 
is apparent that he did see the 'window of opportunity' to promote his leadership 
candidacy that the cease-fire of 6 November presented. Whether his conduct in 
instigating the cease-fire was an attempt to undermine Eden, or to save the British 
economy, must remain as conjecture. This chapter has demonstrated that the actions of 
Macmillan and Butler were central to the outcome of the 1957 leadership selection. 
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Chapter Five 
The Suez Crisis and the 1957 Leadershin Selection: The Situational 
Interpretation 
This chapter applies the Situational Interpretation to the 1957 leadership 
selection. It assesses the influence of the situation that the party found itself in, the 
formal and informal aspects of the selection procedure, and the candidates' level of 
acceptability, electability and governability, and their effect on the outcome - the 
selection of Macmillan and the failure of Butler to attain the leadership. 
The Situation and its Requirements 
The Core Requirements 
The Conservative goverment had three urgent considerations following the 
retirement of Eden. The first was to unite the party behind a new leader, the second 
was to boost party morale and save the party from collapse, and the third was to revive 
the Anglo-US relationship. The Special Relationship was only of tertiary importance to 
the party at this time. Unless the party fulfilled the first two objectives, the government 
was not going to be in a position to even consider reviving the Anglo-US relationship, 
as the retention of power was unlikely. Pimlott believes that there were three criteria 
on which the selection of Eden's successor was based. Firstly, the verdict on the crisis, 
and Pimlott suggests that the need was to sweep the crisis away from the political 
scene as soon as possible. This was certainly true, and it was necessary for the crisis to 
be erased from the memories of the electorate, and the new leader had to fulfil this. 
The second criterion was the appointment of a stop-gap leader to get the party through 
the current difficulties and restore some stability to the party. This was also a 
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consideration, and Macrnfllan's age compared to Butler's suggests this may have 
occurred, but Macmillan was the better qualified of the candidates for the position. The 
tl-ýird was the need for the best candidate to secure re-election for the Conservatives. 
This was also a highly important consideration, as it was widely expected that the party 
would fall because of the crisis, bringing about an imminent election. However, the 
party did have breathing space as a general election did not have to be called until 
1960.1 
The Need for a Stop-gap Leader 
The evidence suggests that Eden would not have been accepted by the party to 
continue as its leader following his departure for Jamaica for recuperation in 
November 1956. This was because he was widely discredited as leader following the 
failure of the government's policy towards Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
Company, and towards the invasion of Egypt on 30 October. Concerns about Eden's 
health also raised doubts about his position as leader. Macmillan felt that once Eden 
departed for Jamaica he would not return as Conservative leader for long, and 
Macmillan was right. As he noted 
For several days past (since Christmas, in fact) many of our 
colleagues have been very restless. There had been many 
meetings - no intrigue, but great concern at the apparent inability 
of the P. M. or anyone else to take hold of the situation. Outside 
the ranks of the Cabinet, etc., M. P. s have been meeting. There 
1 Pin-dott, The Queen p. 257; and Blake, The Conservative Party, p. 279 
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has been a general acceptance of the fact that the government 
could not go on. As soon as Parliament met it would be in 
trouble; in a few weeks it would fall. At the same time, no one 
has known what to d02 
The goverment's policy during the crisis had caused deep divisions within the 
party, and Eden could not repair those divisions because he had instigated them in the 
first place. Once Eden had departed for Jamaica, he no longer had the power base to 
remain in charge of the party, and it was only a matter of time before he was succeeded 
by a new leader. The US government was also hostile to the continuation of Eden's 
Premiership, and 'rumours started to circulate that the United States would never 
3 
resume normal relations with Britain unless there was a change of leadership'. The 
US government had been aware since November that the continuation of Eden's 
leadership was unlikely because of the discredit that was heaped on the party following 
the failure of the govermnent's policy. Eden's relationship with Eisenhower had also 
been wrecked by his attitude during the crisis, and there is no doubt that the President 
was hostile to the continuation of Eden's leadership, and he believed that the 'Special 
Relationship' could not be restored while Eden was in power. The press in the United 
States also believed Eden was finished as Prime Minister, and his image also had 
detrimental effects on Britain's status internationally. 'They presented Britain as 'the 
sick man of Europe, with the sick man of Britain at its head'. The negative 
connotations that this inspired contributed to the end of Eden's leadership. 
2 Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 28*. (4). 
3 Clark, The Tories, p. 3 11 
4 Clark, The Tories, p. 311 
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Only by convincing the party that it could survive, would the Conservatives 
have a chance of restoring their fortunes, and this was, therefore, a vital requirement 
for the new leader to fulfil. This points to the probability that the new leader would be 
viewed as a stop-gap appointment, to enable the party to re-unite behind the new 
leader, and recover its short-term fortunes in the aftermath of the crisis. The widely 
held notion that the party was likely to fall because of the crisis also contributes to the 
assessment that Macmillan's appointment was as a stop-gap leader. In fact, on his 
appointment as Prime Minister, Macmillan told the Queen that his government was 
only likely to survive for six weeks, a comment she reminded him of on his sixth 
anniversary as Prime Nfinister. 
The Restoration of Party Unity and Morale 
This was the most important task for Eden's successor. The Conservative Party 
was in a considerable state of disunity because of the divisions that were caused by the 
goverment's policy during the Suez Crisis, and the new leader would have to unite 
the whole party, ministers and back-benchers, behind him. ' The crisis would have to 
be wiped from the political landscape as soon as possible, so that it no longer caused 
division, or gave political capital to the Labour Party. Morale needed to be restored, as 
the party's spirits were low after the embarrassments of recent months, and the 
humiliation of the retreat from the Canal Zone. The government's policy during the 
crisis was shown to have been wrong, and costly in both domestic terms, and in the 
damage it did to the Anglo-US relationship. The need for morale deemed it necessary 
for a leader with a high degree of electability to be selected, as the party needed to be 
5 Blake, The Conservative P, p. 278 
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convinced of its own qualities, much as a leader needs to convince an electorate to 
vote for their party at a general election. This meant that an inspirational leader was 
needed to lift the party's spirits. 
The Crisis and the Electoral Cycle 
An important situational factor was the time that the party had to recover from 
its present difficulties, as a general election was not due until 1960. This meant that the 
party, despite the wide belief that the government would fall because of the crisis, did 
not have to go to the polls for three years. This would allow the new leader time to re- 
unite the party, and restore its morale in time for the election. This, nevertheless, had 
to be achieved quickly, for if unity was not restored in a short time, the government 
would collapse. However, the lack of pressure that the imminence of a general election 
would put on the situation, eased this concern. It was also important as it would show 
the party's NTs that if they united behind the new leader, they could still secure 
another term in office, and this acted as a spur to party unity. This was also important 
as it gave the opportunity for the Suez Crisis to be wiped from the memories of the 
electorate before the next election. If this could be achieved by the new leader, success 
at the next election for the party would still be a possibility. 
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The Selection Procedure: Formal Aspects and Informal Networks of 
Communication 
Formal Aspects 
7he Canvass of the Cabinet 
The selection procedure used to select Eden's successor followed the traditions 
of the party, by relying on informal discussions by the party hierarchy with the Cabinet 
and senior party figures, to determine the best successor to Eden. Before his 
resignation, Eden had discussed the succession with Sir Nlichael Adeane, the Queen's 
Private Secretary. He suggested that 'a senior minister who was not personally 
involved should be asked to take soundings in the Cabinet', and Lord Salisbury was 
suggested as a possible minister who could fulfil this task. 6 Lord President of the 
Council Salisbury and Lord Chancellor Kilmuir, were chosen to represent the party 
hierarchy by conducting the soundings, as they were senior party figures, members of 
the Cabinet and were not contenders for the leadership. 7 On 9 January, Eden met 
Butler, Macmillan and Salisbury, and told them that he would inform the Cabinet, at 5 
8 
p. m. that evening, of his decision to resign as party leader. Macmillan first realised 
something was going to happen when he received a message that morning at the 
Treasury summoning him to 10 Downing Street at 3 p. m. Eden told him 'there was no 
way out'. 9 Before the Cabinet meeting, Salisbury, privy to the news of the 
resignation, spoke to Kilmuir, and advised him that, in this situation, the Queen was 
entitled to ask advice from anybody she wished about who should replace Eden. He 
also told Kilmuir that the Queen did not need to wait for a party meeting, as that 
6 Watkins, The Road To Number Ten, p. 63 
7 Fisher, The ToKy Leaders p. 83 
8 Shepherd, The Power Brokers, . 146; and Rhodes-James, Anthony Eden, p. 596 9 Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macmillan del). d. 28*. (3). 
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would have meant abandoning the most important part of the Royal Prerogative. They 
then agreed on the procedure that should be adopted to select Eden's replacement. 
This was for Salisbury and Kilmuir to see each Cabinet NEnister individually in 
Kilmuir's office in the Privy Council Offices. The manner of the consultations followed 
all precedents of previous selections, except for the selection of Bonar Law in 1922, 
who insisted on being elected party leader at a party meeting before becoming Prime 
Nfinister. 'o This procedure followed the principle of 'you choose, we send for, that 
characterised this selection, and the selection of Home in 1963. Sir Edward Ford, the 
Queen's Assistant Private Secretary, told Ben Pimlott 'we took the view that that it 
was for the Conservative Party to select its leaders, and that the Queen should not do 
anything until she was sure what the party had decided'. " This meant that the party 
chose the best candidate, and the Queen appointed that nominee. Pimlott has described 
this selection as 'putting the Prerogative on ice', as it meant that the party chose the 
successor on this occasion, while allowing the Royal Prerogative to remain in tact. 
However, Pimlott believes that this selection led to the downfall of the Royal 
Prerogative, as the selection by the party hierarchy of Eden's successor showed it was 
a 'doubtful instrument'. In asserting this view, Pimlott ignores the often dominant role 
of the party hierarchy in the selection of Conservative Party leaders under the 'magic 
circle' system of selection, and it is apparent that the Monarchy traditionally preferred 
having the choice made for them by the party hierarchy. 12 
After the Cabinet meeting, Macn-dllan and Butler, the only two contenders to 
replace Eden, left Ten Downing Street. The rest of the Cabinet were asked by 
10 Macmillan, Riding The Storm, p. 183; and Rhodes-James, Anthony Eden, p. 596 
11 Pimlott, The Oueen P. 257 
12 piMlott, ýhe 
_QUeen, __p. 
260 
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Salisbury and Kilmuir to see them individually in Kilmuir's office, following the C) 
procedure they had agreed earlier that day. 13 As Butler recorded, 'Cabinet NEnisters 
were 'corralled' to give an immediate judgement between Harold Macmillan and me as 
successor'. Macmillan, in contrast, wrote that 'there was no attempt by either 
Salisbury or Kilmuir to use what one rrýight call a prefect's influence on the opinions of 
those they interviewed'. 14 Selwyn Lloyd objected to the consultations being conducted 
by Salisbury and Kilmuir because they were Peers, suggesting a belief that they would 
not be impartial and neutral canvassers of Cabinet opinion. The Conservative Party 
hierarchy were central actors in the selection of Macmillan, and he was the choice of 
the party hierarchy. There is no evidence to suggest that Kilmuir and Salisbury 'fixed' 
the results of the canvass of the Cabinet, but the fact that they were supporters of 
Macmillan must have had some influence on their collection of the opinions of their 
colleagues. Unlike the selection of Home in October 1963, the selection of Macmillan 
in January 1957 was the choice of the Cabinet. Lord Kilmuir later described the 
consultations 
To each Bobbety said, 'Well, which is it, Wab or Hawold? ' As 
well as seeing the remainder of the ex-Cabinet, we interviewed 
the Chief Whip [Edward Heath] and Oliver Poole, the Chairman 
of the Party. John Morrison, the Chairman of the 1922 
Committee, rang me up from Islay the next morning. An 
13 Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 28*. (5) 
14 Home, Macmillan 1894-1956, p. 467; Butler, Art of the Possible, p. 195; and Macmillan, Ridiang 
The Storml p. 183 
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overwhelming majority of Cabinet NEnisters was in favour of 
Macmillan" 
Macn-Oan noted, 'I heard afterwards that the opinion was particularly 
unanimous in favour of me, and not Butler'. 16 Kilmuir later told Rhodes-James that 
only Patrick Buchan-Hepburn had supported Butler. Anthony Head also recalled this 
as being the case, but Butler believed that Walter Monckton, the Paymaster-General 
and James Stuart, the Scottish Secretary, also supported him. 17 On 10 January, 
Salisbury was summoned to the Palace to report the results of the soundings of the 0 
Cabinet, and the informal consultations by the Chief Whip, Party Chairman and 
Chairman of the 1922 Committee, to the Queen. He did this at IIa. m., and 
recommended Macmillan as the successor to Eden. Salisbury did not give his own 
views, only expressing those of the Cabinet, and his assessment of the Cabinet's 
support for Macrnillan was crucial in the selection. 
However, Salisbury's role in the selection did arouse controversy, as it 
appeared that his own views were important in the selection, as he felt Macmillan 
should succeed Eden. Bogdanor has described the criticisms levelled at the selection. 
'The process of consultation enabled critics to caricature the process of selection as 
one in which the Premiership was being decided by an unrepresentative clique, out of 
touch with the realities of the second half of the twentieth century'. " Macmillan noted 
in answer to these criticisms that, 'since the Socialists afterwards tried to make out that 
this was a personal and private effort by the head of the Cecil's, it is important to 
15 Kilmuir, Political Adventure, p. 285 
16 Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 28*. 6). Emphasis on original document. 
17 Rhodes-James, Anthony Eden p. 599; Interview, Lord Head in Home, Macmillan 1894-1956, p. 468; 
and Howard, RAB, p. 247 
18 Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, p. 95 
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verify that Lord S[Salisbury] merely acted as a means of conveying to the Queen the 
general view within the party'. '9 It is clear that Salisbury did convey the views of the 
Cabinet, but his own support for Macmillan probably also weighed in his favour. 
At 12.55 p. m., Macmillan was telephoned by Adeane and was summoned to 
the Palace at 2 p. m., and was appointed Prime Nfinister . 
2' Butler was informed by 
Heath that Macmillan was to be Eden's successor. Following this, Butler walked alone 0 
along the Embankment. When a cameraman inquired what he was doing, he replied, 
'I'm taking a walk - the best thing to do in the circumstances'. 
21 Macmillan was 
endorsed as party leader at the traditional party meeting in these circumstances on 22 
January at Church House. 22 Lord Salisbury, as chairman of the meeting, proposed the 
motion that 
The Right Hon. Harold Macmillan, M. P., be elected Leader of 
the Conservative and Unionist Party; and that this Meeting, with 
full appreciation of the great services which he has already 
rendered to the Nation in many of the highest Offices of State, 
pledges its loyal support to him in discharging the great 
responsibilities with which he has now been entrusted 23 
19 Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 28*. (6-7) 
20 Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macn-dllan dgp. d. 28*, (7) 
21 Macmillan, Riding The Storm, . 
184, and Daily Sketch, 11 January 1957 in Howard, RAB, p-247 
22 'Meetings to Elect the Conservative Leader'. Geoffrey D. M. Block, 3 February 1965 
-CPACCO 20/39/3 
23 'Agenda. Party Meeting in the Assembly Hall, Church House, Westminster, at 12 noon on Tuesday, 
22nd January 1957' CPA CCO 4nl i 8o 
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In the tradition of previous party meetings to elect new leaders, the defeated 
candidate had to second this motion, which Butler duly did. Macmillan was thus now 
confirmed as successor to Eden as party leader and Prime Minister. 
Influence on the Outcome 
Pimlott noted of the selection that 'the process was not only quick. It was 
smooth. There was no time for unseemly wrangling - or for second thoughts, either 
about the decision, or the method of making it. Butler had seemed the likely successor, 
the next his rival was kissing hands'. 24 The selection was resolved in a rapid manner, 
as Eden resigned at 5 p. m. on 9 January, and Macmillan became Prime Minister at 2 
p. m. on 10 January. Clark has asserted that the selection procedure has 'never been 
bettered' in terms of 'minimising division and foreshortening the period of uncertainty'. 
This illustrates one of the 'magic circle' systems attributes: the ease and speed of 
succession. The speed at which the decision was reached did not allow time for 
extensive consultations within the party, and the decision of the Cabinet was crucial in 
the selection of Macmillan. This served to minimise dissent in the party, and paved the 
way for Macmillan to set about re-building Conservative fortunes. 25 
This is in stark contrast to the selection procedure used to select Home as 
Macmillan's successor in October 1963. This procedure was far longer, taking eleven 
days to complete, compared to the twenty-four hours that were needed to complete 
Macmillan's appointment. The canvass was far more extensive in 1963, but was more 
complex and the views of certain Conservative Nfinisters and NTs were 
misrepresented, unlike the selection of Macmillan. There was also opposition from at 
24 Pirnlott, The Queen p. 258 
25 Clark, Ihe Tories, p. 312 
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least half the Cabinet to Home's appointment, whereas there was only slight dissent to 
Macmillan's appointment, as only one minister voted for Butler. This ease of the 
succession, and the lack of opposition to it, suggests this was a far more successful 
selection procedure than that used in October 1963. 
Informal Networks 
There were two broad types of informal networks. The first were the informal 
canvasses of wider party opinion undertaken by Poole, Heath and Morrison. Poole, the 
Party Chairman,. and Heath, the Chief Whip, conducted informal canvasses of wider 
party opinion, and they affirmed that the greatest support was for Macmillan, and that 
significantly stronger opinions had been expressed against Butler. Morrison, the 
Chairman of the 1922 Committee, also recommended Macmillan as the candidate most 
supported by Conservative back-benchers, despite the fact that he was on holiday on 
the Isle of Islay off the Scottish coast at the time of the selection. 26 The second set of 
informal networks were the consultations undertaken by the Palace with other senior 
party figures, including Churchill, and Lord Chandos (formerly Oliver Lyttelton) and 
Lord Waverley (formerly Sir John Anderson, the Conservative Chancellor during the 
war-time coalition government). They affirmed that Macmillan was the party's choice 
to succeed Eden, and that he was felt by the party's senior statesman to be the most 
acceptable candidate. 
26 Shepherd, The Power Brokers, p. 147; and Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. Macmillan dep. 
d. 28*, (6) 
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777e Canvasses of Wider Party Opinion 
The indirect canvass of back-bench opinion by Heath illustrated that there was 
a significant 'anti-Butler' faction on the Conservative benches. He also received many 
letters from Conservative NIPs who were opposed to Butler, and he recommended 
Macmillan. 27 Heath told Geoffrey Hutchinson that 'the outcome was "highly 
acceptable to a substantial" majority in the House, a majority to which he himself 
belonged' . 
28 Butler acknowledged tlýs 'anti-Butler' faction undermined his prospects 4ý 
of succeeding Eden, illustrating the importance of the informal networks that 
expressed discontent at his candidacy. 'It was clear from the representations that had 
been made to the Chief Whip's office that there were many on the back-benches who 
would oppose my succession; there was no similar anti-Macmillan faction'. 29 
However, a certain number of Conservative back-benchers complained that 
they had not been consulted, thus questioning the extent of the informal canvassing of 
back-benchers. Tom Iremonger, the Conservative NT for Ilford, complained in the 
press that his views had not been asked for, and stated that the canvassing had been 
conducted on a selective and 'oligarchical' basis. This provoked a response from other 
Conservative MPs, including Martin Lindsay, the Conservative MP for Solihull, that 
Iremonger should have informed the party whips of his opinion, as he himself had 
done. Nigel Fisher, a biographer of Macmillan and then a Conservative MP, stated that 
he sent his views to the Chief Whip, and believes that 'Edward Heath had ample 
information on which to base his advice' . 
30 However, this must be questioned as there 
was less than twenty-four hours between Eden's resignation and Macn-Oan's 
27 Shepherd, The Power Brokers p. 146 
28 G. Hutchinson, Edward Heath, p. 86 in Watkins, The Road to Number Ten, p. 66 
29 Butler, Art of the Possible, p. 195 
30 Fisher, The Torv Leaders, p. 84 
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succession. However, Heath could have, and probably did, collect views on Eden's 
successor before he resigned, as it was clear that he was finished as Conservative 
leader from late 1956, which would explain the extent of the views gathered so quickly 
over the period of 9 to 10 January. According to Punnett, many Conservative NTs 
have acknowledged that this took place, but he offers no evidence for thiS. 
31 
Poole also found opposition to Butler existed in the party in the country. 
Morrison also recommended Macmillan, and based this on his assessment of back- 
bench opinion, despite the fact that he was on holiday at the time of the selection. 32 
Morrison probably relied on consultations by members of the 1922 Executive 
Committee with Conservative back-benchers in reaching this decision. 
Yhe Consultations of Party Influentials 
The Queen also consulted other senior party figures, including Churchill, and 
Lords Chandos and Waverley. Bogdanor has questioned the qualifications of Chandos 
and Waverley that entitled them to be consulted, but this can be explained by their 
former status in the party, and their experience of working with both Macmillan and 
Butler. This led them to be in a position to offer an opinion on who was the most 
viable successor to Eden . 
33 Churchill's role as the Conservative elder-statesman was 
influential, and the Queen consulted him as he was the only other Conservative leader 
still alive, except for Eden, and Churchill told Butler later that he went for the 'older 
man', and did so because he felt Macmillan was more decisive. 34 However, the Queen 
Punnett, Selecting The Partv Leader, p. 37 
32 This is argued in Shepherd, The Power Brokers , p. 147; Macmillan has asserted that he thought Morrison sent an assessment of back-bench opinion in Diary entry for 3 February 1957, Ms. 
Macmillan, dep. d. 28*. (6) 
33 Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, p. 95 
34 'Reminiscences ending with Suez', undated Butler MSS RAB G31 (89); Interview between Howard 
and Sir John Colville, 4 June 1985 in Howard, EAR, p. 247; and Rhodes-James, Anthonv Eden, p. 600. 
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consulted Churchill as she was requested to do so by Anthony Montague Brown, 
Churchill's Private Secretary. He felt that if Churchill's views had not been consulted, 
it might appear that he disapproved of the choice made by the party and the Queen. 
Brown then telephoned Adeane who suggested that he should visit Chartwell, 
Churchill's home, to ascertain his views. However, Brown stated that this would not 
appear as a thorough consultation. and would not satisfy public opinion, as the image of 
Churchill giving 1-ýs advice to the Queen at the Palace would add gravitas to the 
selection of Macmillan. 
35 
Beaverbrook suggested to Butler that Churchill was the dominant voice in the 
selection of Macmillan, and 'Churchill is all powerfiil at Buckingham Palace. You 
know how I like him. But I do not agree with his sole right to select his successors in 
Downing Street' . 
36 The suggestion that Churchill's was the dominant voice in the 
decision that Macmillan was to replace Eden cannot be totally discounted, and 
illustrates the importance of informal networks of communication in ascertaining the 
best successor. Butler commented on Beaverbrook's assertion in his private account of 
the selection of Macmillan. He suggests one of the key reasons why Macmillan was 
chosen ahead of him was the ... ambience" and connections of the present incumbent of 
the post at No. 10ý. 
37 Howard has also argued that Macmillan gained better 
intelligence of the developments than Butler after the canvass of the Cabinet, and 
Macmillan was made aware of these views, something he later denied . 
3' Butler's notes 
Butler noted that Churchill told him he went for the 'older man', but does not reveal it was because he 
felt Macmillan was more decisive than Butler. 
35 Watkins, The Road to Number Ten, p. 65 
36 Beaverbrook to Butler, 23 January 1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (47) 
37 Notes, February 1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (70) 
38 Howard, EAR, p. 247 
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were made in February 1957, so he was referring to Macmillan, and suggests Churchill 
played a crucial role in the selection of Macmillan. 
Some accounts of Macmillan's selection assert that Eden was not consulted by 
the Queen because he was considered too ill to offer advice. According to Macn0an's 
diary of 3 February 1957, Eden told him that he had 'neither been asked for his advice 
nor had volunteered it'. Kilmuir also believed this to have been true . 
39 However, a 
document in Eden's private papers shows that he informed the Queen during their final 
audience as Queen and Prime NEnister, that he felt Butler would be a worthy 
successor. Eden wrote to Adeane, on 12 January 1957, and stated 'the Queen made no 
formal request for my advice but enabled me to signify that my debt to Mr. Butler 
while I have been Prime NEnister was very real and that I thought he had discharged 
his difficult task during the three weeks while I was away in Jamaica very well'. 40 
Eden's views were not influential in the selection, illustrating the decline of his 
reputation in the party. 
Influence on the Outcome 
The informal networks of communication within the party were of importance 
in affirmipg the opposition to Butler, and the support for Macmillan in the party and 
the party hierarchy. This was because the canvasses of wider party opinion undertaken 
by Heath, Poole and Morrison, illustrated the existence of an anti-Butler faction in the 
parliamentary party, while there was no significant section in the party opposed to 
Macmillan. This meant Macn-dllan was the most acceptable candidate to unite the 
39 Macmillan Diary, 3 February 1957 in Macmillan, Riding The StOrm, p. 184; and Kilmuir, Political 
Adventure p. 287 
40 AP 20/33/12 Eden to Adeane, 12 January 1957 in Pin-dott, The Queen, p. 259 
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party. This opposition to Butler was central to his failure to become leader, as the 
Conservative Party is reluctant to select leaders who cannot guarantee party unity. 
The consultations of party influentials had a great influence on the outcome, as 
they affirmed that Macmillan was the choice of the party's senior statesman. In 
particular, the views of Churchill were decisive, as he still held a position of 
considerable gravitas. No one was still more influential in the Conservative hierarchy 
than Churchill, and his views were bound to have been influential. The views expressed 
by Churchill, Chandos and Waverley served to exacerbate party opinion that 
I 
Macmillan was the right candidate for the dire situation that the party found itself in, 
which was augmented by the canvass of the Cabinet. 
The Core Situational Criteria: Acceptability, Electability, and Governability 
Butler 
i) Acceptability 
Butler was deemed to be unacceptable as successor to Eden for a number of 
reasons, and the clearest evidence of his unacceptability was the existence of an 'anti- 
Butler' faction on the Conservative back-benches. This became apparent through 
letters and conversations received and undertaken by the Chief Whip, Edward Heath as 
part of the informal networks of the selection procedure. Heath found that many 
Conservative MEN were opposed to Butler succeeding Eden. Many of Butler's Cabinet 
colleagues shared the doubts of back-benchers about a Butler leadership. Kilmuir 
noted that 'party feeling in the House of Commons was running very strongly against 
Butler at this time', and he believed that the parliamentary party would have 
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disintegrated, if Butler had been selected as Eden's successor. 41 In February 1957, 
Butler offered this explanation as to why Macn-ffllan was chosen to replace Eden 
There were three criticisms which went in favour of the choice as 
finally made by the Queen. The first was the reaction of 
Conservative NTs, after visiting their constituencies at Christmas 
time, to the retreat from Suez. The second was the attitude of the 
younger members of the Cabinet. The third was the "ambience" 
and connections of the present incumbent of the post at No. 1042 
The first two factors were directly associated with Butler's reputation in the 
party, and this illustrates the importance of the decline in his reputation that resulted 
from the crisis. The 'scapegoat factor' was dominant in Butler's unacceptability and his 
failure to succeed Eden. The reasons for this opposition to him were, firstly, the blame 
put on him for the failure of the Suez invasion, and the cease-fire and withdrawal from 
the Canal Zone. When Butler became acting Prime Nfinister during Eden's 
convalescence in November 1956, this coincided with the withdrawal from the Canal 
Zone, and the compliance with US conditions for the rescue-package for the British 
economy. Butler, as the head of the government at that point, became the scapegoat 
for the failure of the government's policy during the crisis. This was particularly 
apparent with the right-wing Suez Group, who were vehemently opposed to 
withdrawal, before the govermnent had toppled Nasser from power. 
41 Rhodes-James, Anthony Eden, p. 599; and Kilmuir, Political Adventure, p. 285 
42 Notes, February 1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (70) 
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Butler became symbolic of all that had gone wrong, and for the retreat which 
was abhorred by many in the party, especially on the Imperialist right wing. The 
attitudes expressed by many in the party during the crisis illustrated that Butler's 
acceptability as Eden's successor was going to be seriously affected by Ws position as 
acting Prime Minister. Members of the Suez Group expressed these sentiments at the 
meetings of the Conservative Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. At the outset 
of the crisis, Captain Charles Waterhouse, NP for Leicester, South East, wamed 
Nasser's action of 26 July was a 'direct challenge to the British position in the Middle 
East and Affica, comparable with the situation in 1939'. Robert Boothby, NT for East 
Aberdeenshire, believed Nasser's action was comparable to Hitler's seizure of the 
Rhineland. On 31 July, Leonard Ropner spoke against a compromise, and demanded 
that the nationalisation of the Canal must not be accepted. On 29 October, John Biggs- 
Davidson, NT for Chigwell, told the Committee that 'if we are not prepared to use 
force we are finished. This is an issue on which governments should be prepared to 
fall'. 43 Waterhouse 'asked what is the altemative to force? He foresaw a disastrous 
situation in which we shall stand absolutely alone and any threat of military action by 
Nasser or any further aggrandisement should be considered as a casus belli'. 44 On 7 
November, Julian Amery, NT for Preston, North, 
43 'Confidential. Conservative Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. Report of a meeting held in 
Room 11 at the House of Commons at 5.0 p. in. on Monday 30 July 1956. ', 'Confidential. 
Conservative Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. Record of a meeting held in Room 14 at the 
House of Commons at 6.30 p. m. on Tuesday 31 July 1956. ', and 'Confidential. Conservative 
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs. Middle East Sub-Committee. Minutes of a meeting held in Room 13 at 
the House of Commons at 6 p. m. on Monday 29 October 1956' CPA CRD 2/34/2 
44 'Confidential. Conservative Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. Middle East Sub- 
Committee. Minutes of a meeting held in Room 13 at the House of Commons at 6 p. in. on Monday 
29 October 1956' CPA CRD 2/34/2 
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Ur-ged that now we had a foot in the door, we should not stop 
until we had attained three main objectives: a settlement of the 
Canal question, a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and 
destruction of Nasser's military junta. At the same time we must 
stand on the Prime Nfinister's conditions for a cease-fire: that we 
must not be excluded from the U. N. force, and must remain until 
the above settlements could be guaranteed by the U. N. 45 
Sir Ian Horobin, NP for Oldham East, and F. M. Bennett, NP for Torquay, 
endorsed Amery's view, and Louis Spearman stated his disagreement with government 
policy. On 14 November, Patrick Maitland, MP for Lanark, 'questioned whether the 
government had followed the right course in calling a cease-fire before our full 
objectives were achieved'. Waterhouse followed Maitland's statement by telling the 
Committee that the government must make it clear that the forces would not be 
withdrawn until the Canal had been cleared by the UN. Amery 'considered that the 
way to wreck a rebuilding of relations with America was to go cap in hand'. 
Waterhouse told the Committee, 'we must make it clear we were not prepared to 
withdraw our forces until the Canal was cleared by the United Nations'. 46 
At the meeting of 21 November, F. W. Harris, NT for Croydon, North West, 
expressed 'great anxiety at rumours that the Government was contemplating 
withdrawal of our forces before the United Nations had implemented the conditions 
45 'Confidential. Conservative Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. Record of a meeting held in 
Room 10 at the House of Commons at 4 p. m. on Wednesday 7 November' CPA CRD 2/34/2 
46 'Confidential. Conservative Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. Record of a meeting held in 
Room 10 at the House of Commons at 4 p. m. on Wednesday 14 November 1956' CPA CRD 2/34/2 
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laid down by the Prime Nfinister and the Foreign Secretary'. 47 Harris also stated that 
he could not support the government 'in any premature withdrawal', and at the same 
meeting, Amery argued British forces should remain in Port Said until the government 
had 'solid guarantees' about the Canal, and an Arab-Israeli settlement. Dudley 
Williams stated his opposition to any withdrawal before the government had achieved 
its objectives, telling the meeting that unless this happened, a general election would be 
called and the goverment would lose. 48 
These sentiments show that anyone who led the retreat from Suez would be 
reviled in some sections of the party, and when Butler was placed in charge of the 
retreat from the Canal Zone, his standing in the party was severely affected. This 
decision angered the Imperialist wing of the party, as 'the subsequent cessation of 
Anglo-French action and the eventual withdrawal were viewed [by the Suez Group] as 
clear-cut defeats'. The bulk of the party believed in the use of force and this had a 
major effect on Butler's reputation . 
49 This has been confirmed in a letter from Poole, 
to Heath during the May 1957 controversy over the impending decision by the 
government to allow British ships to begin re-using the Suez Canal, in accordance with 
the terms Nasser had laid down. At a meeting with a number of Suez rebels including 
Viscount I-Enchingbrooke, Victor Raikes, and John Biggs-Davidson, who all spoke out 
against the decision to withdraw troops in December 1956, they told Poole they would 
resign the party whip. Poole acknowledged, 'there is no doubt that the views they 
expressed to me are widely held in certain sections of the party'. " It can thus be 
47 'Confidential. Conservative Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. Record of a meeting held in 
Room 10 at the House of Commons at 4 p. m. on Wednesday 21 November 1956' CPA CRD 2/34/2 
48 'Confidential. Conservative Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. Record of a meeting held in 
Room 10 at the House of Commons at 4 p. m. on Wednesday 21 November 1956' CPA CRD 2/34/2 
49 L. P. Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis, (London: Pall Mall, 1964), pp. 48 and 65 
50 Poole to Heath, 10 May 1957 CPA CCO 20/l/5 
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assumed that these sentiments were just as widely held in the party in December 1956 
and January 1957, if not in even stronger terms during that immediate fall-out from the 
crisis. This denotes their significance in Butler's unacceptability to Conservative Ws 
opposed to the cease-fire and withdrawal. 
This decision had a major effect on the outcome of the leadership selection in 
January 1957, as Butler was deemed to be unacceptable because of the opposition to 
him from Conservative NTs that this action, and others, aroused. Anthony Nutting, 
who resigned as Nlinister of State at the Foreign Office in protest at the invasion of 
Egypt, has expressed the depth of this opposition to Butler in the party because of his 
actions during tfitis period. He has stated that -Butler was the 'Suez Group's chosen 
scapegoat', and they saw to it that he could not succeed Eden. 51 Similarly, 'the feeling 
in the Party was that if he would not take responsibility we could not have him as 
leader. Afterwards Rab [Butler] was hounded for that very reason, by what I call the 
'blue blood and thunder' group, and one or two of them did their best to stop Rab 
becoming Eden's successor'. 52 Butler revealed his incomprehension towards the 
party's selection of Macmillan when he told Home, 'I couldn't understand, when I had 
done a most wonderful job - picking up the pieces after Suez - that they then chose 
Harold [Macmillan] 7.53 
When Lord Beaverbrook wrote to Butler following the selection of Macmillan, 
and told him, 'if the H [House] of C [Commons] had been given the opportunity to 
decide the leadership your selection was certain, he was incorrect as all evidence 
suggests that Butler would not have been selected leader by his colleagues in the 
5' A. Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The StoEy of Sue , (London: Constable, 1996,2nd edition), p. 15 9 52 Maudling, Memoirs, p. 64 
53 Maudling, Memoirs, p. 64; and Home, Macmillan 1894-1956, p. 465 
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House of Commons. 54 This was due to a large extent because of Butler's role as the 
'man who led the troops out' of the Canal Zone. It is also apparent that Butler's 
conduct during the crisis did not just offend the Suez Group and the traditionalist right 
wing. Fisher has argued that 'even those NTs who agreed with him were, though to a 
lesser extent, critical of his apparent lack of resolution'. 5' This is a correct assumption, 
as Butler did offend colleagues with sirnilar views to the crisis, by his lack of courage. 
I-Es criticism of government policy via indirect channels, such as the Commons 
Smoking Room and the Lobby, also raised doubts about the extent of his resolution. 
Anthony Head, NEnister of Defence in 1956, acknowledged to Home that this was a 
major fault of Butler's, and had consequences for the outcome of the leadership 
selection once Eden resigned 
The whole time he [Butler] was saying 'on the one hand, on the 
other'. It did him a lot of harm. If Rab [Butler] had been more 
forceful throughout the period, he could have been Prime 
Nfinister. But there was an ambivalence about him all the way - 
and it did him absolutely no good in the Cabinet 16 
Nigel Nicolson, who resigned as Conservative NP for Bournemouth over the 
government's actions during the Suez Crisis, also recalled this attitude of Butler's. 'He 
played a double game, which cost him a lot of backing. He would speak up for the 
Government in the House, and then go into the Smoking Room and say to everyone 
54 Beaverbrook to Butler, 23 January 1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (47) 
55 Fisher, The Tory Leaders p. 86 
56 Interview, Lord Head in fiome, Macmillan 1894-1956, p. 465 
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how terrible it was. He thought that it would get him support, in fact it did the 
reverse'. 57 Kilmuir has acknowledged that this behaviour was a major factor in 
Butler's unacceptability to Conservative NTs 
For this sharp decline in his personal fortunes Rab [Butler) had 
no one to blame but himself Many at that time considered that 
his habit of publicly hedging his political bets was too great a 
weakness and this accordingly damaged his position both in the 
Conservative hierarchy and in the Parliamentary party. " 
It has been argued that the Suez Crisis also re-stirred memories of Butler's 
reputation as a Munichite during the appeasement era of the 1930s, and that the feeling 
in the party was that they would not have an 'appeaser' as its leader. It is the case that 
Butler's conduct during the Suez Crisis did invoke memories of his conduct during the 
1930s, and did lead to doubts about his candidacy, but only because of Ws. conduct 
during the Suez Crisis itself It is more useful to see these apprehensions as an 
accumulation of doubts about Butler, that was provoked by his conduct during the 
Suez Crisis: Thus, his conduct over the second half of 1956 was more important in his 
unacceptability to certain sections of the party than his conduct during the 
appeasement era. Memories can be long in politics, but not that long. This is a view 
that Ramsden concurs with. 'Butler had done enough during the recent Suez Crisis to 
inspire anew a widespread lack of respect in the party; at the least, recent events had 
57 Interview, Nigel Nicolson in Home, Macmillan 1894-1956, p. 465 
58 Kilmuir, Political Adventure, p. 285 
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reinforced earlier attitudes, and arguably it was by then the recent events that mattered 
MoSt,. 
59 
The second factor in his unacceptability was Butler's poor performance at the 
1922 Committee meeting of 22 November. The weaknesses in his leadership qualities 
illustrated by his performance, including his inability to uplift the party and invigorate it 
after the difficulties of the crisis, showed that he was unacceptable as successor to 
Eden. This performance in front of Conservative NUs confirmed their doubts about 
Butler's candidacy, and this information filtered through to the Cabinet and the party 
hierarchy, via the party's informal networks of communication. The letters Heath 
received opposing Butler's candidacy is evidence of this. 
The third factor in Butler's unacceptability was his policy of supporting Eden in 
Cabinet during the crisis, and then criticising him in the Smoking Room and via other 
channels to Conservative NVs. It is widely acknowledged that Butler undertook this 
during the crisis, and his indiscreet criticism of the government's policy provoked 
distrust of Butler. This contributed to his unacceptability, as he was not seen as a 
trustworthy colleague, and his hedging of his political bets led to an impression of 
indecisiveness that damaged his leadership candidacy. The Cabinet were the 
detem-dning voice in the selection of Eden's successor, and, alongside the doubts that 
already existed, those expressed by the Conservative back-benches confirmed Butler's 
unacceptability. 'The question, as so often in Conservative leadership struggles, was 
not how many people were for you, but how many were against you'. " This is a basic 
rule of politics which Butler did not seem able to grasp. His failure to succeed Eden 
59 Ramsden, An Appetite For Power, p. 329 
60 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home., p. 289 
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was the result of opposition to his candidacy within his own party, and his consequent 
inability to unite it. 
ii) Electability 
Butler was the most unelectable of the two candidates, and this was illustrated 
by hýis performance at the 1922 Committee on 22 November. His poor performance 
showed that he did not have the ability to rise to the occasion, and could not lift the 
party's morale. This meant that Butler was not perceived as the most electable 
candidate, because he was not seen as inspiring enough to the party, and would 
therefore not inspire the electorate at a general election. His failure to make the crisis 
appear as a victory of sorts, and to place it in 'the long adventure of politics', as 
Macmillan did, meant Butler was not felt to be enough of an inspirational leader to be 
selected as Eden's successor. This meant Butler was not victorious on the electability 
criterion, but his unacceptability to sections of the party, as opposed to his 
unelectability, was more important than this factor. 
iii) Governability 
Butler was a minister with a vast experience in government, in the most senior 
offices of state as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1951-1955, and therefore was a 
strong candidate on the governability criterion. However, certain features of Butler's 
position in the government in January 1957 counted against his governability rating. 
Firstly, Butler's career since December 1955 had moved away, not towards the 'great 
offices of state'. He had left the Treasury in December 1955 to become Leader of the 
Commons and Lord Privy Seal. This move from the most senior domestic position in 
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the government, to posts with no departmental footing, gave the impression to the 
party that Butler's career was in decline, away from the leadership. 
Ifis temporary position as acting Prime Nlinister in November 1956 gave the 
indication that he was in position to succeed Eden, but this position had more 
disadvantages than advantages. This was particularly the case with Butler's 
acceptability to the party, as he became the scapegoat for the failure of the 
government's policy during the crisis. Thus, this acted against not for his candidacy. 
Butler was a widely experienced Minister in government, but his governability rating 
was lower than Macmillan's at the time of the selection in January 1957. 
Macmillan 
i) Acceptability 
Macmillan was acceptable to the majority of the party hierarchy, the Cabinet 
and the party's NTs. He was thus in a position to unite the party, unlike Butler, as he 
pulled together left and right, ministers and back-benchers. There was no anti- 
Macmillan faction on the Conservative back-benches, unlike the existence of an anti- 
Butler faction. Blake has noted that 'what the party needed was decisiveness, vigorous 
language, and a clear lead. Butler would have been unacceptable to the Suez Group 
and the Tory Right. Macmillan raised no corresponding antipathy among the Tory 
Left'. 61 This assurance of Macmillan's was a central factor in his attractiveness to 
Conservative NTs in the aftennath of the Suez Crisis. Significantly, Bracken wrote, 
'The so-called Canal die-hards think better of him [MacnUan] than they do of Eden 
and Butler. 62 Fisher has noted that 'although Parliament was in recess at the time of 
6' Blake, The Conservative Party, p. 278 
62 Cockett (ed. ), 
-M-y 
Dear Max, p. 200 
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Eden's resignation, anyone in close touch with Conservative opinion in the House of 
Commons should have known that Macmillan was the party's probable choice as his 
successor'. 
63 
Macmillan's acceptability to the party as Eden's successor was due to a number 
of reasons, but his conduct at the 1922 Committee meeting of 22 November 
demonstrated the qualities that made him the most acceptable candidate. Firstly, 
Macmillan's virtuoso performance at the meeting demonstrated that he had the ability 
to lift the party's morale by his rallying cry to the party's NTs. This also significantly 
served to unite the party's NTs as it gave them a purpose. He made them believe that 
the party's difficulties were not insurmountable by placing the crisis in the 'long 
adventure of politics, and instilled confidence that if the party united behind the new 
leader then they could revive their fortunes and win the next election. As Campbell has 
noted, 'the party was determined not to be ashamed of Suez: Macmillan could better 
64 brazen it out, while restoring relations with the Americans at the same timeý. 
Charmley concurs with this view, 'as Macmillan had been mounting a decent 
impersonation of some of Churchill's traits for some time, it was not surprising that the 
party preferred his up-beat mood to Butler's lugubrious one'. 65 
This ability was crucial, as the party was in a severe state of disunity and the 
difficulties were mounting. The party hierarchy felt that if the party was to recover 
from the debacle, it needed a leader with an exceptional ability to instil confidence and 
lift spirits. Macmillan had demonstrated this with assurance and decisiveness since the 
cease-fire, and the 1922 Committee meeting gave him the opportunity to convince the 
63 Fisher, The Tory Leaders p. 85 
64 Campbell, Edward He p. 97 
65 J. Charmley, A I-Iistojy of Conservative Politics 1900-1996, (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 155 
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Party's NIPs that he was the best candidate. A crucial factor in Macmillan's 
acceptability was the fact that his reputation remained largely untarnished by the Suez 
Crisis, despite the fact that he was 'first in, first out', and played a large part in the 
failures of the goverment's policy. In fact, his reputation was enhanced, as he 
appeared to rescue the British economy by instigating the cease-fire. This was because 
Macmillan acted decisively in realising the futility of continuing the operation, and 
limited the damage that the crisis caused. Butler became the main scapegoat for the 
failure of the government's policy, as he was head of the government at the time of the 
admission of defeat, while Macmillan remained in the background, working to save the 
British economy and revive Anglo-US relations. 
A significant factor in Macmillan's acceptability was the manner in which he 
acted as a rallying point for ministers and NTs who were opposed to the continuation 
of Eden's leadership. Macmillan told Butler on 15 December that the younger 
members of the Cabinet, and especially Peter Thorneycroft, did not believe that Eden 
66 
could continue as Prime Nfinister. This was of significance in the leadership 
selection, as he had developed a bedrock of support over that period by acting as a 
focal point for discontent with Eden's leadership of the party. 
Macmillan also noted that Nfinisters and back-benchers were meeting and 
discussing the future, and the need for a new leader. It can, therefore, be assumed that 
he helped to galvanise such opinion. The fact that Butler felt Eden should carry on as 
leader until at least July 1957, meant that he did not canvass for support in the same 
way as Macmillan, and gave his rival a head start in the contest for the succession. 
Turner believes that Macmillan became leader because the party, and especially his 
66 Notes, February 1957 Butler MSS RAB G31 (70) 
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Cabinet colleagues, trusted him more than it did Butler. This assessment thus concurs 
with the correct view that Macmillan was more acceptable as successor to Eden than 
Butler . 
67 As Thorpe has noted, 'there was a groundswell of opinion among back- 
benchers for Macn-dllan, and there was a small minority who were opposed to Butler at 
any price. The combination of these two factors secured the decision for Macmillan. 68 
Another interpretation of Macmillan's acceptability was the perception that he 
was a stop-gap leader 'to tide the party over the crisis'. Sampson has argued that it 
69 
was 'widely assumed' in 1957 that Macmillan's leadership was a stop-gap measure. 
Macmillan was selected as he was acceptable in being able to unite the party, and guide 
it safely through its immediate difficulties. This explains the appointment of Macmillan, 
as it was seen as a short-term expedient, dictated by the circumstances that the party 
found itself in after the Suez Crisis. His age compared to Butler's also suggests this 
was the case, but Macmillan was more acceptable than Butler to the party as successor 
to Eden. 
ii) Electability 
Macn-dllan was the most electable of the two candidates, as he had an ability to 
uplift and inspire the party and the public, unlike Butler. The 1922 Conunittee meeting 
was important in this, as his invigoration of the party's ND? s offered hope for a revival 
in the party's fortunes. Macmillan's use of this highly effective electioneering ploy, and 
his physical gestures that exuded confidence and decisiveness, demonstrated that his 
ability as a public speaker was profound, and Macmillan already had a reputation in the 
67 J. Turner, Macmillan (London: Longman, 1994), p. 127 
68 D. R- Thorpe, Selwyn Lloy , (London: Cape, 1989), p. 270 69 Sampson, Macmillan, p. 125 
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party for this. His success as Minister of Housing during the 1951-55 Conservative 
administration, especially in his public promotion of the housing drive, showed his 
ability to publicise the government's programme in an important electoral arena. 
Macmillan's establishment of Premium Bonds as Chancellor in 1956 also confirmed 
this ability. 
Macmillan exuded more confidence in a rejuvenation of the party's success 
than Butler, and this convinced the Cabinet, the party hierarchy and the party's NTS 
that he was the most electable candidate. Despite the fact that a general election was 
not due until 1960, the electability of the candidates was still a vital consideration in 
the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, because the party was in such a severe state of 
disunity and low in confidence. The need for a restoration of unity and an increase in 
morale, meant that the situation that the party was in signalled an urgent need for an 
increase in public confidence, and this was exacerbated by the fact that it was widely 
expected that the government would fall because of the crisis. Macmillan fulfilled this, 
while Butler did not. 
iii) Governability 
Macn-Oan was Chancellor in January 1957, and had previously been Foreign 
Secretary, so had occupied two of the 'great offices of state' in succession. He was 
thus on a traditional career path to the party leadership by occupying the most senior 
foreign and domestic briefs in the government prior to the leadership selection. 
Macn-Oan was of great status in the government, and his governability was higher than 
Butler's, as his career was progressing towards the leadership, while Butler's appeared 
to be moving away from the summit of the government. He had a wide experience of 
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government since 1951, as NEnister of Housing and Local Government, Minister of 
Defence, Foreign Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer, and was on a clear line 
of progression to the leadersl-ýip. Ramsden has noted an important aspect of 
Macmillan's governability that appealed to Conservative voters 
Macmillan [brought] to the task of reviving his party from the 
trough in which it found itself in January 1957 both a foreign 
policy record and an aristocratic bearing that appealed to the 
deferential Tory voter, and an approach to domestic policy which 
attracted the more pragmatic Conservative who looked for 
evidence of economic competence and social caring. 70 
The Cabinet felt that Macmillan was a candidate with a high level of 
governability, and despite the fact that Butler had a wider experience of government, 
Macmillan was seen as the more effective and decisive minister because of his conduct 
during the Suez CriSiS. 
71 His links with the US government also increased Macmillan's 
reputation for governability, as the rejuvenation of Anglo-US relations was to be of 
paramount importance for Eden's successor. He thus did not have a significantly 
higher governability than Butler, but was seen as a more effective minister, and on a 
progressive career path. 
'0 Ramsden, An Appetite For Power ' p. 361 71 Charmley, History of ConservatiVe Politics, p. 155 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the Conservative Party had three 
considerations following the Suez Crisis. The first was to restore party unity. The 
second was to restore party morale, and the third was to revive the 'special 
relationsl-ýip' with the United States government. The appointment of Macrrdllan was a 
stop-gap and short-term appointment, as the party's vision for the future was short- 
term. This was because it was believed that the goverment would fall because of the 
crisis. Nevertheless, Macmillan was the best qualified of the candidates. The selection 
also occurred at a convenient place in the electoral cycle, as it allowed the party time 
to recover before it had to go to the polls, but the restoration of party unity was an 
immediate concem. 
This selection was the first in the party to have a canvass of the Cabinet, and an 
assessment of wider party opinion. The selection process was quick and smooth, and 
resolved the matter without disruption. The informal networks in the party were vital 
to the selection process, as they confirmed Macmillan's acceptability to the party, and 
the existence of an anti-Butler faction in the parliamentary party, that deemed Butler 
unacceptable as party leader. Macmillan fulfilled the core criteria of acceptability, 
electability, and governability, while Butler did not. This was because of their actions 
during the Suez Crisis, and Macmillan fulfilled the party's requirements in the 
aftermath of the Suez Crisis better than Butler. 
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Chapter Six 
The 1963 Leadership Selection: The Candidates' Actions and Conduct 
This chapter analyses the candidates' actions during the 1963 selection of Sir 
Alec Douglas-Home as party leader. The candidates were Butler, Home, Maudling, 
and Hailsham, and the significance of their actions in the outcome of the selection will 
be demonstrated. 
Butler 
Butler's Actions during the Decline of Macmillan's Leadership: July - October 1963 
In the summer of 1963, Butler did not know himself if he really wanted to 
succeed Macmillan because of his previous failure to gain the leadership in January 
1957. This was a critical determining factor on his conduct throughout the period from 
the summer of 1963, to Macmillan's resignation in October. He was also affected by 
the perception of his prospects of succeeding Macmillan, which seemed slim as party 
opinion was in favour of a new leader. Butler wrote in a confidential diary note 
My diagnosis shows that there is a very strong movement in 
favour of somebody not too closely associated with the 
Establishment. What is really happening in the Party is that the 
herd instinct is unleashed and that they are tending to attack 
anybody in authority starting with the Prime Nlinister, including 
the Chief Whip and also embracing the leaders of the 1922 
Committee, Morrison and Mott-Radclyffe, who are thought to be 
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too old world. These in their turn are not making much stand 
against the herd and are tending to accept the drift' 
This showed Butler that his chances of gaining the leadership were not high, as 
the party wanted to move to the next generation of leading Conservatives. This was 
because the present generation of senior leaders were widely discredited by the 
allegations, and events of the recent months, principally the Profumo, crisis. This 
continued throughout the surnmer, and it became clear he did not expect to succeed 
Macmillan. Butler dined with Macmillan at Chequers on II September, where they 
talked for four hours, with the conversation almost exclusively devoted to Macmillan's 
future prospects. Butler noted of the end of the evening, 'as we approached my 
bedroom door, he said that since my own prospects were uncertain in regard to the 
leadership I should do well as a king-maker. But my own private diagnosis was that at 
this point he hoped and intended to remain as leader. 2 This also shows that Macmillan 
did not feel Butler should succeed him. Macmillan felt he gained a clear impression of 
his deputy's position 
He would naturally (if I resign) accept the Premiership if there 
was a general consensus of opinion for him. But he doesn't want 
another unsuccessful bid. It is clear that in his heart he does not 
expect any real demand for him. He would prefer to be Warwick 
I 'Confidential Note', 12 July 1963. Butler MSS RAB G40 (72-73). 
2 Butler, Art Of The Possible, p. 238 
184 
(which he could be) and not try to be King (which he can't be). 
On the whole, he is for HailshaM3 
This quote illustrates that Butler did not expect to gain the leadership in 1963, 
because the party wanted to choose a new leader from the next generation of leading 
Conservatives, and this attitude determined his conduct. It also shows that he 
supported Hailsham, as the leader from the next generation, because of his 
electioneering experience, which was of obvious vital significance because of the 
impending general election. 
Butler's Reaction to Macmillan's illness before the Party Conference: 8 October 
At the Cabinet meeting on 8 October, at which Macmillan declared his wish to 
lead the party into the next election, and during NEnisters' discussion on this, Butler 
wisely did not commit himself to help in any possible consultations to find Macmillan's 
4 
successor, which as acting Prime Nlinister he was within his rights to do. This was 
probably because he did not want to count himself out as a candidate for the 
leadership, and also he did not want Macrnillan to retire, so the discussion was seen as 
an irrelevant distraction to him. Following the onset of Macmillan's illness on the 
evening of 8 October, Butler did not like the manner by which Macmillan's resignation 
was being rushed through by the party managers. He illustrated this discontent at the 
developing course of events, when he telephoned Timothy Bligh, Macmillan's Private 
Secretary, just after midnight on 8 October. He told him that it was important to 
3 Diary entry for II September 1963, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 50*. 
_(75). 
Emphasis on original 
document. Extracts from this entry are in H. Macmillan, At The End Of The Day: 1961-1963, 
(London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 494 
4 Howard, RAB, p. 309 
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remember that the Conservative Party's conferences were more like rallies, and 'one 
did not take a serious decision at a rally. 5 Butler wished this information to be made 
clear to Macmillan, and offered the following course of action. He argued Macmillan 
should make it clear that he was not going to give up the leadership of the party, and 
reserve his position on whether he would be fight the next election as leader. 6 This 
illustrates two points of significance. Firstly, Butler wanted Macmillan to remain as 
Conservative leader, and second, he wanted Macmillan to stay on as he did not believe 
he would succeed him, and feared a move towards the next generation of Conservative 
leaders. This explains Butler's wish for a cautious approach to be adopted to the 
situation. 
Butler's Conduct at the Party Conference: 9- 12 October 
Butler did not like the atmosphere generated by Home's relaying of 
Macmillan's intention to resign once a successor had been found. He felt that a 
cautious and inoffensive approach would be sensible, so as to not appear to be 
canvassing for the leadership, and ruining any chance he had of succeeding Macmillan. 
Butler has described his approach: 'I spent most of the time in my room to avoid 
creating the wrong impression'. 7 Unfortunately for him, this meant he created no 
impression, and had just an adverse effect on the prospects of his candidacy as 
Hailsham's effervescent approach. 
At lunch on 12 October, the day of the rally at which Butler was to make the 
Leader's Speech in place of Macmillan, he and his wife dined with Alec and Elizabeth 
s Bligh to Macmillan, 8 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/50081ý2) 
6 Bligh to Macmillan, 8 October 1963 PRO PREM 1115008 (57) 
7 Butler, Art of the Possible, p. 242; 'Alan Clark's Historv of the 
- 
ToKy Party'. Episode three: From 
Estate Owners to Estate Agents. An Oxford Television Production for BBC TV. First shown 28 
September 1997; and diary note, c. 20 October 1963 Butler MSS RAB G40 (5) 
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Home. Home told Butler he was seeing his doctor in London next week. According to 
Thorpe, Butler did not grasp what this signified and asked him why, to which Home 
replied, 'because I have been approached about the possibility of my becoming the 
Leader of the Conservative Party'. 'It is difficult to imagine a more unsettling piece of 
news for Butler to receive at what was already a difficult and nervous time for him'. 8 
Thorpe is correct in describing the impact of this declaration, and it did affect Butler's 
performance. Butler's speech was poor, and it did not inspire the conference. He 
delivered the speech poorly, and it was 'flat and uninspiring. 9 Butler was delivering a 
speech that had been prepared for Macn-dllan, which may explain in part the poor 
performance, but he still had a history of failures on such occasions, as with the speech 
to the 1922 Committee in November 1956. The Times noted the main weakness in 
Butler's candidacy that was revealed by the speech - his failure to inspire the party, 
which gave the impression that he could not inspire the electorate. 'Had he lived 3,000 
years ago he would surely have been conscripted for the Oracle of Delphi. He is not a 
vote charmer'. 10 The speech was not the uplifting oration that the party needed after 
the shock of Macmillan's illness. Butler was also heckled by an Empire Loyalist during 
the speech, and Home, as Conference President, had to intervene to restore order 
while Butler mopped his brow to compose himself 11 He had again failed to rise to the 
occasion, and this exacerbated the doubts about him in the party. 
Home recalled of the speech, denoting the impact of Butler's failure. 'It was 
rather a pity really that he just had this one sort of failure, which anyone can have. 12 
8 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 296; and A. Home, Macmillan 1957-1986, (London: Macmillan, 
1989), p. 551 
9 Howard, BAR, p. 313 
10 The Times, II October 1963 
" Shepherd, The Power Brokers, p. 155 
12 Reputations, 13 July 1983 in Howard, RAB, p. 314; and Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 297 
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Maudling noted of Butler's performance at the Conference, that 'Rab [Butler] was 
himself, neither more nor less. He had to deputize for Harold [Macmillan] and give the 
final speech of the Conference, and he did this with great dignity, not trying to seize 
for himself the opportunity to advance his own ambitions'. 13 This illustrates much 
about the nature of Butler's actions, and his failure to attain the leadership. 
Butler's Reaction to the Canvasses of Party Opinion: 15 - 17 October 
At the Cabinet meeting of 15 October, (chaired by Butler), approval was given 
for the four canvasses of party opinion to take place. The Cabinet considered the 
procedure as the last item on the agenda, as was usual for 'political' matters, and 
agreed that it was the right procedure. 14 This followed instructions from Macmillan to 
Butler in a minute of 14 October, in which he stated that he had been considering 'how 
best to proceed with the customary processes of consultation'. 15 This demonstrates 
that Macrnillan was fully in control of the consultation process, and Butler announced 
the plans on 15 October. He reported to Macn0an that 'they all agreed that this was 
the right procedure'. 16 Ramsden has noted of Butler's conduct over the canvasses 
Butler's acquiescence is not surprising in the light of an aide- 
memoire that he had composed for himself in the previous July; 
he wrote that in the event of a leadership contest there should not 
be a ballot, and that he preferred the collection of opinions by the 
whips, the results of which should be 'conveyed to the present 
Maudling, Memoirs p. 126 
Butler to Macmillan, 15 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (24) Howard, RAB, p. 316; and Diary 
entry for 15 October 1963, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 5 1*. (17) 
"'Leadership of the Party, 14 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (32) and CPA CCO 20/8/7 
11 Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 201 
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leader'; he added significantly that if there is clearly a big 
majority for one candidate then I think the rest of us should pull 
in and help'. 
17 
This explains much about Butler's conduct towards the leadership controversy, 
after the return from the party conference. He felt that party unity was the most 
important objective, and he would support the candidate who appeared best able to 
secure party unity. This was also aligned with Butler's belief that he would not succeed 
Macmillan. 
Butler's Reaction to the 'Midnight Meeting' Opposition: 17 October 
Rarnsden has described the impact that the 'Midnight Meeting' opposition 
could have had. 'Since this group included the Deputy Prime Minister, The Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, the Leaders of both Lords and Commons, and the Party Chairman, 
they had considerable collective weight as well as numbers'. 18 Edward Boyle, Nfinister 
of Education, noted in his record of the meeting, 'RAB [Butler] & RM [Maudling] 
won't say. QH [Hailsham], IM [Macleod], EP [Powell] - No', and significantly noted 
they were being 'overtaken by events'. On 17 October, Powell 'appealed to RAB this 
afternoon not to let us down'. 19 This illustrates some doubt about whether Butler 
would claim the leadership, as he believed he would not get it. This is an indication of 
doubts on the part of Butler's fellow opponents of Home as to whether he would 
demand the leadership. 
" Butler note, 12 July 1963, Butler MSS, G40 in Rarnsdcn, Winds of Change, p. 202. Emphasis on 
original. 
18 Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 206 
19 Boyle MSS, 5581 in Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 206 
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The news of Home's lead in the canvasses provoked the other candidates to 
push their claims for the leadership. They tried to persuade Lord Dilhorne, the Lord 
President, to agree to a meeting of Nlinisters to discuss the matter, but this was 
refused. Much of the blame for the resulting deadlock, according to Shepherd, must go 
to Butler. As Deputy Prime Nfinister and acting Prime NEnister, he had every right to 
call a Cabinet meeting, yet failed to do so. This is a failure which suggests a lack of 
courage by Butler, and is a further indication of why he did not become party leader. 
Butler felt he had missed his chance, and was not the choice of the party. 
On the afternoon of the 17 October, Butler, Macleod and Maudling heard from 
William Rees-Mogg, the Deputy Editor of The Sunday Times, that Macmillan would 
advise the Queen to send for Home, and this led to a series of meetings and telephone 
conversations to try to organise the opposition to him. Macleod has implied that the 
press were deliberately informed before the Cabinet, to prepare the public for the 
emergence of Home . 
20 Butler, however, remained inactive and only took telephone 
calls from his supporters. Joint Party Chairman Macleod and Powell, Minister of 
Health, outraged at the course of events, led the opposition to Home, and they 
telephoned him that afternoon to inform him of the reasons why they objected to him 
beconýng leader. 
Butler telephoned Dilhorne on 18 October to ask him to persuade Macmillan to 
authorise a meeting of the other three candidates, before a final decision was conveyed 
to the Queen, but no reply was made to Butler's requeSt. 21 According to Lady Butler, 
Macmillan refused to talk to Butler while he was in the nursing home, and was 
20 1. Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership, The Spectato 17 January 1964, p. 66; and R. Shepherd, lain 
Macleod, (London: Pimlico, 1995), p. 328. Macleod did not reveal it was Rees-Mogg in The Spectato . " Butler, Art Of The Possible, p. 248; and Fisher, The I )rv Leaders, p. 109 
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determined Butler was not going to get a chance to succeed him. Howard, however, 
found no evidence that Butler made any attempt to. contact Macmillan, but states he 
did telephone Dilhorne to request Macmillan's authorisation of the meeting of the 
other three candidates. Butler, Hailsham and Maudling did meet, without Dilhorne, at 
n-ddday, but Macmillan was now set on this course of action and was not to be 
dissuaded. 22 Butler probably made the request under pressure from his fellow rebels, 
as he demonstrated diffidence and unease at the opposition*to Home's emergence, and 
did not want to threaten party unity by opposing his succession. The opposition was 
understandably led by those who felt they had a legitimate claim to the leadership of 
the party, but in reality did not. Butler's diffidence towards the opposition shows that 
he believed his emerging as leader was not in the party's best interest, as he knew he 
was not the choice of the party. 
Butler's Reaction to Home's offer of the Foreign Office: 19 October 
At his first meeting with Home, Butler reserved his position, and told Home he 
would give him his decision later that evening, following another discussion. Butler 
remained the key figure in the opposition, and Home and his opponents knew that if 
Butler agreed to serve, Home would become party leader. For this reason, the rebels 
and their supporters urged Butler to hold out. He had been approached having lunch at 
the Carlton Club on 18 October by Rees-Mogg, and other supporters of Butler, who 
urged him not to serve. 23 If he refused to serve, Home's chances of forming a 
government would have been reduced, and his authority severely weakened. Butler 
22 'Alan Clark's History of the Tory Party'. Episode three: From Estate Owners to Estate Agents. An 
oxford Television Company Production for BBC TV. First shown 28 September 1997; Howard, RAB, 
pp. 318-319; and Shepherd, The Power Brokers p. 157 
Shepherd, Lain Macleod, p-333; and Butler, Art Of The Possible, pp. 248-249 
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told Macleod that he would only serve under Home, if he was satisfied that it was 'the 
only way to unite the party'. Mollie Butler urged her husband not to agree to serve. 24 
Butler's emphasis on the importance of party unity was a critical determining factor on 
his conduct, along with the perception that he would not be offered the opportunity to 
succeed Macmillan. I-Es own commitment to unity meant that he would not snatch the 
leadership from Home, and once he perceived that Home was the man the party 
wanted, he agreed to join his government as Foreign Secretary. His meeting with 
Home on IS October suggests this was his most important concern 
I saw Lord Home this afternoon. He said that everything 
depended upon my decision and that of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer ... I said that 
I must reserve my position on two 
grounds: first, as to whether it was right to go back to a 
hereditary peer at the present time and second, as to whether he 
could conunand enough unity in the Cabinet ... The thing had been 
rushed and there had not been sufficient consideration of the 
difficulties. It was now up to him to secure the necessary 
unity ... I gave him the particulars of the Ministers who were 
unwilling to go on and he took down their names and said he 
would see them. 
I said that I was honoured by any suggestion he had made 
for me but would like to see him later in the evening when I had 
the answer to the question of unity... I was only trying to seek a 
" Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership' in Spectator. 17 January 1964, p. 66; and Fisher, The Toly 
Leaders p. 110 
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solution, which would obtain the maximum unity. We decided to 
leave the matter until I met him again2' 
Butler's realisation that he could not now become leader, as there was 
insufficient demand for him, and that Home had the impetus in the selection, led him to 
agree to serve. The other rebels' desire for Butler to become leader was stronger than 
his own. He lacked the ruthlessness to take the leadership, and 'this is an endearing 
characteristic in the man; it was a fatal flaw in the politician'. This was something 
Powell believed, and expressed a conversation he and the other opposers had with 
Butler during their opposition to Home, on television in 1983 
We handed him a loaded revolver and told him all he had to do 
was pull the trigger. He asked if it would make a noise and we 
said, "That is in the nature of guns, RAB. " He asked if it would 
hurt and we said, "That too is in the nature of guns, RAB, " and 
he said, "I don't think I will. D'you mind? "26 
Of Butler's conduct, Hailsham commented that 'Ferdinand the Bull had 
preferred to sniff the flowers rather than take what would have been his if he had 
wished itv. 
27 So, 'the sad truth was that, almost from the beginning, Rab [Butler] 
succumbed to what appears to have been a fatal intimation of his own ultimate political 
defeat', and tlýs led to his ineffective opposition to Home's succession . 
28 Butler 
25 'Secret'. 18 October 1963 Butler MSS RAB G40 (101) 
26 Fisher, The Tory Leaders, p. 110; and Reputations, BBC TV, 13 July 1983 in P. Cosgrave, The 
Lives of Enoch Powell, (London: Bodley Head, 1989), p. 188 
" Hailsham, A Sparrow's Fli gh , p. 3 56 28 Howard, RAB, p. 304 
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himself was drawn to this explanation. 'To sum the whole thing up, it is no good 
thinlýing there is no life left if one is not elected Pope. One can always be a respected 
Cardinal. On the other hand while there is a chance it is a good thing to be in for it. " 
This clearly illustrates the certainty in Butler's own mind that he would not succeed 
Macmillan. There appears to have been a desire for the leadership, but not the 
detern-ýination to get it, and a realisation that he could not obtain it. This inaction by 
Butler severely upset his supporters. Joint Party Chairman Lord Poole told Dennis 
Walters, who had led the Hailsharn camp, 'I tell you if you had seen [Butler] yesterday 
morning, dithering about in a gutless sort of way, you would not want him to be Prime 
Minister of this country. I was quite appalled; quite disgusted'. 30 
Butler's decision to serve as Foreign Secretary can be easily explained. Firstly, 
Butler believed that Home was the man the party wanted, as he could guarantee the 
unity of the party, and Butler realised that he could not. Secondly, Butler did not really 
want the leadership as he had already failed once in January 1957, and knew that the 
party did not want him. Thirdly, Butler did not have the necessary 'killer instinct' to 
demand the leadership and was not prepared to use the 'loaded revolver' presented to 
him by Powell, Macleod and Maudling. All three combine together to give the fullest 
explanation of Butler's actions, or in-actions, during the leadership controversy. 
As Ramsden has noted, 'Butler was exactly the wrong man to be placed in this 
situation. Like Home he wanted to have the Leadership without fighting for it, but 
unlike Home he had no Macmillan to stage-manage the succession in his favour; 
without a lead from him the resisters crumbled away'. 31 Butler's conduct meant that 
29 'Confidential Note'. 31 July 1963 Butler MSS RAB G40 (83-84) 
3' D. Waiters, Not Always, pp. 136-18 in Ramsden, Winds L)f Chang-e, p. 207 31 Ramsden, Winds of Change p. 207 
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nobody but Home would succeed Macn-dllan. Ramsden has also offered a sympathetic 
interpretation of Butler's actions 
To be fair to Butler, there was a positive side to the case; unlike 
the situation in January 1957, he had it entirely within his grasp 
to become Prime Nlinister in October 1963, for if he had stood 
out, several others would have done so too, and Home would 
have had to report to the Palace his failure to unite the party; but 
once Home had been given the first try to form a Cabinet, his 
failure could have been brought about only through a 
constitutional crisis involving the Monarchy, and with the party 
split; it is inconceivable that a Butler team formed after Home's 
public hurniliation would have been able to unite the party to win 
the upcon-dng election" 
This illustrates the vvider political factors that may have had an influence on 
Butler's conduct. The implications of opposing Home once he had been offered the 
chance to form a government were immense, and would have instigated a general 
political and party crisis, alongside the party's existing difficulties. Once Home 
occupied Ten Downing Street to conduct his consultations, he had the momentum to 
become party leader and Prime NEnister, and Butler could not have altered the 
outcome without provoking further political problems for the party. The chances are 
32 Ramsden, Winds of Change p. 207 
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that this was not a factor in Butler's thinlýing, as he already knew he could not succeed 
Macmiflan. 
Home 
Home's Reaction to Macmillan's Inquiries into the Possibilfty of his Succession: July - 
September-1963 
Macmillan courted both Hailsham and Home during the summer of 1963, to 
discover the prospects of their succeeding him. Macmillan told Hailsharn in June that 
he was the right man to succeed him, if he decided to quit. Macmillan also approached 
Home, but his response had been unenthusiastic. This was the pattern of Home's 
responses to Macmillan's enquiries throughout the summer and autumn of 1963. At 
the Ministerial meeting on the Denning report, the government's report on the 
Profumo Affair, on 18 September, Macmillan mentioned to Home that he was 
considering retirement before the next election, and he responded this would cause 
disunity in the party, and 'great troubles will follow'. This was Home's biggest fear 
about the succession, and for this reason he wanted Macmillan to remain as leader. On 
6 October, Macmillan discussed the leadership situation with Home, and they outlined 
their concerns at the proposed plan for Macn-dllan to announce at the Conference that 
he would resign in January. On the same day, the two men discussed the situation at 
Chequers. Before this meeting Macmillan had been undecided, but following it, he had 
decided to stay on, as there was no agreement on who should be his successor, and his 
retirement threatened disarray. This shows that Home wanted Macmillan to remain as 
leader, as he believed there was no successor who could unite the party. 
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After the Cabinet meeting of 8 October, Dilhorne told the Cabinet that if 
Macmillan did resign, he would be available to conduct any Cabinet consultations on a 
possible successor, and Home also declared his readiness to assist, as he was not a 
candidate. 33 Macleod later alluded to this as a significant factor in the leadership 
contest, as Home had assured the Cabinet that he was not a candidate, but did not 
specify whether this ruled him out from the contest under any circumstances. 
Macleod's accusations are unjustified, as circumstances changed rapidly over the 
course of the leadership crisis, and Home could not have predicted how circumstances 
might change in the future. His actions also show that he was not then considered a 
candidate, and did not consider himself to be a candidate. 
Home's Reaction to Macmillan's illness and his Role in the Resignation Statement: 8- 
9 October 
Following the onset of Macmillan's illness, Home and Dilhorne visited him in 
hospital on 9 October, and they together wrote the statement that Home would read to 
the Party Conference, that made it clear Macmillan would not be continuing as leader. 
Macmillan discussed the possibility of Home succeeding him, and he did not express 
any willingness to do so. This led Macrnillan to state his preference for Hailsham. 34 
Home's reluctance to stand as a candidate is clear from Macmillan's discussions with 
him, and his illness did not change that. Hailsham's antics at the party conference did, 
because Home's doubts about Hailsharn were confirmed, and he was pressured by the 
party's senior figures to stand. 
33 Shepherd, lain Macleod. p. 306; and Howard, RAB, p. 309 
34 Diary entry for 9 October 1963, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 5 1* (9). This is also in Macmillan, At The 
End of the Day. p. 502; Shepherd, The Power Brokers, p. 153; Shepherd, lain Macleod, p. 309; Lord 
Home, The Way The Wind Blows, (London: Collins, 1976), p. 18 1; and Fisher, The Tory Leaders 
p. 104 
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The exact nature of Home's role in the formulation of the resignation statement 
is unclear. Butler believed that the party hierarchy forced the resignation statement 
from Macmillan, and according to Bligh, the resignation statement was due to the 
pressure put on him by Home (primarily), and Redmayne, the Chief VVThip, and Poole. 35 
The fact that Macmillan did not mention the statement at the party to celebrate the 
renovation of 10 Downing Street was evidence of the statement being forced from 
him. 36 Butler had a considerable amount of disagreement with the party hierarchy over 
the developing course of events, and this was instigated by Home's role in the 
resignation statement. He noted in his diary of c. 20 October 
I had a certain amount of difference of opinion with the Chief 
Whip on arrival since he and the hierarchy were particularly keen 
to hurry on the Prime Minister's retirement - i. e. Macmillan. I 
was equally keen to give him a chance to recover and not to have 
to take vital decisions while he was an invalid 37 
Butler was implying that the party hierarchy manipulated Macn-dllan's current 
weakness to manoeuvre him into resignation, as they felt he was finished and wanted 
to install Home as his successor unopposed, and as quickly as possible. As Poole was 
Joint Party Chairman, it can be assumed that he was representing the wishes of the 
party hierarchy. Butler felt that Macmillan should not make a hasty decision, and 
should wait until he knew the full extent of his illness. " 11is advice was ignored, 
35 October 1963'. Butler MSS RAB G40 (103-105 
36 Howard, RAB, p. 3 10 
37 Diary note, c. 20 October 1963 Butler MSS RAB G40 (5) 
33 'Confidential. Prime Minister'. Signed T. J. B. (Bligh). 8 October 1963 PRO PREM 1115008 (57- 
58). For details of Butler's displeasure at Macmillan's haste to resign. 
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testifying to the lack of influence he had with the hierarchy, and that the succession 
was hurried on to install Home as Macmillan's successor. Dilhorne and Home's offer 
to help in conducting the canvasses can also be assumed to be evidence of the party 
hierarchy's natural wish to control matters. The party managers did want Macmillan to 
retire, but there is little evidence to suggest that Home played a major part in this. 
Home's Conduct at the Pagy Conference and his Reaction to the Pressure to Stand: 9- 
12 Octobe 
Maudling noted of Home's performance at the Conference, 'AJec [Home] 
presided with discretion and a certain alooffiess. '39 Home played a pivotal role in the 
Party Conference at Blackpool, as he was President of the National Union that year, 
and in this capacity made the statement of Macmillan's intention to resign. This speech 
cast Home into the public eye, and his chances of succeeding Macmillan began to be 
reported in newspapers, and talked about at the Conference. However, Home made no 
declarations of his intentions to stand as a candidate, as he probably did not believe 
himself to be a possible candidate at that time. 
Following the resignation statement, Hailsham, obviously concerned about 
Home's growing prominence, reminded him of their earlier agreement following the 
institution of the 1963 Peerage Act in July, that 'the field would support only one 
peer'. He told Home that he did not think he should stand because of his lack of 
experience of domestic politics. Home told Hailsham that he had served at the Scottish 
Office for four years and also worked at the NEnistry of Labour. Hailsham replied this 
was not enough, and Home made no indication that he might or might not stand, 
39 Maudling, Memoirs, p. 126 
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despite declaring he was not a candidate at the Cabinet meeting of 8 October, only two 
days earlier. 
It has been argued that Home's conduct at Blackpool was dominated by the 
need to act cautiously, and to not be seen to be canvassing for the leadership. 'Alec 
Home shrewdly weighed his options as the field of front-runners came back towards 
him'. 40 Home perceived that he could fill the role of stop-gap leader, as Butler was not 
feasible because of his closeness to the Macmillan regime that was widely discredited 
in the party. The younger candidates such as Maudling and Macleod were felt to be 
not yet ready to succeed: the situation proved too late for Butler, and too soon for 
Maudling and Macleod. Home and Hailsham were seen as possible stop-gap leaders, 
until one of the younger generation of leading Conservatives was ready to take the 
leadership, and after the general election had been fought. As Thorpe has correctly 
argued, 'they [Home and Hailsham] plugged a gap between the Macmillan generation, 
approaching their seventies, and the 1950 intake, who might block the leadership for 
too long a period by succeeding to the office of Prime Nfinister too young. 41 
Home was only seven months younger than Butler, but did not have the same 
level of 'guilt by association' with Macn-dllan that Butler had. Home, it can be 
assumed, had perceived that he might be called upon as a stop-gap leader, and this 
dictated his cautious conduct at Blackpool, even when he was under intense pressure 
to stand. However, an important point must be noted: Home was not widely seen as a 
candidate before the Blackpool conference, and did not want to be. He only agreed to 
be a candidate after his perception of the consequences of a Hailsham leadership, 
following his conduct at Blackpool. Thorpe's analysis is only relevant after Hailsham's 
40 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home ' p. 286 41 Thorpe, Alec Dou las-Home, p. 287 
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actions made Home decide to stand, and he appears to be implying a plan of action by 
Home to gain the leadership, which evidence suggests was not the case. Home only 
agreed to become a candidate after pressure was put on him to keep out Hailsham and 
0 
Butler, but he probably did perceive that he may be called upon before that point. 
Even before his successful performance in the foreign affairs debate, Home 
found himself under pressure to throw his hat into the ring. Among those to pressurise 
him was Dilhorne, who had been perturbed by Hailsham's behaviour at Blackpool, 
Duncan Sandys, John Hare, Sir Anstruther-Gray, Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe and Nigel 
Birch. Selwyn Lloyd was also central to the pressure being put on Home. He reacted 
nonchalantly to this pressure, and 'Home played the part of reluctant candidate to 
perfection, a fact that key figures in the other camps were beginning to recognise and 
fear'. 42 Tony Lewis, a correspondent with The New York Times, told Dennis Walters, 
a supporter of Hailsham, that Home's conduct was similar to that of compromise 
candidates at American leadership conventions. Thorpe's analysis suggests an element 
of scheming towards the leadersl-ýp by Home by playing this role of compromise 
candidate, and that may or may not have been the case, as Home may not have been 
consciously striving to create that image. However, the important aspect is the impact 
of this behaviour, and it was highly beneficial to Home and added positively to his 
candidacy. Nfinisters, NTs and party activists liked Home's performance, yet remained 
unaware of his potential candidacy. 
The other candidates' chances were adversely affected by their behaviour at the 
Conference, and this dissatisfaction with the other candidates improved Home's 
position, as did his own performance. He made a successful speech on foreign policy, 
42 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 294; and Fisher, The Tory Leaders, p. 105 
201 
and affirmed his status as an effective Nfinister. Home told the Conference before 
beginning his speech: 'I am offering a prize to any newspaperman this morning who 
can find a clue in my speech that this is Lord Home's bid to take over the leadership of 
the Conservative Party'. Thorpe has stated that one of the people present on the 
platform whispered to their neighbour, Wec you're lying! ). 43 Home's speech was a 
great success and was widely applauded, and was popular with the Conference 
delegates. Punnett has argued, 'in contrast [to Butler's and Maudling's speeches] Lord 
Home's contribution in the debate on foreign affairs was regarded as a considerable 
success'. 44 Thorpe noted of Home's speech that 'for those who were close observers 
of the way things were developing, however, it was yet another example of the 
reluctant candidate keeping his options open". " This more accurately describes the 
motives behind Home's conduct than an analysis based on the idea that he pursued a 
conscious plan to gain the leadership. 
There has been a considerable amount of conjecture as to Home's motives 
behind his conduct at the conference. Was his really just a reluctant candidate, or was 
he playing the role of compromise candidate to perfection, to improve his prospects of 
succeeding Macrnillan? There does not appear to be a way of attaining a conclusive 
answer to this, and the most important aspect is the impact of his performance. 
Compared to Maudling's and Butler's speeches, Home's was a major success which 
contributed positively to his candidacy, whereas the speeches of Butler and Maudling 
had a detrimental impact on their candidacies. The effect of Home's conference 
performance led to his name becoming increasingly prominent in rumours on who 
43 Private Information in Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, pp. 294-295 
44 Fisher, The Toly Leaders, p. 104; and Punnett, Selecting the Party Leader p. 40 
4' Thorpe, Alec Dou las-Home, p. 295 
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would succeed Macmillan. On the evening after Home's speech, Reggie Bennett, the 
Conservative MP for Gosport and Fareham, told Macleod that support for Home was 
growing, to which Macleod replied 'don't be so bloody ridiculous. Alec told us in 
Cabinet he wasn't a runner'. This illustrates the impact of Home's performance at the 
Conference, and how he emerged as a candidate, when he was originally felt to have 
no realistic prospect of becoming leader. " 
On 12 October, the day of the rally that traditionally followed the Conservative 
Party Conference, Home told Butler over lunch that he was seeking medical advice 
about putting his name forward for the leadership. 47 Ramsden has noted that Home's 
ovation as chairman during the Leader's Rally overshadowed Butler's as the speaker. 48 
It can be assumed that this was the key date at which Home's behaviour tumed 
towards striving to gain the leadership, as the conference was over, and the full 
consequences of Hailsham's antics at the conference became clear. Home felt he would 
be called upon as the compromise candidate, and he felt he could unite the party better 
than the other candidates. 
Home's Conduct during the Canvasses of Parjy Opinion: 15-17 October 
On his return from Blackpool, Home went to see Macmillan on 15 October at 
3.30 p. m. He told Macmillan of the events at Blackpool, and Macmillan asked if he 
had decided to be a candidate. Home replied he was seeing his doctor that evening, 
and Macmillan was 'relieved' by this news. Home told Macmillan he had been alarmed 
by Hailsham's conduct at Blackpool, and Macmillan turned his attention fully to 
46 Fisher, The Toly Leaders, p. 104 
47 Howard, RAB. p. 313. Home sought medical advice because he was unsure whether his poor 
eyesight would affect his ability to fulfill his duties as Prime Nfinister; and Fisher, The To! y Leaders 
p. 105 
4' Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 200 
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Home. Home told Macmillan that 'he would be prepared to undertake the task if he 
was asked by the Prime Nfinister to do so in order to prevent the party collapsing'. 49 
This was a key determinant on Home's behaviour, as he had been convinced by 
Macmillan and the party's senior figures that his candidacy was the only way to save 
the party. He appears to have decided to stand on the 15 October. Selwyn Lloyd, in 
effect Home's campaign manager, noted in his diary, 'Tues. 15 October. Saw Lord 
Home. He said that he had come to the conclusion that he will accept if the Queen 
sends for him after all the consultations and it being apparent that most people want 
him'. 5' 
Home was the first NEnister to see Macmillan that day, and told him of the 
concems towards Hailsharn from the US govemment expressed by David Ormsby- 
Gore, the Ambassador in Washington. The Americans doubted Hailsham's suitability 
to be Prime Nlinister because of his conduct during the Test Ban Treaty negotiations. 
Home's relaying of this information ruined any chances of the leadership that remained 
for Hailsharn after Blackpool. That evening, he underwent a medical examination that 
pronounced him fit enough to become Prime Nlinister, and 'if the party wanted him, he 
would stand. " 
Home's Reaction to his Emergence and the Opposition to Him: 17-19 October 
Following the consideration of the results of the canvasses by Macn-dllan and 
the party hierarchy, Home was told by Macmillan that he was recommending him to be 
his successor. Following this news, Home stayed at his London residence, I Carlton 
49 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, pp. 298-299 
50 Selwyn Lloyd Diary, 15 October 1963. SELO 61 (211) Selwyn Lloyd Papers, Churchill College, 
Cambridge in Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 300 
5' Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 302 
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Gardens, and was joined by Lloyd and Redmayne. The opponents of his succession 
now began to contact him to express their displeasure at the course of events. While 
Home reacted calmly to the protests, Lloyd told Hailsharn it would look like sour 
grapes if he blocked the emergence of Home. Dilhorne arrived at Carlton Place, and 
Home told him 'I was quite prepared to come forward as the candidate to unify the 
party, accepted by everyone; but if it is said that my coming forward would split the 
party, that is a different proposition'. Dilhorne told him that he 'must pay no 
attention'. 52 This illustrates the central role of the party hierarchy in buttressing 
support for Home's succession, and giving him the confidence to obtain the leadership. 
Home was invited to the Palace on IS October at 12.3 0 p. m., and was asked to 
see if he could form an administration. The fact that he conducted the consultations 
with his opponents from Ten Downing Street had a major impact on the effect of his 
attempts to persuade the dissenters, and the opposition soon collapsed. Home had the 
momentum and the initiative, and with the strong support of Macmillan and the party's 
senior figures, used this to secure his position as the incumbent. Maudling and Butler, 
the key opponents who Home needed to convince to support him, had agreed to serve 
by the following day, once it became fully apparent that he had the momentum and the 
apparent support of the party. Home was agitated over the discontent expressed at the 
'midnight meeting', but Macn-dllan characteristically told him, 'look, we can't change 
our view now. All the troops are on the starting line. Everything is arranged'. 
Macmillan noted, 'he [Home] felt like withdrawing. I urged him not to do so. If we 
give in to this intrigue, there would be chaos. Butler would fail to fonn a government, 
52 Selwyn Lloyd record of 17 October 1963. SELO 61 (6). Selwyn Lloyd Papers, Churchill College, 
Cambridge in Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 312; and Fisher, The Tory Leaders, p. 109 
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even if given another chance no one else would succeed'. 53 This illustrates that 
Home's conduct during the final stages of his succession was driven by Macmillan. 
Home set about consulting the opponents to his succession in order to 
persuade them to serve under him. Macmillan was contacted by Home following his 
audience at the Palace, and Macmillan advised him to see Butler and Maudling 
immediately, to try to get Butler to accept the Foreign Office, and Maudling the 
Treasury Macmillan told Home if he did this 'the game would be in his hands'. 54 
Home met Butler, Hailsham, Maudling, Powell, Macleod and Boyle individually that 
aftemoon. 55 Macleod and Powell stated they would not serve, while the rest reserved 
their position, until they had seen how the situation was developing. That evening, 
Home again interviewed Maudling, Hailsham and Butler. Maudling, after Hailsham's 
agreement to serve, now changed his mind and accepted Home's offer of continuing as 
Chancellor. Following discussions with Home on 18 October, Butler was satisfied that 
Home's succession was the only way to secure party unity, and accepted the offer of 
the post of Foreign Secretary. 
Maudling 
Maudling's Reaction to Support for his Succession: July - September 1963 
Support for Maudling to be Macmillan's successor grew after the success of 
the 1963 Budget, and polls in The Daily TelegLa-ph indicated that he was the favourite 
with Conservative NTs in the summer of 1963. Maudling reacted to this support for 
him, by going to see Macmillan to clarify his position. He recorded, 'I thought it right 
53 R Churchill, The Fight For the Toly Leadership (London: Mayflower, 1964), p. 13 7; Macleod, 
'The Tory Leadership' in Spectator. 17 January 1964, p. 66; and Diary entry for 18 October 1963, Ms. 
Macmillan dep. d. 5 1*, (24). This entry is also in Macmillan, At The End Of The Day p. 515 IP 54 Diary entry for 19 October 1963, Ms. Macmillan del). d. 5 I *, (27) 
55 Fisher, The Torv Leaders p. 109 
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to go and see Harold [Macmillan], to assure him that while I should like to be his 
successor, I would play no part at all in any intrigues to get him to go'. Maudling 
noted he could not remember the exact details of the conversation, but recalled it was 
can entirely fiiendly one, and the understanding between us was open and sincere'. 56 
Butler has recorded on 31 July 1963 that Maudling asked him if he became Prime 
Nfinister, could Maudling stay on at the Treasury, and would he accept the same if the C' 
situation was reversed? Maudling was thus trying to ensure the support of Butler, if he 
was in a position to become leader. 57 
Maudling's Conduct at the Party Conference: 9-12 October 
Maudling recalled in his memoirs, 'a lot was bound to depend on how the 
various candidates performed at the Conference. He was due to make the 
Chancellor's speech early in the Conference proceedings, and was told by his 
supporters that it was vital that he got it right: 'I am afraid I did not'. In his memoirs, 
Maudling recounts an explanation for his conduct that was given by Wilfred Sendall of 
The Sundqy Express on 4 October 1973, that he believes fully explains his conduct 
Maudling would not wish to frustrate or defeat Rab Butler. Ms 
loyalty to his old Research Department chief was too strong. He 
therefore had to be convinced that Butler had no chance 
anyway ... I pointed out that Maudling had the conference 
platform reserved for him the next morning, when he was to 
reply as Chancellor to an important debate. I exhorted him to 
56 Maudling, Memoirs, p. 125 
51 Confidential note, 3 1' July 1963 Butler MSS G40 (83-84) 
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believe that this was his moment ... On the platform as Maudling 
rose to speak, lain Macleod generously whispered to him: 'Go 
on, Reggie, this is your chance'.... Thus Reginald Maudling, at 
the critical moment in his career, declared his faith. If only the 
delivery could have matched the words. 
But, alas, it fell abysmally below them. 
Handed to Churchill, or to Macmillan or Macleod, this text could 
have produced a famous speech. Maudling himself wrecked it5s 
This extract makes two significant points in relation to Maudling's conduct and 
its impact. Firstly, he felt Butler should succeed Macmillan, and he would only 
challenge for the leadership if it became clear Butler was not in the running. Secondly, 
his conduct at Blackpool had a detrimental effect on his chances of gaining the 
leadership, because of the poor delivery of his speech, and unlike Macn-Oan, he did 
not have a sense of opportunism in order to 'seize the moment'. Maudling did not give 
an inspiring performance, and this clearly affected his reputation of whether he could 
inspire the voters at a general election. Clearly, Maudling's poor speech did have a 
detrimental effect on his chances for the leadership, and did not make the impact that it 
might have done, and his sympathy and loyalty to Butler, after their close working 
relationship during the 1940s and 1950s at the CRD has been widely documented. 
However, the extent of Maudling's subservience to Butler can be questioned. It must 
have been apparent to Maudling in 1963, that he was in a far stronger position than 
Butler to gain the leadership, because he was in a more senior position in the 
58 The Sanday Express, 4 October 1973 in Maudling, Memoirs, pp. 127-128 
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government, and the party and the public had been pressing for a 'younger man'. Thus, 
the situation in 1963 was in Maudling's favour, and he could have acted on this. That 
he did not contributes more to an explanation of his failure to gain the leadership than 
a subservience to Butler. 
A key influence on Maudling"s conduct was his view that, 'back in London 
decisions would be taken by 'deliberation and not by the decibel meter'. This was a 
correct assumption, but the importance of the candidates' conduct at the Party 
Conference and it's impact should not be discounted. This may also explain 
Maudling's lack of impact at the Conference, as he felt his conduct there would not 
have an important effect'on the decision taken. Maudling later admitted to this failing, 
'what perhaps I had not realised was how closely those channels [of communication in 
the parýy] had been listening to the decibel meter'. 59 Ramsden has noted the 
significance of Maudling's failure, as he failed 'to raise the conference temperature, 
[and this] was eagerly contrasted by the press with the success of Macleod, Hailsham 
and Home'. 60 Maudling and Macleod had a private pact, that whoever was in the 
strongest position at the time of the selection of Macmillan's successor, would help the 
other. Macleod, an able public speaker, assisted Maudling with his speech, but this had 
no effect on it, and his 'performance was pedestrian and his hopes slipped away as the 
speech sagged heavily to its conclusion'. 61 . 
They all gave powerful performances at the 
conference, and Home's improved his position as a candidate, wMe Hailsham's did 
not. Maudling did not inspire any enthusiasm for his candidacy by his performance and 
this affected his prospects of succeeding Macmillan. 
59Maudling, Memoirs p-128 
I Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 198 
6' Fisher, The Tory Leaders, p. 104 
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Maudling's Conduct during the 'Nfidnight Meeting' Opposition: 17 October 
On 17 October, following the emergence of Home, Maudling tried to persuade 
Dilhorne to summon a meeting of Nfinisters to discuss the leadership issue, or at least 
to review the procedures by which the Queen was to be advised, and both these 
requests were refused. 62 Maudling has noted that the emergence of Home after the 
party conference gave rise to 'considerable concern and apprehension. There were 
many of us who felt that Alec [Home], with all his qualities, suffered from a disability 
in political terms in being the fourteenth Earl of Home'. 63 This was also felt by 
Macleod and Powell, in particular, and along with the desire to promote their own, and 
indirectly, Butler's candidacies, these were the two dominant motives behind their 
conduct after the emergence of Home as the front-runner in the selection. 
Maudling, Powell and Macleod felt they were an important part of the Cabinet, 
and were entitled to express their doubts about Home's potential leadership of the 
party. On 18 October, Maudling had been dining with the Governor of the Bank of 
England, and when he arrived home, was told of Home's emergence and that 'several 
people were deeply concerned'. Maudling was invited to Powell's house in South 
Eaton Place where the 'Midnight Meeting' began, with Maudling, Powell, Macleod, 
Erroll and Aldington present. Butler kept in touch with the meeting by telephone. 
Redmayne, following his discovery that the meeting was taking place, joined them, and 
twe made it clear that in our view the choice was a mistake from the party point of 
view'. Maudling later noted of Macmillan's view that this meeting was 'unseemly 
behaviour', that 'we all had a strong and genuine feeling: we all thought a rnistake was 
62 Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership' in Spectator. 17 January 1964, p. 65 
61 Maudling, Memoirs, p. 128 
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being made. It was not only our right but our duty to say this in the most effective way 
we could'. 64 Maudling expressed his view that Butler was the best candidate, but if 
Butler could not serve, his own was a viable candidacy. Maudling, Powell and 
Macleod wanted Butler to emerge out of self interest, allied with the feeling that he 
was the man best suited to succeed Macmillan. They all also hoped to be the party's 
leader after Butler, so supported his candidacy for dual purposes: they all felt Butler 
should succeed Macmillan, but also wanted to promote their own positions. 
Maudling's Reaction to Home's Offer of the Treasufy: 19 October 
On Friday 19 October, following his audience with the Queen, Home asked 
Maudling to see him at 10 Downing Street. Home offered him the opportunity to 
continue as Chancellor, and Maudling 'said that I hoped he would withdraw that 
question because I would hate to say 'No' to him. Though I was happy to serve under 
him, I thought he was the wrong choice and Rab [Butler] would be the right one. "' 
Home told Maudling that it was important for him to note that there was great 
opposition to Butler in the party, and if the opponents to Home prevented him 
beconýng leader, Butler would not succeed because of this opposition, and Maudling 
would become leader. Maudling told Home that he 'was not trying to play that sort of 
game at all', and told Home that he would serve under either man, but felt that Butler 
was the better choice. 66 Maudling came to realise that the opposition to Butler was 
too strong for him to become leader, and that Home was the choice of the party, and 
accepted his invitation to serve later that day. This was the reason behind his decision 
64 Maudling, Memoirs, p. 129 
65 Maudling, Memoirs, p. 129 
66 Maudling, Memoirs p. 129 
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to serve, as Maudling saw that Home now had the momentum, and the support for the 
party's senior figures. That evening, Home again interviewed Maudling, Hailsham and 
Butler. Maudling, after Hailsham's agreement to serve, now changed his mind and 
accepted Home's offer of continuing as Chancellor. He told Butler that 'things were 
closing in'. 
Thus, the opposition led by Maudling, Macleod and Powell, and apathetically 
supported by Butler, dissipated as soon as it became clear that Butler would not be the 
choice of the party, and that Home was. The impact of this opposition was, therefore, 
limited, and only served to indicate that Home was the choice of the party, which led 
to the rapid disintegration of it. Maudling may also have been motivated by a desire to 
become the 'leader-in-waiting', which would have been improved by his continuation 
as Chancellor, the most senior domestic position in the government. 
Hailsham 
Hailsham's Reaction to Macmillan's Inquiries on the Possibility of his Succession: 
June-October 1963 
In June 1963, Hailsham was visited by Oliver Poole, and 'the purpose of his 
visit was to tell me that I should prepare myself to become the next Leader of the 
Conservative Party'. Hailsham has noted his surprise at this, as he did not realise he 
was being considered a candidate, or that Macmillan was on his way out, and did not 
take Poole's declaration seriously as he regarded Butler as the certain successor, and 
Macleod as an outsider to Butler. 67 
67 Hailsham, A Sparrow's Flight p. 348 
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Macmillan has noted that he sent Hailsharn to Moscow as the government's 
representative in the Test Ban Treaty negotiations, deliberately to 'test his powers of 
negotiation'. Macmillan noted, 'he did yM well' . 
68 However, Hailsham did not 
impress the US officials during the negotiations, and they had doubts about Hailsham's 
temperamental suitability for the leadership. Home informed Macmillan on 15 October 
that he had received a message from David Ormsby-Gore, that the US goverrmient felt 
Hailsham had shown a lack of judgement during the negotiations, and this led the 
American government to be uneasy at the prospect of Hailsham becoming leader. 69 
On 30 September, Macmillan sent for Hailsharn, and told him he was 
contemplating resignation, and that if he did so, he wanted him to be his successor. On 
7 October, Macmillan stated that he wished Hailsham to succeed him after Christmas, 
when he would retire. 'I remember being almost struck dumb with surprise at the 
content of our conversation and do not remember a thing that I said'. 70 Julian Amery 
and Maurice Macn-dllan arrived in Blackpool on 9 October, and immediately sought 
out Hailsham with an important message for him from Macmillan, who wanted him to 
act at once and stake his claim for the leadership. Hailsham was 'flabbergasted' with 
Macmillan's request but 'once the Prime Minister said something you took it 
seriously'. 
71 
Hailsham's conduct towards the succession was galvanised by this declaration. 
This was a couple of hours before he was due to give his CPC lecture. Hailsharn, 'in all 
68 Diary entry for 5 September 1963, Ms. Macn-dllan dev. d. 50*. (64). Emphasis on original 
document. 
69 For a detailed analysis of the significance of this point, see chapter seven, pp. 262-263 
" Hailsham, A Sparrow's Fligh p. 350 
71 Fisher, The To! y Leaders, p. 102; Hailsham, A Sparrow's Flight, p. 352; and Interview with Lord 
Hailsham featured in 'Alan Clark's History of the Toly Party'. Episode three: From Estate Owners to 
Estate Agents. An Oxford Television Company Production for BBC TV. First shown 28 September 
1997 
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loyalty to him', told Butler of his intention to disclaim his peerage, and Butler tried to 
dissuade him out of this move, but Hailsham had decided to stake his claim after 
Macmillan's message. On 10 October, he discussed the leadership issue with Home, 
and Home told him that he was under strong pressure to put himself forward as a 
candidate. Hailsham has recorded that he was not surprised at this declaration, but did 
not regard Home as a serious contender, and only saw himself, Butler and Macleod as 
candidates. This underestimation of Home's candidacy is a common trait to all the 
candidates, and explains the initial apathy to his threat to their ambitions. On 10 
October, Hailsham, in the postscript to his lecture to the Conservative Political Centre 
at the Pavilion Cinema, announced his intention to disclaim his title and become a 
contender for the leadership 
It is not always realised that I have been proud of my father's 
public life. I was proud to succeed to that heritage ... 
I felt it 
would be contrary both to my duty as a colleague and my duty to 
the State to do any act which would be interpreted as an act 
calculated to undermine the authority of the Prime NEnister of the 
day. But it must be obvious to you that that situation no longer 
exists. I shall continue to try to serve my country honourably but 
I wish to say tonight that it is my intention to disclaim my 
peerage. If I can find anyone to receiye me as a candidate to 
stand for Parliament I shall do so72 
72 Churchill, Fight For the Tory Leadership p. 109 
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Film footage from the time shows an audience shouting and applauding, and 
Hailsham recalls that he was considerably embarrassed at the scenes, and with being 
the centre of attention. Others were more condemnatory, and one witness present told 
Butler he thought it was 'reminiscent of a Nuremberg Rally'. William Deedes, Minister 
Without Portfolio, on the platform with Redmayne during the lecture, recalled that 
they knew that Hailsham was going to make this announcement, and decided that as 
members of the government they could not applaud and had to appear impartial, and 
just stood on the stage motionless. Young noted that Hailsham left the platform 'with 
the sort of rapture more often accorded by teenage girls to pop singers than to 
potential Prime Mnisters. 73 Hailsham made his declaration during the vote of thanks 
following the lecture, and as he has noted, 'the effect was one of the most dramatic in 
my lifetime', and he had started the over-enthusiastic and over-indulgent behaviour 
that cost him support, and lost him a place as a candidate. This had a significant effect 
on senior party figures, who did not like the image that Hailsharn was conveying at 
Blackpool. 
The effect of Hailsham's speech could hardly have been more dramatic, and its 
impact on the Conference was phenomenal, as 'the whole audience, and the platform, 
went mad, standing and cheering and waving in the full light of the national television: 
and, of course, the whole press was f 74 ull of it the next morning'. Hailsham has stated 
that he tried to 'keep out of the public eye' for the rest of the Conference, but his 
flamboyant behaviour, his parading of his baby as a voter-winning exercise (something 
he later denied), and the behaviour of his supporters, turned Macmillan, the party's 
73 Hailsharn, A Sparrow's Flight p. 353; Interviews with Lord Hailsharn and Lord Deedes in 'Alan 
Clark's History of the Tojy Party'. Episode three: From Estate Owners to Estate Agents. An Oxford 
Television Company Production for BBC TV. First broadcast 28 September 1997; Butler, Art of the 
Possible ' p. 243; and Fisher, The Toly Leadersl p. 103 74 I-Iailsham, A Sparrow's Fli-gh p. 353 
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most senior figures and Conservative NPs away from Hailsham, and they turned 
towar s ome. 
75 
Hailsham began a concerted effort to seduce the conference. He was a 
showman, a rabble rouser, a 'I-Egh Church Heseltine'. However, his overt attempt to 
snatch the leadership, along with Randolph Churchill's distribution of 'Q' badges, only 
served to alienate many in the party who felt that the leadership issue should not be 
settled in so vulgar and public a manner. 76 Churchill gave badges to Butler and his 
wife, which Butler threw away immediately. As Deedes has argued, 'kissing babies 
while campaigning is one thing, parading your baby while as a candidate for the 
leadership is another'. To all intents and purposes, Hailsham scuppered his chances. 
Fisher has noted the effect of Hailsham's antics, as 'in the result, the uninhibited 
canvassing for Hailsham reacted against him and alienated more support than it 
attracted'. 77 Macmillan was visited by Dilhorne and Redmayne on their return from 
the conference. They told him they were upset at Hailsham's and his supporters' 
behaviour at Blackpool. They said they were supportive of his succession, but felt his 
open courting of the Conference was 'turning "respectable' people away from Hogg' 
[Hailsham]. 
78 
Rarnsden has noted, 'Hailsham's campaign seemed to have everything going 
for it; he was the Prime NIinister's candidate, he was anyway the darling of the 
75 Hailsham denied this charge and stated that his wife and baby were there to support him 
emotionally, not advertise his candidature. Hailsham has also noted that he disapproved of Randolph 
Churchill's distribution of 'Q' badges, which made him appear like a candidate in an American 
leadership convention. This is in Hailsham, A Sparrow's Fligh p. 352 
76 'Alan Clark's History of the Toly Party, Episode three: From Estate Owners to Estate Agents. An 
Oxford Television Company Production for BBC TV. First Broadcast 28 September 1997 and Fisher, 
The Tory Leaders, p. 102 
77 Fisher, The Tory Leaders p. 103 
78 Diary entry for 14 October 1963, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 51*. (13 -14) 
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conference; he had a team ready to run his campaign'. 79 This explains in part why 
Hailsham's conduct failed to have the desired impact: the Conservative Party was not 
used to campaigns for the leadership, and did not find them conducive. Hailsham's 
enthusiasm for impressing the conference did not appeal to the party. Aggressive 
campaigning was detrimental to a candidate's chances, and John Boyd-Carpenter, 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, has summarised well the party's attitude to 
campaigning. 'The Conservative Party still then retained the concept that gentlemen 
don't throw their hats, or their coronets, into the ring. It preferred the convention, 
however artificial, that leaders come forward in response to the pressure of others. 80 
This not only helps to explain the failure of Hailsham, but the selection of Home. 
Maudling noted of Hailsham's performances at Blackpool that 'Quintin [Hailsham] 
was his warm, ebullient, emotional self, commanding the enthusiasm and loyalty of 
many, but arousing the doubts and apprehensions of many others. 81 
Hailsham's Reaction to Home's Emergence: 19 October 
After Hailsham returned from Blackpool, he tried to arrange a meeting with 
Butler and Maudling, to make sure they all acted together, as this would prevent Home 
becoming leader. He managed to do so, but only after Home was on his way to the 
Palace to be offered the task to see if he could form a govemment. After Hailsham said 
they should stick together, Butler 'said he had already given his word to Alec [Home]'. 
A secret minute from Redmayne to Bligh has illustrated the discontent of Hailsham 
after the party conference, and the worry this was causing to the party hierarchy. It 
79 Ramsden, Winds of Chang , p. 
198 
" J. Boyd-Carpenter, Wgy of Life, (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, 1988), p. 177 
81 Maudling, Memoirs, p. 126 
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declared, 'it is most important that we should try to keep Lord Hailsham in the 
boat ... This note must 
be regarded as of the most urgent importance in order that we do 
12 
not fail to take action on it at precisely the right moment'. 
Maudling and Hailsham telephoned the 'midnight meeting' and stated that they 
opposed Home, but would serve under Butler. Butler, Hailsham and Maudling met at 
midday following the 'midnight meeting'. Home met Butler, Hailsham, Maudling, 
Powell, Macleod and Boyle individually following his meeting with the Queen. Powell, 
Macleod, Boyle and Maudling all refused to serve immediately, Butler reserved his 
position as did Hailsham. Hailsham, later that evening, decided to serve. He had been 
persuaded by Selwyn Lloyd, a strong supporter of Home, who told Hailsham that it 
would look like sour grapes if he refused to serve. Pressure had also been put on him 
by Amery, Poole and Thomeycroft. 83 Clearly, after the party conference, Hailsham 
was in a weakened position, and was not in a position to become leader, and it became 
clear that Butler had too much opposition in the party to succeed. This explains his 
decision to agree to serve in a Home administration. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the actions of the candidates at the Party 
Conference was central to the outcome of the selection. As the conference took place 
during the selection, it constituted the 'campaign' for the leadership, such as usually 
occurs in a fonnal leadership election. Butler and Maudling both gave poor 
perfonnances at the conference in their speeches, while Hailshain's over-exuberance 
and obvious excitement at the prospect of becoming party leader, raised doubts about 
82 'Secret. Mr. T. I Bligh'. Signed M. R. (Redmayne). 17 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (8) 
83 Fisher, The Tory Leaders p. 108 
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his suitability for the highest office in the government. In contrast, Home's conduct at 
the party conference demonstrated that he was generally acceptable as a can&date. 
Butler's inactive role in the opposition in the Cabinet that emerged to Home 
becoming party leader demonstrated two important points. Firstly, that he did not 
believe he could become leader as he was not acceptable to the party, and secondly, 
that it was not in the interests of party unity for him to prevent Home succeeding 
Macmillan. Home's delivery of Macmillan's resignation statement to the conference, 
and his speech as Foreign Secretary were vital to his emerging candidacy, as his 
competent conduct was in stark contrast to that of the other candidates, whose 
weaknesses were exposed to the party. The fact that Home was not an expected 
candidate at the time of the conference meant he was not scrutinised as much as the 
other candidates, but his conduct nevertheless had a better impact than that of the 
other candidates. This lead to the pressure that was put on Home during, and after the 
conference to stand as a candidate. Home only aowed his name to go forward after he 
saw the weaknesses of the other candidates, and he put himself into the ring in the 
interests of party unity as the compromise candidate. 
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Chapter Seven 
The 1963 Leadership Selection: The Situational Interpretation 
This chapter applies the Situational Interpretation to the 1963 leadership 
selection. It analyses the influence of the situation and the selection procedure, and the 
ratings of the candidates' acceptability, electability and governability. The chapter then 
assesses their effect on the outcome - the selection of Home and the failure of Butler, 
Maudling and Hailsham to attain the leadership. 
The Situation and Its Requirements 
The Decline of Macmillan's Goverrunent: 1962-63 
On 27 April 1962, Macleod distributed a memorandum on the political 
situation in Spring 1962, and noted 'I am afraid there is no question that the electorate 
are bored with us as a government. This springs mainly from the fact that we have 
been in office so long. " The Conservative Party had been in power since 1951, and 
the second term of Macmillan's government was experiencing the difficulties that a 
party in power for a long period can experience, in both ideological and goverrunental 
terms. Macmillan noted on January 1"' 1963 
1962 is over. It has been a bad year, both in Home and Foreign 
politics. The government's position is weak and there is a general 
view that the Socialists will win the next General Election. The 
country is in a dissatisfied and petulant mood. My own 
popularity has gone down a lot. There is a wave of anti- 
' 'The Political Situation, Spring 1962', lain Macleod, 27 April 1962 CPA CCO 20/8/5 
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European and anti-American feeling. There is trouble about 
growing unemployment. The press is, with scarcely an exception, 
hostile 
... 
Can we recover in 1963 and 1964.1 don't know. But I 
mean to have a good trY2 
Dissatisfaction was being expressed by the public about Macmillan's 
Edwardian image, and the failure of the government's programme. A memorandum 
from Paul Bryan, the Party Vice-Chairman, to Macleod and Poole illustrates that 'there 
is a trace of feeling among the YCs [Young Conservatives] that we are being led by 
an old man', showing the disadvantages of Macmillan's image. ' On 15 October 1963, 
Macmillan noted that policy was not splitting the party, and that the party's difficulties 
were due to 'boredom with material success', and the apparent inability to harness this 
to spiritual purposeS. 4 The electorate had become bored after many years of 
Conservative rule, and the party appeared to need to undergo a process of 
rejuvenation. 
The Imminence of the General Election 
The leadership struggle came at an inconvenient time for the party in the 
electoral cycle, as a general election was due in October 1964, at the latest. On 17 
February 1963, Macmillan noted, 'faced with Wilson (47 or so) we must have a young 
man (Heath or Maudling). This line of approach leaves out poor Butler as well as me. 
Of course, there's something in it'. 5 This shows one of the central requirements in 
2 Diary entry for I January 1963 Ms. Macmillan dev. d-48 (35-36). Emphasis on original. 
3 Bryan to Macleod and Poole, 15th May 1963 CPA CCO 20/8/6 
4 Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 15 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (27) 
5 Diary entry for 17 February 1963 Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 48 (79) 
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1963: a leader with a new image to face Labour leader Harold Wilson, to give the 
party some chance of winning a fourth successive election victory. As Macmillan 
noted, this meant a younger leader with an image not closely tied to his, which counted 
against Butter. Macmillan noted on 5 September 1963 
I cannot go into an Election and lead in it. I am beginning to feel 
that I haven't the strength and that perhaps another leader could 
do what I did after Eden left. But it cannot be done by a 
pedestrian politician: it needs a man with vision and moral 
strength - Hailsham, not Maudling. Yet the back benchers (poor 
. 
fools) do not seem to have any idea, except a 'young man'. 
Admirable as Maudling is, I doubt if he could revive our fortunes 
6 
as well as Hailsham. 
This illustrates the need for a younger leader, and also the divisions of opinion 
over who should be Macmillan's successor, but it is clear that Macmillan's career as 
leader was coming to an end, and he had perceived tfýis. On 4 October 1963, 
Macmillan noted 'my decision to retire before the next General Election is right. The 
problem is how exactly to announce it and how to get the right successor. Butler 
would be fatal. Maudling uninspiring. Hailsham, with Maudling and his men in loyal 
support, might still win. 7 Macmillan thus supported Hailsham as a younger, more 
electable leader, and it was only doubts about Hailsham that arose after the Blackpool 
Conference that led him to focus his attention solely on Home. 
6 Diary entry for 5 September 1963 Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 50* (63) 
7 Diary entry for 4 October 1963 Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 50* (117) 
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The Role of the 1963 Peerage Act 
The Peerage Act that was passed on 31 July 1963, was a central situational 
influence on the outcome of the selection. According to Macmillan, without the Act, 
'Butler would have succeeded, almost without challenge'. Stark has noted that 'the 
making of Prime NEnister Douglas-Home depended as much on this constitutional 
reform as it did on the magic circle selection system'. 8 Without the Act, this could not 
have taken place, as the party would not accept a leader who was not a member of the 
House of Commons. Home could now become an NP, and was therefore a feasible 
candidate. The same now also applied to Hailsham. 
The Act was passed after the pressure of Viscount Stansgate, who wished to 
disclaim his peerage and return to the Commons as Anthony Wedgewood-Benn, and 
he had undertaken a three year campaign to obtain his right to do so. Benn had 
succeeded to the Viscountcy on his father's death, and tabled a Bill proposing that 
peers could disclaim their peerage if they so wished. The Bill originally passed by the 
Commons would have allowed the renunciation of peerages only after the next 
dissolution of Parliament, which meant that former peers would have been ineligible to 
be selected as parliamentary candidates for the 1964 general election. However, the 
Lords amended the Bill to allow renunciation of peerages from the moment the Act 
went into effect, and this was accepted by the Cabinet on 27 June. It was also decided - 
that 'surrender should not extinguish the Peerage itself, and this was important as if 
this had occurred, Home would not have allowed his name to go forward for the 
leadership as he was proud of his family heritage. 9 This constitutional reform, 
8 Macmillan, At The End Of The D, p. 509; and. Stark, Choosing A Leader p. 134 
9 See Stark, Choosing A Leader, p. 88; and Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, pp. 2'59-261 
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therefore, had a major influence on the outcome, as without it, Home would not have 
succeeded Macmillan. 
The Selection Procedure: Formal Aspects and Informal Networks of 
Communication 
Formal Aspects 
Yhe Development of the Procedure: Motives and Effect 
The attitude of the Palace to the selection of Macmillan's successor was 'you 
choose, we send for'. 'O In other words, the party should determine who the best 
successor was, and the Palace would ask that person to form a government. This led 
Macmillan and the party hierarchy, because were clear divisions of opinion on who 
would be the best candidate, to decide to undertake extensive canvasses of party 
opinion to determine the best successor. This desire lay behind the emphasis in 
Macmillan's resignation statement at the party conference on the use of the 'customary 
processes of consultation'. Drafts of this statement in the Public Record Office file on 
the leadersfiýp controversy, show Macmillan took enormous care in his deliberation 
over the content and phraseology of the message. This is particularly apparent with the 
key phrase 'customary processes of consultation'. Drafts show that he did not 
originally intend to use this phrase, and the final version contains the following: 'I hope 
that it will soon be possible for the customary processes of consultation to be carried 
out within the party about it's future leadersl-ýp'. " Drafts of the message contain the 
following crossed out, and replaced with the phrase Macmillan used 
10 Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home p. 292 
11 'Confidential. Foreign Secretary'. Signed Harold Macmillan. 9 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 
(36) 
224 
I hope that it will soon be possible for the chief figures of the 
Party to consult together about the future leadership with various 
individuals and groups in both Houses of Parliament as well as in 
the Party outside, thus making it possible for Her Majesty to be 
given any advice which She may seek 12 
This fine-tuning can be interpreted in a number of ways, but the opposition to 
Butler's succession is clear in the announcement, and in the subsequent canvasses. 
Macmillan appears to have changed the original phrase because he did not wish to CP 
make it explicit that the whole party would be consulted. This was because he and the 
party hierarchy wanted to consult only those whose opinions were considered to be 
important, and that agreed Home should succeed Macmillan. If the whole party was 
consulted, the result may not have been the one that they wanted. Tl-ýs explains the use 
of the phrase 'customary processes of consultation', as there were no 'customary 
processes' for this situation, so Macmillan did not make a formal commitment to 
consult the whole party. The phrase was also ambiguous enough to allow Macn-dllan 
and the party hierarchy to conduct the canvasses in the manner they wanted. Macleod 
was convinced that Macmillan arranged for the canvasses of party opinion to 
deliberately block Butler from succeeding him, by making the opposition to him in the 
party fully apparent. 13 However, if there was opposition to Butler's succession, then 
Macmillanwas justified in making the party aware of that fact, -as he could not unite 
the party. 
'2 'Confidential. Foreign Secretary. ' Unsigned. 9 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (38,48,50) 
13 Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership' in Spectator. 17 January 1964, p. 65 
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Two alternative theories can be offered to explain why the procedure was 
developed. Firstly, the procedure took that form so that the party hierarchy appeared 
to be consulting the whole party, and justified their selection of Home as Macmillan's 
successor. Secondly, there were deep divisions of opinion in the party on who should 
succeed Macmillan, and the canvasses were the best means of finding the candidate 
most acceptable to the party. The evidence suggests that the party hierarchy wanted 
Home to become leader as he could best guarantee unity, and because there were 
divisions of opinion, needed to demonstrate the support for him. By developing this 
procedure, the stage was set for his emergence, and the procedure played a major part 
in the selection of Home as Macmillan's successor. 
Redinayne's Canvass ofMPs: Method, Results, Influence on the Outcome 
i) Method 
The method used was for the party whips to ask NTs questions on who they 
felt should succeed Macmillan, who they would least like to succeed Macmillan, and if 
they felt Home would be an acceptable leader. Ninety per cent of NPs were said to 
have been interviewed personally by a whip, the rest by telephone, or if abroad by 
telegram, and some were seen more than once. 14 There appear to have been as many 
as four questions asked of NTs 
1. Who should succeed Macmillan? 
2. Who should be the second choice? 
3. Who among the candidates would you least like to see as leader? 
" Ramsden, Winds of Change p. 203 
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4. If there is deadlock between Rab [Butler] and Quintin [Hailsham], would you accept 
Alec Home? 15 
The wording of the questions does not appear to have taken a consistent 
pattern, but the nature and purpose of the questions asked is clear. The second and 
fourth questions were specifically designed to emphasise Home's candidacy, as the 
party hierarchy knew he was generally acceptable to most NVs, even if he was not 
their first choice. The third question was designed to emphasise the opposition to 
Butler that existed in the Parliamentary party, and thus enhance Home's prospects in 
the process. As Home was the only candidate who could unite the party, the party 
hierarchy emphasised his name in the questioning of NTs. Bogdanor has described this 
procedure of leading questioning as 'guided democracy', or a reliance on the opinions 
of certain senior and influential figures, over more junior members of the 
parliamentary party. 16 
Redmayne calculated the first, second and third choices of NVs, and also the 
definite aversions to candidates. By using this method, Redmayne reduced the field of 
feasible candidates in this canvass to Home, Butler and Maudling, and eliminated 
Hailsham, Macleod and Heath. The purpose of this method was to find the 
compromise candidate who was generally acceptable to the party, and to illustrate the 
depth of the opposition to candidates. This served to promote Home as the most 
generally acceptable candidate, and the candidate who aroused the least opposition, 
15 The Times, 16 January 1987 in Bogdanor, 'The Selection of the Party Leader' in Seldon/ Ball, 
Conservative Century p. 75 
" Bogdanor, 'The Selection of the Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball (eds. ), Conservative Centuly p. 75 
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while emphasising the opposition to Butler and Hailsham that existed among 
Conservative NVs. 
ii) Results 
The evidence suggests that Conservative NUs preferred Home to Butler to 
succeed Macmillan, despite the controversy surrounding the uniformity and 
impartiality of the canvass. What becomes clear is not a widespread endorsement of 
Home's candidacy, but a general acceptance of it. Redmayne assessed the opinions of 
300 Conservative NVs, and told Macn-dllan that their views were "freely given. 11is list 
of the original candidates - Heath, Macleod, Maudling, Hailsham, Butler and Home - 
was reduced to Butler, Maudling and Home, because the support for Heath and 
Macleod was negligible, and Hailsham had the largest number of opponents. 
Redmayne thus re-allocated the first choices for Hailsham, Heath and Macleod by the 
second choices of those NTs who had put these as their first choice. The votes were 
re-allocated as follows - Home: 26; Butler: 18; Maudling: 18.17 Home led on first 
preferences, but had the clearest lead on the second and third preferences. The first 
preferences were: 
Home: 87; Butler: 86; Hailsham: 65; Maudling: 48; Macleod: 12; and Heath: 10. 
The second and third preferences were: 
Home: 89; Butler: 69; Maudling: 66; Hailsham: 39; Macleod: 18; and Heath: 17. 
" 'Prime Nfinister'. Signed M. R. (Redmayne). 16 October 1963 PRO PREM 1115008 (12) 
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The recorded definite aversions to the three men were also significant. The 
results for these were 
Home: 30; Butler: 48; Hailsham: 78; Maudling: 6; Macleod: 1; and Heath: 1.18 
Home gained support ftom a wider and more general section of the party, 
according to Redmayne. He noted of the results 
On every count Lord Home has the advantage even if it is 
sometimes very narrow ... Apart from Home's actual lead I am 
impressed by the general goodwill shown towards him even by 
those who give reasons in favour of other candidates, and I 
cannot fail to come to the conclusion that he would be best able 
to secure urýted support'9 
The results illustrated that Butler and Hailsham were opposed by a number of 
Conservative NTs, as was Home but not to the same extent. Home had a clearer lead 
on second and third preferences, which Redmayne felt indicated a general acceptance 
of his candidacy. It is fully apparent from the canvass that Home was not a clear 
winner, but did arouse the least opposition of the candidates. It is perhaps significant 
that Redmayne did not differentiate between second and third preferences, as if he did 
make it clear who emerged as the clear winner on second over third preferences, 
18 'Secret. Mr. T. J. Bligh'. Signed M. R- (Redmayne). 18 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (5) 
""Secret. Mr. T. I Bligh'. Signed M. R- (Redmayne). 18 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (5-6) 
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Home's lead may not have been as clear as it was. This suggests that Home may only 
have been the third choice of a number of Conservative NTs, and this may not have 
promoted his candidacy as strongly. 
iii) Influence on the Outcome 
The canvasses did not reflect the feelings of the whole party, but were 
weighted in favour of the party's most senior figures, which kept the selection of 
Home in the tradition of the party's previous selections of its leaders. The use of 
multiple questions in a canvass such as this, can be manipulated in favour of a 
compromise candidate, and this was the outcome of these canvasses. It was also a 
definite intention in the use of the questions. Ramsden has noted that 'since the whips 
were counting votes against as well as for each candidate, it is not difficult to see how 
such discussions appeared to be the 'making' of a majority for Home as the least 
unpopular candidate' . 
2' Butler never saw the canvass of Conservative NVs, which 
suggests an element of conspiracy by the party hierarch y. 21 
Shepherd believed Redmayne's leading questioning of NTs in Home's favour 
resulted in an inflation of his support. Fisher has argued that Lord St. Aldwyn 
suggested to Redmayne that he should stress Home's name to Ws, as the candidate 
most likely to unite the party. 22 Ngs who had supported Home, but not as their first 
choice, were asked by Redmayne if their preference would be different, if they knew 
that he was definitely a candidate. This prompted many NTs to review their choice. 
Redmayne later admitted that NTs opinions were not given equal weight, and that his 
11 Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 205 
21 Butler, Art of the Possible p. 247 
22 Shepherd, The Power Brokers p. 156; and Fisher, The Toly Leaders, p. 106 
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conclusion was biased towards 'people on whose opinion one would more strongly 
rely than on others'. 23 As Ramsden has noted, 'tl-ýs would mean that the senior 
backbenchers now backing Home would have a disproportionate effect on the 
outcome'. 24 Butler was told by NTs that they were contacted by junior whips who 
stressed that Home was standing, and that each of the interviewers adopted a different 
approach, so questioning the uniformity and impartiality of the canvass of Conservative 
NTs. Traditionally, this method was adopted in more informal soundings than this in 
the party's history, and as such was therefore not unprecedented, but reflected the 
hierarchy's desire for Home to become leader. This canvass had a major effect on the 
outcome, as it showed Home was the most acceptable candidate to Conservative NTs. 
. 
fluence on the Outcome Dilhorne's Canvass of the Cabinet: Method, Results, In 
i) Method 
Dilhorne's canvass of the Cabinet has provoked even more controversy than 
Redmayne's canvass of Conservative NVs. This is because of the method used by 
Dilhome, and the interpretation he offered of the results. In his record of the canvass 
that was delivered to Macmillan on 15 October, Dilhorne illustrated that he calculated 
the first choices of each member of the Cabinet, and treated Butler, Maudling and 
Hailsham as voting for themselves, but did not include Home's vote for himself 
Dilhorne, also calculated the number of supporters for each candidate if Home was 
eliminated from the selection, and then made the same calculation if Home and 
Maudling were eliminated, and if Home and Hailsham were eliminated. A significant 
23 Shepherd, The Power Brokers ' p. 
156; and Fisher, The Tory Leaders, lp. 107 
24 Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 205 
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aspect of Dilhorne's canvass is that he does not offer an assessment of what the 
25 Cabinet's views were if Butler was not a candidate. 
ii) Results 
The results were interpreted by Dilhome as showing the extent to which 
opinion was split, if Home was not a candidate. The first choices of NEnisters were as 
follows 
Home: 10; Butler: 3; Maudling: 5; Hailsham: 2. 
Home was not counted as voting for himself, so his total was 11. If Home was 
eliminated, the results were: 
Butler: 8; Hailsham: 5; Maudling: 7. 
If Home and Maudling were eliminated, the results were: 
Butler: 12; Hailsham: 7. 
If Home and Hailsham were eliminated, the results were: 
Butler: 14; Maudling: S. 
" Dilhome to Macmillan, 15 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (18-19) 
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Dilhome also attached a break-down of the results, to illustrate which Nfinisters 
had voted for each candidate . 
2" This list of candidates has raised controversy, as the 
ten Ministers who voted for Home as their first choice included Macleod and Boyle, 
who were definite opponents of Home. A variety of arguments have been advanced to 
explain Macleod's inclusion in the 'Home Ten'. Dilhome told Home that 'it is not a 
thing about wl-&h I would make a mistake', and Home commented that Dilhome was 
a lawyer, and trained not to get things wrong. Butler's reaction showed a lack of 
surprise: 'Macleod was very shifty, much more than you think'. Powell declared that it 
was a forgery. Macmillan stated 'well, you know ... Macleod was a Highlander V. 
" 
Home's argument that Macleod was being too clever for his own good and playing a 
devious game is, according to Ramsden, 'hardly convincing, but must nevertheless not 
be discounted as a possibility. 28 Macleod may have been trying to buttress his own 
position by voting for Home, as once the opposition to Butler became clear, he would 
possibly have come into the running as an outside candidate. 
As Fisher has noted, 'it is not easy to understand how so large a majority could 
have been composed'. At least nine of the twenty members of the Cabinet were for 
Butler - Boyd-Carpenter; Edward Boyle; Henry Brooke, Home Secretary; Butler; 
Frederick Erroll, President of the Board of Trade; Hailsham, Macleod; Maudling; and 
Powell. The Cabinet was thus split at the time of the canvass directly between Butler 
and Home. This explains the use of the canvasses, in showing what the situation was if 
certain candidates (except Butler) were eliminated. This served to emphasise the 
opposition to Butler in the Cabinet, that may or may not have really existed, and it in 
26 Dilhome to Macmillan, 15 October 1693 PRO PREM 11/5008 (17-19) 
27 Home, Macmillan 1957-1986 pp. 562-563; and Shepherd, -Iain 
Macleod, p. 326 
11 Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 206 
233 
turn inflated the support for Home . 
29 The 'Midnight Meeting' opposition suggests that 
the impression of a Cabinet fully behind Home, to the extent portrayed by Dilhome, 
was false. 
Macleod claimed that Dilhorne's figures were 'simply impossible', and that 
expressions of genuine regard for Home were translated into second or even first 
preferences. 30 Only two Ministers were for Home, and Macleod used as evidence his 
meeting with five NEnisters for lunch on 18 October, where none of those present felt 
Home was the first choice. Hailsharn, Butler and Boyle were also not present at the 
meeting, which illustrated to Macleod that Dilhorne's results were incorrect. 31 
Ramsden has explained Dilhorne's misleading hssessment of the Cabinet, as he 'failed 
to understand the depth of the actual opposition to Home as Prime Nfinister because 
there was so little hostility to Home the man, and he too may have misreported some 
who had acquiesced when his name was mentioned as first preferences for Home'. 32 
This genuine regard, rather than an enthusiastic endorsement of Home, resulted in the 
inflation of support for him in the Cabinet, and the false impression of support that was 
conveyed by tWs canvass. 
iii) Influence on the Outcome 
The mistakes made in both the Ws and the Cabinet canvasses can be put down 
to misunderstandings due to the use of complex and multiple questioning and 
conversations, that inflated the support for Home. Alternatively, it could have been the 
case that the party managers and senior figures had decided Home was the right 
29 Fisher, The Tory Leaders, p. 107 
30 Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership' in Spectator, 17 January 1964, p. 65 
31 Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership' in SRectator, 17 January 1964, p. 65 
" Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 205 
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candidate and manipulated the canvasses to make sure they got the majority for the 
leader they wanted. They felt it was their duty to do this for the good of the party. This 
was a view Macleod concurred with in his article in The Spectator of 17 January 1964. 
He took the view that they had acted 'in accordance with their idea of duty [and] had 
simply produced the wrong result by asking questions in a particular way'. 33 
Dilhorne's canvass was the most significant, as 'no one unacceptable to his colleagues 
could have become their leader and when Dilhome reported an overwhelming Cabinet 
34 
consensus for Home, it was decisive'. This assessment is correct. Dilhorne's canvass 
was critical to Home's emergence, as it gave the impression that he was generally 
acceptable to the Cabinet as Macmillan's successor. 
777e Canvasses of the Lords and the Constituencies 
The constituency canvass illustrated that opinion was split between Butler and 
Hailsharn, but most soundings had been taken at Blackpool, before Home was a 
candidate. 35 On 16 October, Redmayne reported that it was 'clear that the 
constituencies support Home with Butler a fairly close second; Hailsham is third, and 
the others nowhere. 3' Lord St. Aldwyn's canvass of the active Conservative Peers in 
the Lords reported that the first choices were 
Home: 28; Butler: 14; Hailsham: 10; Maudling: 2. 
The second choices were: 
33 Ramsden, Winds of Change p. 206 
34 Fisher, The Tory Leaders, p. 107 
35 Ramsden, Winds of Change p. 203 
36 Redmayne to Macmillan, 16 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (11) 
235 
37 
Home: 12; Butler: 13; Hailsham: 12; Maudling: 8. 
However, these canvasses were not as influential as the canvasses of NPs and 
the Cabinet, but did confirm the impression that Home was the generally acceptable 
candidate. 
Informal Networks 
These networks had a major role in the selection of Home. They disseminated 
and filtered information from the party hierarchy to the candidates, and potential 
candidates, prior to and during the selection to either buttress a candidate's position, 
or to dissuade them from being a candidate. They also served as a means of 
communication between the party and the party managers, and as links to the press. 
These existed in two forms: those between the party managers and the press to prepare 
for the emergence of Home, and those between the press and the opponents of Home 
to buttress their candidacies. 
Yhe Party Hierarchy to Candidates Networks: July - October 1963 
These played a major role in buttressing candidates, or dissuading them of their 
prospects for succession. Butler was made aware of his poor chances of succeeding 
Macmillan by informal discussions with senior figures on the executive of the 1922 
Committee. On 18 June 1963, John Morrison advised Butler to take part in the 
goverment fonned by the next leader, but declared that he would understand if Butler 
" St. Aldwyn to Macmillan, 15 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (15-16) 
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did not wish to serve after having already lost out on the leadership once in 1957.38 
This illustrates two points: that Morrison was convinced that Macmillan was finished, 
and that Butler was not the man to succeed him. At the end of June 1963, Morrison 
declared to Butler that 'the chaps won't have you', just prior to him leaving for 
Rhodesia, to preside over the conference that was to ratify the dissolution of the 
Central Affican Federation . 
39 The cumulative effect of this and earlier conversations 
with 1922 Committee officials, caused Butler to inquire about his reputation in the 
party. Later that week, he was visited by Redmayne and Poole, who wondered 
whether he would be willing to serve in any new administration that might be formed. 
They told Butler they wanted to keep the disruption that Macmillan's retirement would 
cause to a minimum . 
4' They were implying that his own chances of succeeding 
Macmillan were not good, and confirmed Morrison"s own assessment. Butler asked 
two friends on the Executive of the 1922 Committee if Morrison's assessment was 
correct, and they replied fim-dy that it was . 
41 A confidential note in Butler's papers 
confirms that the party had a strong desire to skip a generation, and did not want him 
to succeed Macmillan 
I was visited by John Morrison and Alex Spearman. The burden 
of their song was that in view of the strong inclination of the 
younger backbenchers to get somebody of the new age group it 
was likely that opinion would crystallise like this as representing 
" Butler, Art of the Possiblel p. 236 
39 Goodhart, The 1922, . 191 " Confidential Note'. 21 June 1963 Butler MSS RAB G40 (68-69) 
4' Goodhart, The 1922, p. 191 
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the greatest common factor. They were both extremely friendly 
but seemed quite sure of their diagnoSiS42 
Informal networks also served to put pressure on Home at the party 
conference, to throw his hat into the ring. These networks came from the 1922 
Committee and also back-benchers, instigated by Selwyn Lloyd, the most senior back- 
bencher. Following his sacking as Chancellor in July 1962, Lloyd had acquired 
prominence as a disseminator of information from the back-benchers to the party 
managers. The figures who, alongside Lloyd, put pressure on Home, were Sir William 
Anstruther-Gray, John Morrison, Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe and Colonel Lancaster of 
the 1922 Conunittee, and Duncan Sandys, John Hare, Edward Heath and Nigel Birch, 
who were ministers and back-benchers who f 43 elt Home should succeed Macmillan. 
Redmayne, and senior backbenchers were 'working for several days to influence the 
votes in favour of Home', but 'they were perfectly entitled to ensure, if they could, the 
election of the man whom they thought best able to unite the party and best fitted to 
lead the country'. 44 Fisher supports Bogdanor's view that 'guided democracy' was 
taking place via these informal networks. Hailsham noted that Home was pressured to 
become a candidate at Blackpool by senior party figures. On 10 October Home told 
him that he [Home] 'was under strong pressure to disclaim and throw his hat into the 
ring '. 45 These networks had a major influence on Home's decision to stand, as he saw 
that he was the most acceptable candidate to the party through the genuine regard for 
him. 
42 'Confidential Note'. 31 July 1963 Butler MSS RAB G40 (83-84) 
43 Fisher, The Tory Leaders, p. 105; Home, Macmillan 195 7-1986 p. 183; and Shepherd, lain 
Macleod , p. 318 44 Fisher, The Tory Leaders , p. 106 45 Hailsharn, A Sparr w's Flight, p. 351 
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7he Party Hierarchy - Candidates - Palace Circle of Networks during the Selection 
and Home's emergence 
These networks were of major significance during the selection, and served to 
convey information to buttress support for Home, and express the discontent of the 
opponents. The Palace was kept in touch with developments during the selection 
through Sir NEchael Adeane, The Queen's Principal Secretary, and Sir Alan Lascelles, 
the Queen's Private Secretary, by the party managers. Bligh noted to Sir Edward Ford, 
the Queen's Assistant Private Secretary, on 9 October, that the Queen gave permission 
for Home to give Macmillan's statement of his intention to resign to the party 
conference. The Palace was also informed by the opponents' camps of their discontent 
at Home's succession. Dennis Walters of the Hailsham camp contacted the Palace, and 
stated that Nfirusters were unhappy at the consultations, after information of the results 
had filtered OUt. 
46 
Butler was excluded from the networks during the contest, probably because 
he was perceived as a threat to Home, and the party hierarchy did not want to keep 
him up to date with developments. Macmillan did deliberately keep Butler in the dark 
over critical developments about the procedure to be adopted to install his successor. 
He failed to inform him of the time the canvasses would take to be completed, while 
keeping the Queen fully informed, telling her it would only take a couple of days to 
complete, after the Cabinet had agreed on the procedure Macmillan had determined. 47 
Butler was under the impression that the canvasses would take some time to complete, 
and felt this would work in his favour, as support for him could be consolidated. This 
Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 204 
Macmillan, At The End Of The D, p. 511 
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was obviously not Macmillan's intention. He also refused to talk to Butler while he 
was recovering from his operation in the nursing home, and Lady Butler felt this to be 
typical of the deviousness of Macmillan. 48 Macmillan did act in a secretive and devious 
manner towards Butler, but this cannot just be attributed to any personal spite. He 
believed that Butler was not the right man to succeed him, because of Butler's 
personal failings which meant he was unable to unite the party. 
The Press to Home's opponents during the Selection and Home's Emergence 
These played a crucial role in the development of the opposition to Home's 
emergence. They existed as a two-way movement of communication, and Macleod 
used the press to galvanise opposition to Home during the Party Conference, and 
William Rees-Mogg, an opponent of the succession, promoted and galvanised the 
opposition to Home following his emergence. On the evening of 11 October, Macleod, 
following rumours of Home's growing prominence as a candidate, gave two respected 
lobby journalists, David Wood of The Times, and Harry Boyne of The Daily 
Telegrap , an off-the-record 
briefing in his room at the Imperial Hotel in the early 
hours of the morning. He confirmed to them that Home had now emerged as a 
candidate for the leadership. 49 
On the afternoon of 17 October, Butler, Macleod and Maudling were told by 
Rees-Mogg, that Macmillan would advise the Queen to send for Home and ask him to 
discover if he could form a government. This served to further galvanise the opposition 
to Home, and led to a series of meetings and telephone conversations to organise the 
48 Interview with Lady Butler in 'Alan Clark's Historv of The Tory Party'. Episode three: From Estate 
Owners to Estate Agents. An Oxford Television Company Production for BBC TV. First shown 28 
September 1997 
49 Shepherd, The Power Brokers p. 154 
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opposition. Rees-Mogg continued to play a crucial role in the opposition, and 
approached Butler while he was having lunch in the Carlton Club, and urged him not 0 
to serve. 
50 
The Party Hierarchy to the Press after Home's Emergence 
These were deemed of particular importance in preparing the country for the 
emergence of Home. A memorandum from Redmayne to Bligh of 17 October 
illustrates that great emphasis (with Macmillan's approval) was placed on keeping the 
field open, and stopping rumours of candidates dropping out, or no longer being 
considered. This was to be done by Harold Evans, Macn-dllan's Press Officer, who 
would prompt the press when the situation was felt to be ready for Home's emergence, 
and weight could be put behind 'the probable successor'. The document places great 
emphasis on the need to be certain on how the press are to be 'handled, and Evans, 
Bligh and Deedes would play the crucial roles on this. 51 These were significant as they 
eased Home into the public arena as Macmillan's successor and seemed, to some 
extent, to control opposition to his succession. 
The Core Situational Criteria: Acceptability, Electability, and Governability 
Butler 
i) Acceptahility 
Butler was deemed to be unacceptable by many sections of the Conservative 
Party for a variety of reasons. Firstly, his level of acceptability as MacnUan's 
50 Macleod, 'The Tory Leadership' in Spectator. 17 January 1964, p. 66; Shepherd, Iain Macleod, 
p. 328. Macleod did not reveal it was Rees-Mogg in The Spectato ; and Butler, Art of the Possible 
pp. 248-249 
11 Redmayne to Bligh, 17 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (7) 
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successor, was tarnished by the 'guilt by association' that he had with the discredited 
Macmillan regime. This meant that, as the party wanted to move to a leader from the 
next generation of leading Conservatives, Butler was not acceptable to the party. In 
March 1963, Macmillan warned Butler that criticism of him was also criticism of 
Butler, as they were seen as inseparable, and 'the combination of the Kennedy image 
plus Harold Wilson at 46 was a potent force in favour of a younger man'. 52 
Butler's career was now moving away from the 'great offices of state', and he 
was also more closely tied to Macmillan after he became Deputy Prime Minister. This 
severely affected his leadership prospects, as Macmillan's reputation was in serious 
decline, and the party wanted to move to the next generation: 'He [Butler] had the 
same disadvantage as Macmillan himself - age and length of service'. 53 The decline of 
the Macmillan government from 1962, and the allegations of sleaze and corruption 
aroused by the Profurno crisis, was central to Butler's unacceptability, as he was 
directly associated with that decline as Macmillan's deputy. 
Secondly, Butler was not seen as a 'leader'. 'Macmillan's overriding 
motivation was undoubtedly his determination to block Butler from the succession and 
his consequent wish was to do all he could to secure the leadership for Hailsham". 
Similarly, Fisher believes 'the course of the leadership crisis can only be explained by 
Macmillan's determination that Butler should not succeed him as Prime Nfinister'. 54 
This determination was based on Macmillan's belief that Butler did not have the 
necessary 'steel' to be leader. The definition of 'leadership steel' can be taken to mean 
Butler's indecisiveness, and his perceived inability to lead from the front and direct the 
Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 194 
Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 194 
Shepherd, Iain Macleo ,, p. 307; and Fisher, The ToKy Leaders, p. 102 
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course of the government. Macmillan felt Butler had certain personality characteristics 
that meant he should not become leader, much as Churchill had doubts about Eden's 
temperamental suitability for the Premiership. What Macmillan called Butler's 
4vacillations' were significant. Butler could not provide the definite line needed to keep 
the party together, and both of these are legitimate reasons for Macmillan to oppose 
Iýs succession. Julian Amery, Macmillan's son-in-law and Minister of Aviation, felt 
that Butler was not made of 'officer material. 5' Many in the party, and significantly 
the party hierarchy, agreed with Macmillan. 
Thirdly, Butler was clearly unacceptable to certain influential sections of the 
Conservative Party, and in particular the right-wing. Butler appeared to be a divisive 
candidate, and for this reason, the party hierarchy deemed him unable to unite the 
party. Redmayne informed Macmillan that the opposition to Butler, as expressed in the 
NVs canvass, was 'personal'. 56 This meant that the opposition to him was for both 
personal and political reasons, and Redmayne believed this significantly affected his 
acceptability to the party. Butler traditionally had a capacity for arousing great 
opposition in the party, as he had done in 1957. 
It was already apparent then [June 1963] that Butler suffered 
from the same double handicap in 1963 as he had done in 1957: 
not only were the right implacably opposed to his views, but also 
there was little enthusiasm for him as a potential leader among 
centre and left NTs who agreed with his policy views - in 
55 The Makers of Modem Politics, 3: Rab Butler: Allist of the Possible, BBC Radio Four, 1995 
5'Redmayne to Macmillan, 16 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (12) 
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October the One Nation Group was to decide not to support 
hiM. 57 
This is significant as it meant the opposition was not just confined to the right, 
but a wide feeling across the party was that the new leader should come from the next 
generation of leading Conservatives, like Maudling and Heath. Macmillan was fearful 
of the split that might appear in the party, if Butler succeeded him because of this 
opposition to him. Butler was still tarriished by his image as an appeaser, and this was 
exacerbated by the memories of the Suez Crisis. The party's right wing would not 
accept him as they saw him as weak and dithering because of his conciliatory stances in 
both instances. Furthermore, he was seen by many (not just on the right) as a 'milk 
and water socialist' after his work on the 'New Conservatism' after the 1945 election 
defeat. 58 
The opposition from the party's 'die hard' Imperialist wing was further 
increased by his work in Macmillan's governments. 11is pivotal role in the break-up of 
the Central African Federation (CAF) severely affected his reputation in this influential 
section of the party. When Butler addressed the House of Commons on informing 
them of the agreement for the dissolution of the Federation in July 1963, the 
opposition benches cheered Butler loudly, and he was congratulated on his success by 
the Labour spokesman on Commonwealth Affairs. 'It was all, no doubt, good, clean 
parliamentary fun - but even the amused support of his opponents was a dubious 
blessing for Rab [Butler], given the reputation he had borne for 'milk and water 
5' Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 194 
58 'Private and Confidential. (not for publication) "Industrial Charter or Magna Charter? ". The 
Conservative Industrial Charter attacked by Sir Waldron Smithers, JP, MP, to the authors of the 
Charter. London, July 1947'. Butler MSS RAB H92 (112-145) 
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socialism' ever since the days of The Industrial Charter'. 59 Howard is correct as the 
dissolution of the Central Mrican Federation offended the traditionalist right wing of 
the party, who were opposed to the dissolution of the empire. It exacerbated the 
doubts about Butler by re-stirring memories of accusations levelled at him during the 
appeasement era and the Suez Crisis. These accusations of 'wetness' served as a 
cumulative effect ftom the three episodes, that severely affected Butler's acceptability 
in 1963. 
The level of Butler's unacceptability was apparent to a large extent among the 
Cabinet and the party hierarchy, as well as the party's NVs. The opposition to Butler 
making the Leader's Speech in place of Macmillan is evidence of his unacceptability to 
some members of the Cabinet, and the party's desire not to promote his candidacy to 
succeed Macmillan. Butler had to persuade twelve members of the Cabinet to accept 
his right to make the speech, after he had been warned of the opposition to him making 
the speech by Lord Aldington and Peter Goldman on his arrival in Blackpool on the 
evening of 9 October . 
60 This was significant, as Butler was the obvious choice to 
make the speech as acting Prime Minister in Macmillan's absence, and he was also 
Deputy Prime NEnister. Following the warning from Aldington and Goldman, he 
immediately sought a formal invitation to make the speech from the National Union to 
buttress his claims to doing so. Butler showed a ruthlessness in persuading the Cabinet 
to allow him to accept the invitation, which the Cabinet did eventually grant on the 
evening of 9 October. " This opposition illustrates the doubts about certain ministers' 
"' Howard, RAB, p. 301 
60 Butler, Art Of The Possible. p. 241 
61 Howard, RAB, p. 3 11; and Butler, Art Of The Possible, p. 241 
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support for Butler's candidacy, and questions the level of his acceptability to the 
Cabinet. 
The party hierarchy were also opposed to Butler's succession, and this is clear 
from Macn-dllan's diary notes made during the leadership controversy. The party 
hierarchy were also influenced by Macmillan's implacable opposition to Butler 
succeeding him, and most significantly by the fact that their assessment of the growing 
Home support after Blackpool appeared to be a 'keep out Butler' movement. 
Macmillan also recorded Butler 'was much disliked by the Party Organisation, 
especially the women. Why this is so, no one seems to know'. 62 
ii) Electability 
There were many reasons, linked to his level of acceptability, why Butler was 
deemed to have a poor electability rating. Firstly, his image was too close to 
Macinillan's, and this would affect the party's position at the next general election as 
the Macmillan regime was now widely discredited. This was a factor in his lack of 
electoral appeal, as Macmillan's image had been severely tarnished by the events of 
recent months, including the government's poor handling of the Profumo crisis. If 
Butler succeeded Macmillan, the new goverment would be perceived by the public in 
the same way, and Macmillan had talked of the need for the 'younger men' to emerge 
in the months preceding. 
Macmillan had noted on 15 October that MPs who showed a desire for a move 
to the next generation over the previous summer 'to help with the election', would 
support Maudling or Hailsham, 'since Mr. Butler is not so much of a change as all 
62 Diary entry for 16 October 1963, Ms. Macmillan del). d. 51*, (19) 
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that'. 63 This confinns the poor position that Butler was in because of his close 
association with Macmillan. The practical need for a complete change was duly 
apparent in Macmillan's thinking, and he persuaded Butler that 'they sank or swam 
64 
together' . 
This confirms both the closeness of Macmillan and Butler, and also the 
desperation that the Macmillan regime was in during its final months in office. 
Macmillan's image was one of the reasons for selecting a new leader, and this counted 
strongly against Butler. Secondly, Butler was an uninspiring performer on a public 
platform, and did not appear to be able to lift the party for the next election. A new, 
vigorous image was seen as essential by many NTs if the Conservatives were to win a 
fourth successive election victory. Fisher has argued that Macn-Oan's opposition to 
Butler was 
No doubt based on the view that Butler lacked the steel 
necessary for strong leadership and the inspiration needed to pull 
the Party through a toughly fought election. Many members of 
the Parliamentary Party shared this opinion. Others took the 
opposite view. They believed, in the words of Iain Macleod, that 
Butler had one important asset, apart from his great experience 
of goverment - that he could attract 'wide, understanding 
support from many people outside the Tory Party. And without 
such an appeal, no general election can be won'. 65 
63 Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 15 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (26) 
64 Howard, EM, p. 298 
61 Fisher, The Tory Leaders. p. 102 
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Evidence suggests that Macleod was wrong, and Macmillan was right, and 
many Conservative voters did not believe Butler would appeal to the electorate. 
Macmillan's conviction was that he did not have what it would take to lift the party for 
the forthcoming election. Macmillan made this point to Lord Swinton, an old friend of 
Butler's, who nevertheless felt he 'would lose the election disastrously'. 66 Dilhome 
and Redmayne were against Butler succeeding Macmillan as they felt 'the Party in the 
country will find it depressing'. 67 Public correspondence received on the party 
leadership prior to Macmillan's resignation shows some opposition to Butler for 
electoral reasons, and little support for him, as he does not appear to have inspired 
Conservative voters. One concerned Conservative activist wrote 
What strange death wish has seized so many Conservatives that 
they should contemplate, even for a moment, choosing Rab 
Butler to lead them into an election? With all the qualities of 
integrity and ability that would make a good Prime Minister, he 
is electoral poison! Every time he speaks on the radio he loses us 
thousands of votes, and when he appears on television, tens of 
thousands. I-Iis voice, manner and looks are against him. " 
Butler was not a good public performer; he never seemed to rise to the 
occasion in the same way as Macmillan, so could not rally the party so close to the 
66 Diary entry for 30 September 1963, Ms. Macmillan, dep. d. 50*, (112) 
67 Diary entry for 14 October 1963, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 5 I *. (14) 
68 Leach to Macleod, 10 October 1963 CPA CCO 20/39/1 
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election, and for this reason was not seen to be a viable candidate on his electability 
rating. 
iii) Governability 
Butler was clearly the most successful candidate in terms of governability, and 
there was a great deal based on this criterion to suggest that Dutler was the most 
feasible candidate. However, there were also some significant reasons against, 
alongside the defects in his candidacy for reasons of acceptability and electability. 
Firstly, in support of his candidacy was his wide governmental experience. Fisher noted 
'there is no doubt that Butler was the best qualified of the contenders and none of the 
younger members of the Cabinet in the House of Commons commanded sufficient 
69 
support to defeat him'. Macmillan noted on 15 October that those Ministers and 
NTs who place most emphasis on 'the orderly conduct of government would go for 
Butler' . 
70 Butler had been an effective Minister since Macmillan became Prime 
NEnister in 1957, and his reliance on Butler in times of strain for his government has 
been well documented. Butler often stood in for the leader when he acted as the 
international statesman on tours of the Commonwealth and the United States. He was 
the fixer in Macmillan's governments, and became a source of great strength to him. A 
secret and personal minute from Macmillan to Butler on 7 May 1963 illustrates this. 
It would be a great help to me if you would be prepared to take 
on some of my duties, both on the backroom work of running 
some of the Committees which I have been doing and also on the 
69 Fisher, The Tory Leaders p. 102 
70 Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 15 October 1963 PRO PREM 1115008 (26) 
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formal or representational side ... Anything that you can do to 
relieve me of some of this necessary and important but time- 
consuming work will be a great blessing to me" 
Macrnillan's reliance on Butler can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, he 
genuinely needed the support of Butler, and it was an essential aspect of the successful 
operation of his government. Secondly, he was using Butler's dependability to 
discredit him in the eyes of some sections of the party, for reasons of personal spite. 
Macmillan's choice of Butler to take on the responsibility for the dissolution of the 
Central Affican Federation in March 1962 has been interpreted in this way by Butler's 
former colleagues and analysts of this period. Turner has described the post as a 
72 
epoisoned chalice' . Roy Welensky, the then Prime Minister of the Federation, 
believed that Macmillan's intention in giving Butler the responsibility for the break-up 
of CAF, was to discredit him in the eyes of the right-wing of the Conservative Party. 
Now that I am no longer in office I think I can say to you that I, 
of course, fully realised how difficult was the task that Macmillan 
gave you and as I said to you in your office I was convinced that 
he did it in the hope that it would break you73 
Macmillan recognised fiill well that the responsibility for the break-up of CAF 
would discredit Butler in the eyes of the party's imperialist wing, who were already 
" 'Secret and Personal. My Dear Rab'. Signed H. M. (Macmillan). 7 May 1963 CPA CCO 20/8/6* 
and _CCO20/8/7 71 Turner, Macmillan, p. 186 
73 Welensky to Butler, 3 January 1964 Butler MSS RAB G41(36) 
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hostile because of his behaviour during the Suez Crisis, and for his reputation as a 
Munichite. However, Macmillan's appointment can be viewed in a more charitable 
perspective, as his government had been beset by problems with CAR Butler was 
viewed by Macmillan as the only Minister capable of solving the problem. The 
evidence suggests this to have been the case, and the allegations of personal spite can 
be dismissed. 
Butler had illustrated his ability to be a competent minister throughout his 
career, as President of the Board of Education from 1941-44, as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer from 1951-1955, and as Home Secretary from 1957-1962. However, in 
1963, Butler, in the same way as in 1957, did not occupy a 'great office of state'. He 
was First Secretary of State and Nfinister for Central Affica, and tlýs affected his 
governability rating. Butler, despite being Macmillan's most senior minister, gave the 
impression of a career in decline, away from and not towards the summit of political 
office. Alongside a wish widely held in the party for a leader of the next generation of 
leading Conservatives, this counted strongly against Butler. 
Home 
i) Acceptability 
Home was deemed by the party hierarchy as the candidate most acceptable to 
the party for a variety of reasons. Firstly, he was acceptable to those sections of the 
party who were strongly opposed to other candidates. Following his canvass of 
Conservative NVs, Redmayne informed Macmillan that the opposition to Home 
expressed in the canvass only arose from his position as a Lord, and was not personal, 
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as it was for Butler and Hailsham. 74 This was significant, as it illustrated to Redmayne 
that Home was held in high regard in the party, and was generally acceptable as 
Macmillan's successor. Macmillan's diary entries during the leadership crisis show that 
the party hierarchy felt this general acceptability was the most significant feature of 
support for Home. On 14 October, Macmillan recorded that Dilhorne and Redmayne 
told him that they supported Home's succession as support for Hailsham, which had 
evaporated after his flamboyant displays of showmanship at Blackpool, was moving 
towards Home. Macmillan noted 
The movement against Hogg (on this account) had not gone to 
Butler or Maudling, but to Home. The "draft" Home movement 
was in reality a "keep out" Butler movement. I was struck by the 
fact that both Lord Chancellor and Chief Wýhip agreed on this 
analysis and both are, or were supporters of the Hogg succession. 
Both are against the Butler succession on the grounds that the 
Party in the country will find it depressing75 
In other words, Home appeared to unite all sections of party opinion that were 
against other candidates. This level of general acceptability comes through prominently 
in the canvasses, and justified the party hierarchy's support for him. This led to the 
second reason for Home's acceptability. He was the compromise candidate who 
appeared to unite all sections of party opinion. Even in the constituencies where 
awareness of Home as a candidate for the leadership was minimal, Lord Chelmer and 
74 Redmayne to Macmillan, 16 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (12) 
75 Diary note for 14 October 1963, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 51*, (14) 
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Mrs. Shepherd of the NUCUA 'were certain everyone would rally around Lord 
Home'. 76 This further galvanised the party hierarchy's certainty that he was the most 
acceptable candidate, as opinion in the constituencies was split between Butler and 
Hailsham. Macmillan conveyed this growing certainty among the party hierarchy, and 
'the truth is that with the three main "hats" in the ring (Butler, Maudling and 
Hailsham) and the very strong feeling both for and against each, were excited by their 
candidature, the only way out was a "compromise' candidate. Lord Home was the 
only compromise candidate possible'. 77 
Macmillan's diaries illustrate the extent of Conservative MPs' support for 
Home's succession as the compromise candidate. On 16 October, Macmillan saw Peter 
Thomeycroft, Minister of Defence; Boyle; Lloyd; Hare; Brooke; and Sir Keith Joseph, 
NEnister of Housing and Local Government. Only Lloyd declared his outright support 
for Home. However, Macmillan noted, 'practically all of these Ministers, whether 
Hoggites or Butlerites or Maudlingites, agreed that if Lord Home would undertake the 
task of P. M. the whole Cabinet and the whole Party would cheerfiilly unite under him. 
Sandys (Commonwealth Sec. ) feels this especially strongly'. " Once the new leader 
was in place the party would unite around him, and as Home appeared the most 
acceptable to all sections of party opinion, he was deemed the most acceptable 
candidate. However, did this general acceptance constitute real support for Home as a 
leader of the party? In Redmayne's canvass, second and third preferences showed a 
clear lead for Home over Butler, but a question must be asked: what if most of this 
76 Diary entry for 17 October 1963, Ms. Macmillan dev. d. 5 1*. (22) 
77 Diary entry for 20 October 1963, Ms. Macmillan deR. d. 5 1*, (33). Emphasis on original document. 
78 Diary entry for 16 October 1963, Ms. Macmillan dep. d. 51 . (20) 
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lead consisted of third preferences, and if this was the case, surely it questions Home's 
level of acceptability. 
The 'Midnight Meeting' opposition established that at least eight members of 
the Cabinet strongly opposed Home's appointment . 
79 This questions Dilhorne's 
assessment of the extent of Cabinet support for him. It appears to be the case that 
Macmillan and the party hierarchy felt that the general acceptance for Home was more 
significant than Cabinet support for Butler, as the Cabinet would unite around Home 
once he was in place as leader. It is apparent that the factors against Butler counted for 
Home's acceptability. On 15 October 1963, Macn-dllan noted that the Cabinet would 
be universally behind Home as he is popular, and would make 'an effective chief. " 
Despite the questions that have been asked of the canvasses, the party wanted Home 
more than Butler, and there was a lack of real opposition from the party as a whole to 
Home's emergence, reflected in the broad cross section of support for him. Home was 
also acceptable to the party as a stop-gap leader, as the older, domestic ministers in the 
Macmillan government, like Butler, were now discredited. The younger, new 
generation of leading Conservatives, like Maudling and Heath, were also not yet felt to 
be ready, and would be discredited by leading the party into the next election, which 
the Conservatives were widely expected to lose. Thus, Home's position was as a stop- 
gap leader, acceptable as he was Foreign Secretary in Macmillan's government, and 
not tarnished to the same extent with the domestic failures. This was aligned with his 
position as the compromise candidate, and galvanised his level of acceptability. 
Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 204 
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ii) Electability 
Home was deemed by the party hierarchy as the candidate with the highest 
level of electability. This was for two reasons. Firstly, he had a clean reputation, and 
was untarnished by the scandals that had beset Macn-Oan's government in recent 
years. He was seen as enough of a change to mark a clear distinction between 
Macmillan's government, and any future administration. This would be a clear 
electoral advantage, as Home was the stop-gap between the discredited senior 
domestic ministers like Butler, and the next generation of Maudling and Heath, who 
were felt to be not yet ready for the leadership. 
Ramsden has noted that Home had 'few political enemies and hardly anyone 
suspected him of underhand motives', and that 'after the recent claims against public 
life, this was Home's strongest suit'. 81 This was true not only in terms of his 
acceptability, but it also had positive electoral connotations. The party hierarchy felt 
Home could persuade floating Conservative voters, tempted to vote for Labour, to 
vote Conservative, as he marked a clear distinction from Macmillan's regime, and did 
not appear to give offence to any section of the population. However, Home's position 
as a Lord did not give the Conservatives the new image that the party had hoped for. 
The party hierarchy do not appear to have been concerned by this, and felt he was a 
good stop-gap leader, and was not likely to cause grave offence. The fact that the 
Conservatives were widely expected to lose the election may also have led them not to 
give too much concern to this matter. The second reason was Home's high profile in 
the goverrunent as Foreign Secretary. As he was not in charge of one of the key 
domestic posts, Home was not as tarnished with the domestic failures of 1962 and 
81 Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 201 
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1963 as Butler. Home was also widely known because of his role in the Cuban NEssile 
Crisis, and Ws growing prominence as a international statesman could be emphasised 
to the electorate. 
iii) Governability 
Home was not as pron-dnent as Butler in governability, but had more years of 
experience than Maudling. However, Home did currently hold one of the 'great offices 
of state', the Foreign Office. This meant he, despite his position as a Lord, was in one 
of the traditional avenues to the leadership of the party. I-Es lack of experience in 
domestic posts obviously counted against his governability, but his position as Foreign 
Secretary was a positive attribute that contributed to his candidacy. Another significant 
aspect of his governability was the reputation he gained as Foreign Secretary with 
leading world statesmen. On 15 October 1963, Macmillan noted that Home 
represented the 'old governing class at its best', and that he was well liked by 
President Kennedy, Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, and President Gromyko. 82 
This was felt by the party hierarchy to be a major attribute to Home's status in the 
selection, and meant that he could continue the emphasis placed by the Macmillan 
government on the importance of foreign affairs. 
82 Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 15 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (28) 
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Maudling 
i) Acceptability 
Maudling was deemed to be unacceptable to the party for two main reasons. 
The first was that he was not inspiring enough to unite it, and lead it to victory in the 
general election. This was expressed in the canvass of Conservative NTs. Redmayne 
informed Macmillan that there was little personal opposition to Maudling, but he failed 
to get 'official positive support'. There was a feeling expressed that Maudling was not 
ready to be leader, and not inspiring enough. 93 This was confirmed to the party by his 
poor speech at the Party Conference. This lacklustre performance confirmed that 
Maudling was not acceptable as an inspirational leader that would be of value at the 
next election. The second reason why Maudling was unacceptable was that he was not 
yet felt to be ready for the leadership. This had been expressed in Redmayne's canvass 
of Conservative NTs, and Maudling was seen as the 'leader-in-waiting', who required 
more experience in government before becoming leader. 
ii) Electability 
Maudling was deemed to be unelectable by the party hierarchy for the same 
reasons that he was unacceptable. These were firstly, that he was an uninspiring 
performer on a public platform. 'No one felt that he could convert the uncommitted or 
84 
inspire the faithful to an electoral victory' . This was the view of the party hierarchy, 
and they felt this most prominently after Maudling's speech as Chancellor in the debate 
on economic policy at the Party Conference. Maudling's speech, as has been 
demonstrated, was poor in its delivery, and minimal in its impact on the conference 
83 Redmayne to Macmillan, 16 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (12) 
94 Fisher, The Toly Leaders p. 104 
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delegates. This was felt by the party hierarchy to give an indication of how Maudling 
would fail to inspire the party and the electorate at the imminent general election. 
He was also felt to be not yet ready for the leadership, and was the 'leader-in- 
waiting'. As noted, this was a view that was confirmed to the party hierarchy in the 
canvass of Conservative NTs, and they felt this was also a view held among 
Conservative voters. However, public correspondence received by Conservative 
Central Office illustrated that Maudling was a popular choice with a number of 
Conservative voters, from the summer of 1963 to the period of the selection. In July 
1963, T. W. Warburton, the President of the Shipley Division Conservative 
Association, informed Macleod that his executive believed that the Conservatives 
could still win the next election, but 'the essential prerequisite is youthful, virile and 
competent leadership, which must not be long delayed and the one who can meet this 
requirement and restore the party's fortunes is the Rt. Hon. Reg Maudling'. 
Conservative MP Evelyn Emmet informed Macleod on 4 October that opinion in her 
constituency felt that Macmillan should retire, and there was ninety per cent support 
for Maudling to replace him, and this was most prominent amongst the younger 
voters. " This last point is of major significance. The prominence of Maudling's 
popularity among younger voters was a concern of the party hierarchy, and they 
believed that older and traditional Conservative voters felt that Home was a better 
option than Maudling, as a stop-gap leader to get the party through the next election. 
It was felt that a further period in opposition was needed for Maudling or Heath to 
prepare them to take over the leadership. 
85 Ruskin to Poole, 6 October 1963; and Warburton to Poole, 31 July 1963 CPA CCO 20/3 9/1 
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iii) Govemability 
Maudling achieved the governability criterion to some extent, as he was I 
currently in a 'great office of state', as Chancellor of the Exchequer. This was also a 
traditional avenue to the leadership, and he had been perceived as a success as 
Chancellor, especially following his 1963 Budget which had coincided with an increase 
in support for Iým to succeed Macn-dllan among Conservative Ws. This suggests 
there was a clear link between the two. Maudling had also been a successful minister in 
Macmillan's government, as Colonial Secretary, so had a considerable amount of 
ministerial experience. However, as with Maudling's acceptability and electability, he 
was felt to be too inexperienced for the leadership, and needed a further period of 
consolidation in government or opposition, to prepare him for the leadership. The 
imminence of the general election was also a factor in this feeling, because if Maudling 
became leader and was defeated at the election, this. would affect his standing and his 
govemabUity over a longer period past the general election. 
Hailsham 
i) Acceptability 
Hailsham became an unacceptable candidate after his conduct and actions at 
the Party Conference. Evidence suggests that he was felt to be unacceptable in many 
quarters of the party and the Conservative voters before then, but his actions at 
Blackpool confirmed and strengthened these doubts. Hailsham was most unacceptable 
to the party hierarchy and the more traditional Conservative voters, while he appeared 
to be acceptable among younger Conservative Ngs and voters because of his high 
profile, and his ability at electioneering and publicity. 
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The doubts over Hailsham's temperament and judgement were central to this 
unacceptability, which was impressed on the party after his conduct at the Party 
Conference. His obvious desire and excitement at the prospect of becoming party 
leader led to an over-enthusiastic promotion of his candidacy, epitomised by the 
conduct of his supporters, especially by Randolph Churchill's distribution of 
badges, and Hailsham's parading of his baby daughter at the conference. This offended 
many of the party's senior figures, and raised doubts about his temperament for high 
office. On 15 October 1963, Macmillan noted that there were many pro-Hailsham 
Conservative NTs especially from northern and the most threatened constituencies. 
They were from the constituencies that could only be won by non-political votes. 
Macmillan, however, also noted that the senior figures in the constituency associations 
were alarmed by the 'demonstrations of pro-Hailshamism', but that support for him 
fforn the constituencies would still be great. 86 This demonstrates that Hailsharn was 
acceptable to the younger section of the party, but most crucially he was not to the 
party's senior figures and the party hierarchy, and after the Party Conference, they 
turned their attention to Home. 
ii) Electability 
Hailsham was initially seen as the most electable candidate, but as with the 
decline in his acceptability, his electability fell drastically after the Party Conference. In 
the summer of 1963, Macmillan believed Hailsham to be the best available successor 
because of his electability. Hailsham had a high profile in the country, and had 
demonstrated his electioneering ability in his role as Party Chairman during the 1959 
" Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 15 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (30) 
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election campaign. 'In 1963, he [Macmillan] picked out Hailsham, seeing in him (as he 
wrote in October), 'what I was like in my stronger period, am to a greater extent than 
people appreciate behind the scenes, and would like my successor to be'. Macrnillan 
then tried to rise Hailsham's profile further, and all his roles from then on, especially 
the Test Ban Treaty negotiations, were to raise his profile and widen his Mnisterial 
experience. 
87 
Macmillan noted on 15 October 1963, that Hailsham would have a 'mass of 
feeling' in favour of him as a better opponent to Wilson, 'indeed the only one we 
have'. He noted that this was a vital consideration in the marginal seats, and the many 
safe seats under threat. 88 But, following the party conference, the doubts about 
Hailsharn led Macmillan to turn his attention to Home. Dilhorne stated to Macmillan 
on 8 October 1963 that if he retired 'the only hope is Quintin [Hailsham]', as he was 
well known throughout the country, and they would have a better chance with him 
than Maudling in the general election. " However, for all the positive effect that 
Hailsham"s electioneering and publicity skills had on his candidacy prior to the Party 
Conference, the poor temperament and judgement that he displayed there raised 
doubts about his candidacy, and ended it. Fisher noted 
'Quintin Hailsham had been a splendid Chairman of the Party. He 
was uniquely capable of rousing the enthusiasm of the 
constituency workers and had made a significant contribution to 
the Conservative victory in 1959 ... [colleagues] acknowledged 
Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 195 
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that he would make an inspiring leader of the party at a general 
election, but they questioned his judgement, should the 
Conservatives win it, as the leader of the nation'. 9' 
These doubts over the consequences of a Hailsham leadership were of critical 
significance in the decline of his candidacy. Another central factor in this decline was 
Ws offending of traditional Conservative voters by his actions at the Party Conference, 
and this loss of a bedrock of Conservative support was seen by the party hierarchy as a 
major factor against Hailsham's candidacy. Public correspondence on the party 
leadership prior to Macmillan's resignation illustrate public doubts about Hailsharn, 
that it can be assumed were exacerbated by his behaviour at the Party Conference. One 
concerned voter wrote to Central Office 
For God sake is no common sense at all left in the leaders of the 
Party. Hailsham alienated the bulk of the electorate by twice 
showing himself on television as a man who was unable to 
control himself, much less control the Tory Party. In fact, you 
may as well suggest Jack Profumo as your next likely chief, 
indeed even he to many would be less obnoxious than this 
wildest paranoiac. 91 
Another voter from Kent declared, 'a Tory representative of cross section of 
thinking opinion appalled at thought of possibility of a 'ham actor' becoming Prime 
90 Fisher, The Torv Leaders p. 102 
91 Ruskin to Poole, 6 October 1963 CPA CCO 20/39/1 
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Nfinister. Stop Hailsham at all costs. Anyone else preferable to appeal to logic and not 
hysterical emotion'. 92 The expression of these types of views all counted against 
Hailsham's electability. 
iii) Governability 
The doubts expressed by the party hierarchy and Conservative voters about 
Hailsham's temperament and judgement meant he had the lowest rating of the 
candidates in tenns of governability. Another factor against Hailsham was his lack of 
senior ministerial experience, and the fact that he was not in a 'great office of state'. 
He had been Party Chairman during the 1959 election campaign, and had become 
NEnister of Science following that appointment, and was Leader of the House of 
Lords. Hailsham was, therefore, not in a traditional avenue to the leadership, and did 
not have senior govemment experience. This affected his govemability, but his poor 
temperament and judgement were of more importance to the party hierarchy. As 
previously stated, this was confirmed by his actions at the party conference, and the 
doubts expressed by the US government also galvanised this impression. As noted, 
David Ormsby-Gore informed Home in October 1963 that the US government had 
doubts about Hailsham's temperamental suitability for the leadership and Prime 
NEnistership, and when Home told Macmillan of these doubts on 15 October, 
Hailsham's candidacy was finished. The US officials felt Hailsharn was 'a difficult 
partner, unwilling to accept his secondary role, and with his lawyer's instinct for the 
detail of the small print, dragging out negotiation on minor points and almost losing 
the backing on major points' . 
93 Ormsby-Gore had told Home that 'if Lord Hailsham 
92 Henson to Macleod, 11 October 1963 CPA CCO 2013 9/1 
9' Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 267 
263 
was made Prime Nfinister this would be a tremendous blow to Anglo-American 
relations and would in fact end the special relationsbýip'. "' The US government had 
major doubts about Hailsham's governability, and this led to Macmillan's decision to 
promote Home as his sole preference, especially in conjunction vvith Hailsham's 
behaviour at the Party Conference. 
Following tl-ýs revelation, Macmillan noted on 15 October 1963, that Hailsham 
loses on the governability rating, because of his impulsiveness and arrogant 
interference. 9' Fisher noted the effect of Hailsham's antics at the Party Conference on 
perceptions of his ability to govern, as 'his lack of judgement seemed confirmed and 
his too-evident eagerness for the Premiership ensured that he would not achieve it. His 
bandwagon came to a halt almost as soon as it had started to roll'. 96 On 16 October, 
MacnUan noted that Keith Joseph was, 'fearful of Hogg's [HAsham's] eccentricities, 
especially in foreign affairs'. 97 These doubts about Hailsharn's temperament for the 
highest office of goverment were prevalent, and were central to the failure of his 
candidacy. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the leadersbýp selection occurred at an 
inconvenient place in the electoral cycle for the party, as a general election was 
imminent within twelve months. The Peerage Act of 1963 was a vital situational factor 
as it meant that Home and Hailsham could stand as candidates for the leadership, and 
without the Act, Butler or Maudling would have succeeded. The selection process was 
94 'Top Secret Note for the Record' in the Stockton Papers in Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, pp. 298- 
299 
95 Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 15 October 1963 PRO PREM 11/5008 (26) 
96 Fisher, The Tory Leaders, p. 103 
9' Diary entry for 16 October 1963 Ms. Macmillan deR. d. 51* (20) 
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the most complex and extensive in the party's history, and it's nature contributed to 
Home's victory. This was because it demonstrated fully the opposition to the other 
candidates, and the general acceptability of Home as the stop-gap, compromise 
candidate. Tfids was especially apparent with Dilhome's canvass of the Cabinet, which 
maximised the opposition to the other candidates, that may or may not have existed, 
and demonstrated Home's acceptability. The informal networks were important in the 
selection process, as they disseminated information to the candidates on their prospects 
of succeeding Macmillan, and also prepared the party and the public for the emergence 
of Home. 
Home was deemed to fulfil the core criteria of acceptability, electability, and 
governability, better than the other candidates because of the opposition to them in the 
party, and the weaknesses of their performances at the Party Conference. In particular, 
Butler's weaknesses were fully exposed, and his position in the party was perceived to 
have fallen away from the summit, and Maudling was not yet felt to be ready to 
succeed to the leadership. Thýis explains Home's appointment as the stop-gap 
compromise leader, to take the party through the inuninent election. 
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Conclusion 
The Outcomes: Assessment 
The conclusion to the study is in three parts. The first is an assessment of the 
outcome of the 1957 selection of Macmillan. The second is an assessment of the 
outcome of the 1963 selection of Home as party leader. The third analyses the parallels 
and distinctions between the two selections, and what the outcomes illustrate about 
how the Conservative Party selects its leaders in different situations and circumstances. 
The 1957 Leadership Selection 
Macmillan was chosen to succeed Eden in preference to Butler, as he was the 
most acceptable candidate to the party. He offered the best prospects of re-uniting the 
party and restoring its morale. Butler's unacceptability to sections of the party, as 
illustrated by the existence of a distinct 'anti-Butler' faction among Conservative M[Ps, 
showed Macmillan's acceptability, in comparison to the hostility Butler aroused in the 
party. However, an analysis based solely on Macmillan's ability to unite the party does 
not fully explain the outcome of the 1957 selection. It does not acknowledge the 
influence of wider individual and situational criteria on the outcome. The analysis of 
these criteria has demonstrated that the outcome of the contest is more fully explained 
by an emphasis on three criteria. These are the actions of the candidates during the 
Suez Crisis and its aftermath, the situation that the party was in because of the failure 
of the government's policy during the Suez Crisis, and the selection procedure, 
particularly the role of informal networks on the outcome. The wider individual and 
situational criteria determined how the core situational criteria would be judged. 
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The actions of Macmillan and Butler during the Suez Crisis were of particular 
importance in the outcome of the selection. Tl-ýs was because Butler's conduct raised 
doubts about his qualifications for the leadership, and also caused great opposition to 
him in the Cabinet, and among the party's NPs. Butler's conduct at the 1922 
Committee meeting of 22 November 1956 was of massive significance in his failure to 
succeed Eden, as it constituted the 'campaign' for the party's support in the aftermath 
of the crisis, because the leadership selection was now widely expected. Butler's poor 
performance in defending and explaining the government's policy to the Committee, 
confirmed to the party's Ws that he did not have the necessary qualities to be party 
leader, while Macmillan showed that he did. Butler's inability to inspire the party, or 
unite it with hope for Conservative prospects, made him unacceptable to Conservative 
NTs, and demonstrated that he may not be an electable leader because he could not 
inspire the electorate. Butler's conduct as acting Prime NEnister exacerbated his 
unacceptability to the party's MlPs. The Suez Group of Conservative NTs focused 
their dissent on Butler after the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone on 3 
December 1956. This large group of NTs, who had supported the goverriment's 
aggressive response to Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, now 
opposed Butler as successor to Eden. They constituted a large part of the 'anti-Butler' 
faction on the Conservative back-benches. 
In contrast, Macmillan's conduct during the Suez Crisis and its aftermath, 
showed he was the most acceptable candidate to the Cabinet and Conservative NTs. 
The section on Macmillan's conduct during the early stages of the crisis, prior to the 
invasion, shows that Macmillan cannot be accused of 'conspiring' towards the 
leadership before the 6 November signal of the cease-fire in the Canal Zone. This is 
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contrary to some existing analysis that suggests Macmillan deliberately led Eden into 
the crisis to cause his downfall. Following the cease-fire, Macmillan did see the 
', %rindow of opportunity' to stake his claim on the leadership, but an analysis based on 
Macmillan 'conspiring' against Eden before then, does not contribute to an explanation 
of the outcome. 
Macmillan's conduct at the 1922 Committee meeting of 22 November was 
central to his acceptability. He invigorated Conservative NTs with a rallying cry that 
offered hope, and he made the outcome of the crisis appear as a victory of sorts. 
Macmillan was viewed as the exceptional politician who could save the party from its 
present difficulties. He also presented himself as a good option as a stop-gap leader, 
who could restore party unity in the current circumstances. The short-term nature of 
the vision for the future of the party hierarchy, Cabinet and NTs, contributed to the 
outcome of the selection, as it was widely expected that the party would fall because of 
the crisis. Macmillan's actions at that meeting, and during Eden's absence, appeared to 
unite ministers and back-benchers behind his candidacy, and he became a rallying-point 
for those NTs opposed to the continuation of Eden's leadership. 
The situation that the party was faced with also contributed significantly to the 
outcome. This was because the state of great division in the party, caused by the 
government's policy during the crisis, meant that a leader who could unite it was 
urgently required. Party unity is always a vital consideration in leadership selection, but 
this becomes of paramount significance in selections when a party is in vast state of 
disunity. Macmillan's ability to unite the party was vital to the outcome of the 
selection. The electoral cycle was also in the Conservative's favour as a general 
election was not imminent, and did not have to be held until May 1960. This meant 
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that if the party united behind the new leader, it could still be successful at the next 
election, if the memories of the Suez Crisis had been erased from the minds of the 
electorate. This contributed to the outcome as Macmillan showed at the 1922 
Committee meeting that he may be more able than Butler to eradicate the Suez Crisis 
from the political landscape. The selection procedure was an influential situational 
factor, and this was especially the case with the informal networks of the procedure. 
The formal selection procedure was uncomplicated, and resolved the selection in less 
than twenty-four hours, and limited possible dissent to Macmillan's appointment. It 
illustrated that he was by far the most acceptable candidate to the Cabinet. 
Macmillan fulfilled the core situational criteria of acceptability, electability and 
governability, while Butler did not. Butler was unacceptable because of the lack of 
Cabinet support for him, and the existence of the 'anti-Butler' faction among 
Conservative NPs. The doubts about his candidacy aroused by the Suez Crisis, re- 
stirred criticisms levelled at Butler during the appeasement era. I-Es conduct during the 
Suez Crisis was all important, and served to accumulate and intensify the doubts about 
his acceptability. Butler was also unelectable because he did not convince the party 
hierarchy, Cabinet or NTs that he could lift the party at a general election. He did not 
fulfil the governability criteria, as he was not in a 'great office of state', as Macmillan 
was, and his career appeared to be moving away from, not towards the leadership. 
In contrast, MacnUan fulfilled the three core criteria, as he was acceptable to 
the party, and demonstrated better prospects of uniting it as there was no anti- 
Macmillan faction in the party. - The vast majority of the Cabinet supported his 
candidacy because he was best able to fit the requirements of the situation that the 
party found itself in. The notion of Macn-ffllan as a stop-gap leader also contributed to 
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his acceptability. Macmillan was the most electable candidate, and he demonstrated 
this at the 1922 Committee meeting by his ability to uplift the party. This was of vital 
importance despite the time before an election had to be called, as the party needed to 
regain public support after the Suez Crisis. Macmillan also fulfilled the govemability 
criterion, as he was in a 'great office of state, and was on a traditional career path 
towards the leadership. The outcome of the 1957 selection can be easily explained 
because of Macmillan's acceptability to the party over Butler, but a fuller analysis 
demonstrates the nature of the influence of individual and situational criteria on the 
outcome of the selection. 
The 1963 Leadership Selection 
Bogdanor has argued that 'there is no evidence that the result seriously 
misrepresented Conservative opinion'. ' This is a correct assessment in the sense that 
Home was generally acceptable to the party, and was in a position to unite it, as 
opinion was divided over the other candidates. However, an analysis based solely on 
Home's ability to unite the party does not fully explain the outcome of the 1963 
selection. The analysis of the individual and situational criteria have shown that Home 
was selected leader for a variety of reasons. Three criteria appear to be of the most 
significance: the candidates' actions and conduct during the selection, the situation that 
the party was in, and the selection procedure that was used to select Home. As with 
the 1957 selection, these wider individual and situational criteria determined how the 
core criteria would be judged. 
1 Bogdanor, 'The Selection of The Party Leader' in Seldon/Ball (eds. ), Conservative Century p. 79 
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The actions of the candidates were of importance as the actions of Butler, 
Hailsham, and Maudling, allowed Home to emerge as leader. Their 'campaigns' at the 
Party Conference had a negative effect on their candidacies, while Home conducted 
himself well, and as he did not appear prominently then as a candidate. Home was 
pressured to put himself forward by the party's senior figures because of the 
weaknesses of the other candidates, and his own sound performance at the conference. 
Butler and Maudling's poor conference speeches, and the over-enthusiasm of Hailsham 
and his supporters to promote his candidacy offended the party hierarchy. It also raised 
doubts about his suitability for the leadership, as the party was not then conducive to 
campaigns for the leadership. Butler and Maudling confirmed what had been suspected 
by the party hierarchy, that they would not be able to inspire the party to victory at the 
inuninent election. 
The broad situational requirements of a leader not directly associated with the 
domestic failures of the discredited Macmillan regime, and the imminence of a general 
election, counted against Butler. This was because he was directly associated with 
Macmillan, and was tarnished by 'guilt by association'. Maudling suffered from tMs for 
different reasons. He had shown with his conference speech that he was not a leader 
who could inspire the party and the electorate at the next election, and he was not yet 
felt to be ready for the leadership. The broad requirements, therefore, led attention to 
be focused on Home as a stop-gap, compromise leader who could take the party 
through the next election. This was felt after his performance at the Party Conference, 
as it was believed he could attract the electorate as he was inoffensive, was not directly 
associated with the domestic failures of the last Macmillan govemment as he was 
Foreign Secretary, and was a competent minister who could unite the party. 
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The selection procedure served to enhance and promote Home's candidacy, 
and emphasise the weaknesses of the other candidates. The use of multiple questions 
and multiple canvasses, and the nature of the inquiries made, inflated support for Home 
as the generally acceptable candidate who could unite all sections of the party. Home's 
position as the compromise candidate, was confirmed by the opposition expressed by 
significant areas of party opinion to Butler, Maudling and Hailsham. Redmayne's 
canvass demonstrated that there was opposition to Butler, Hailsham and Maudling in 
the party, and that Home was held with genuine regard in all sections of the party, and 
Redmayne interpreted this as an endorsement of his candidacy. 
Dilhorne's canvass of the Cabinet inflated the support in the Cabinet for Home. 
This was illustrated by the 'Midnight Meeting' opposition, and the Cabinet appeared to 
have been split equally between Home and Butler. However, Dilhorne, like Redmayne, 
took genuine regard for Home as an endorsement of his candidacy. This canvass was 
the most significant, as it illustrated to the party hierarchy that Home was most 
acceptable to his Cabinet colleagues, and galvanised his candidacy. The informal 
networks of the selection procedure were important, as they informed Butler that he 
was not a viable candidate to succeed Macmillan, and convinced Home that he was the 
compron-ýise candidate that the party hierarchy wanted. 
The three core criteria of acceptability, electability and governability were 
determined by the above criteria, and Home fulfilled all three to an extent. The most 
important were acceptability and electability, but Home also fulfilled governability as 
he was Foreign Secretary. The other candidates did not fulfil acceptability and 
electability, and tWs was crucial to Home's emergence. Butler, Hailsham and Maudling 
did not fulfil these criteria, because of the opposition that Butler and Hailsham aroused 
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in the party. Maudling and Butler were not seen as inspiring enough to lift the party 
for the imminent election, and Hailsham failed both criteria because of the doubts 
about his temperament and judgement that were caused by his actions at the Blackpool 
Conference. Butler and Maudling did fulfil the govemability criterion, but were judged 
on the other two. Home became leader because he filled the broad requirements of the 
situation, his actions at the Party Conference, the crucial role of the selection 
procedure, and his resultant fulfilment of acceptability, electability, and governability. 
This confirmed him as the compromise candidate, because of the weaknesses of the 
other candidates. 
The Outcomes: Situational Parallels and Distinctions 
The analysis of the two selections demonstrates that there were clear parallels 
and distinctions in the influence of individual and situational criteria on both selections. 
However, one aspect is clearly common to both selections. The wider individual and 
situational criteria set the basic terms of reference on which the core criteria of 
acceptability, electability, and governability were judged. The individual criteria were 
of more weight in the 1957 selection because of the longer period involved in 
influencing the outcome. The 1957 selection was influenced by the six months from the 
start of the Suez Crisis in July 1956, until the resignation of Eden in January 1957. 
This has led to, and justifies, the extra weight given to the candidates' actions in the 
analysis of the 1957 selection, as opposed to the two months of September and 
October 1963 that influenced the 1963 selection. 
It is apparent in both selections that the candidates' actions were central to the 
outcomes. The main examples of this are Butler and Macmillan's conduct at the 1922 
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Committee meeting of 22 November 1956, and the conduct of Butler, Home, 
Maudling and Hailsham at the Party Conference during the 1963 selection. As these 
constituted the 'campaigns' that are normally evident in formal leadership elections, 
this points to the importance of candidates' actions in the outcomes of all leadership 
selections. It also illustrates the need for a full systematic analysis of the candidates' 
actions, which has been conducted in this study, yet is a feature lacking in existing 
analyses of leadersfiýp selections. 
Both selections illustrate that a long career and wide experience as a member of 
the goverment do not weigh in a candidates favour, unless they are in a high position 
in the party at the time of the selection. This usually means being in one of the 'great 
offices of state', and Butler's move away from the summit of government at the time 
of both selections contributes to an explanation of why he failed to become party 
leader in 1957 and 1963. The perception of a career in decline was pivotal to Butler's 
unattractiveness to the party. 
The situations were distinct in 1957 from 1963, as the electoral cycle was in the 
party's favour in 1957, as an election was not imminent. In 1963, an election was due 
to held within the next twelve months, and this put pressure on the party to make a 
choice as leader who could win that election. This is obviously always an important 
consideration in leadership selection, but the imminence of an election increases the 
importance of electability. Evidence suggests that the party still chose to make a stop- 
gap appointment in 1957, as in 1963, and this is indicative of the general manner in 
which the Conservative Party selects its leaders in situations of domestic crisis. 
In 1963, the party was in a more deep-seated spiral of decline than in 1957, as 
the party had been in power for twelve years, and thus six and a half years more than 
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they had been in 1957. The decline was also more long-term, and constituted a general 
domestic political crisis in 1963, while in 1957, the party was in trouble because of one 
crisis on foreign policy. This distinction between general domestic upheaval, and a 
specific foreign crisis led to a harsher verdict on the government in 1963, and less 
optirnism for a rejuvenation in fortunes. The party was clearly greatly divided at the 
time of both selections, but the situation in 1957 led to greater hopes for a recovery, if 
the crisis could be eradicated quickly from the domestic scene. This was far more 
difficult to achieve in 1963. The party's recovery in 1957, resulting in the massive 
1959 election victory suggests this, when compared to the party's defeat in 1964, 
despite the closeness of the result of that election. 
The informal networks of the selection procedure used in 1957 were of more 
importance than the formal selection procedure, in contrast to 1963. This was because 
the formal selection process was far shorter, taking less than twenty-four hours to 
complete, as compared to the eleven days of the 1963 selection process. The 1957 
selection process was also far less complex, as it was predominantly a straight Cabinet 
choice, as opposed to the multi-faceted canvasses of Cabinet and party opinion used in 
1963. The nature of the enquiries made in 1957 was far simpler. This simplicity of the 
selection process led to the greater importance of the informal networks in 1957, as 
they served to illustrate the full extent of party opposition to Butler that confirmed, 
and exacerbated the doubts of the Cabinet, as expressed in the formal selection 
procedure. This is a clear distinction to that used in 1963, as these doubts from outside 
the Cabinet were established in the formal selection process by Redmayne's canvass of 
the party's NVs. 
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The Cabinet was canvassed for the first time in 1957, and in all previous 
selections, informal networks had dominated exclusively. Informal networks retained 
their dorninance in 1957, but the consultations of the Cabinet started a trend that was 
entrenched in 1963, and led towards the more formal procedure that was used to select 
Home. The fact that there were more candidates, and a less obvious successor, in 
1963, also contributed to the formalised procedure. This was the basis for the formal 
election procedure established to select Home's successor, Edward Heath in 1965. It is 
clear that the situation and circumstances of both selections were central to the 
selection procedure that was used, as there was growing pressure for greater 
accountability in the party. 
The informal networks in the party remained of great importance in the 
selection procedure of 1963, but they took on a different form, in line with the 
formalised nature of the selection process. The advice of the outgoing leader, a 
common feature of most selections where there is no heir apparent, took the form of 
an extensive canvass of party opinion, including the Cabinet, NVs, the Lords and the 
constituencies. This constituted the advice that Macmillan gave to the Queen, and was 
pivotal to the outcome. Thus, the traditional informal networks were now part of the 
formal selection procedure. The other informal networks in the party, such as those 
that linked the party hierarchy to the candidates before and during the selection, served 
to buttress the fonnal selection procedure. They served to pressure candidates into 
standing (in the case of Home), and persuading candidates of their poor chances of 
succession (in the case of Butler). No other senior figures were consulted by the 
Queen in 1963, a clear distinction from the party's previous selections. The 1963 
276 
selection signalled the move to formal leadership elections from 1965, and the 1957 
selection contributed to setting that trend in motion. 
In 1957 and 1963, the core criteria of acceptability, electability, and 
governability, were determined by the wider individual and situational criteria, in 
particular the situation, the candidates' actions, and the selection procedure. It is clear 
that acceptability is the most dominant of the core criteria in both, as the base criterion 
on which the candidates were judged. Party unity is central to both selections, but tl-ýs 
does not fully explain the outcomes. This explains the analysis of the individual and 
situational criteria which determined the outcomes. In 1957, Macmillan was more 
enthusiastically endorsed than Home was in 1963, while Home was generally 
acceptable. Butler's unacceptability to sections of the party in both 1957 and 1963, as 
determined by his conduct and actions during both selections, explains his failure. 
Electability and governability were of significance in the outcomes, but acceptability 
outweighed their importance. Tfiýs was because of the massive scale of disunity in the 
party at the time of both selections. 
This study has demonstrated the utility of the analytical framework devised and 
applied to explain the outcomes of both selections, and in particular the extensive 
analysis of the situations and circumstances, the candidates' actions, and the selection 
procedure. This is because they are of major significance in determining the outcomes 
of leadership selections. 
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